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“This book honors an outstanding scholar, but also makes a contribution of great 
scholarly and public policy value. It contains important discussions of issues at the 
forefront of a specialty that began as labor economics, became manpower policy, 
transformed into human resource economics, and is now often described as workforce 
development. Under any label, it is a subject at the heart of economic well-being, and 
the book is required reading for all who want to be up-to-date in the field.”
—Garth L. Mangum, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Utah
“The work presented here attests to the quality of the scholarship that Vernon Briggs 
inspires as a teacher and colleague and to the role he has come to play as a model of 
committed, passionate scholarship, even for those of us who often disagree with the 
policy changes he wants to introduce. It is a fitting tribute to a man who studies the 
world in order to change it and make it better and whose research has always come from 
the heart as well as the head.”
—Michael J. Piore, David W. Skinner Professor of Political Economy, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology
“The case for an active set of national human resource policies, as supported by Vernon 
Briggs over his professional life, is greater than at any time in the past 30 years. This 
book offers much research information and policy analysis that can be used to develop 
what is needed.”
—Andrew M. Sum, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Labor Market 
Studies, Northeastern University
“Vernon Briggs has long been a prolific and influential scholar advocating for 
progressive and humane labor market policies. This book does full justice to his career 
by including wide-ranging and useful essays on immigration, education, job training, 
disability policy, and workforce intermediaries. These chapters will be of interest to both 
researchers and policymakers as they consider how to rebuild labor market institutions 
in the face of the dramatic transformations that we have witnessed in recent years.”
—Paul Osterman, Nanyang Technological University Professor of Human Resources 
and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“With unemployment soaring, it is both pertinent and timely to introduce a new 
generation of economics students to Vernon Briggs’s grand vision of human resources 
as the source of value creation, stability, and growth. While Briggs’s contributions to 
the immigration policy debate remain controversial, they are clarified and challenged in 
this volume in ways that are useful in moving that vital conversation forward.”
—Eileen Appelbaum, Professor and Director of the Center for Women and Work, 
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
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Introduction
Charles J. Whalen
Utica College and Cornell University
A few weeks before the start of his senior year at the University of 
Maryland in September 1958, Vernon M. Briggs Jr. took an all-night 
drive to visit his college roommate’s home in Detroit, Michigan. Ar-
riving with his roommate in downtown Detroit at daybreak, Briggs 
saw “several blocks where the sidewalks were absolutely filled with 
people.” He recalls:
I couldn’t imagine what they were all doing standing there at this 
early hour. As we drove further, we came to the building that they 
were waiting to open. It was an office of the Michigan Employ-
ment Commission. The people were lined-up to register for unem-
ployment compensation. I’d never seen unemployed people face to 
face before. These were not statistics; they were human beings and 
they were all out of work (quoted in Rohe 2006, p. 228).
Briggs describes the moment as “a life-altering experience.” Re-
turning to College Park to complete his undergraduate program, Briggs 
made a decision to concentrate on labor economics. As he explained in 
an interview in 2006, “It is the one sub-field of economics that deals di-
rectly with people and their wellbeing” (quoted in Rohe 2006, p. 228).
Within a year, Briggs was back in Michigan. This time, he was a 
graduate student at Michigan State University in East Lansing. Senator 
John F. Kennedy came to Michigan State during the 1960 presidential 
campaign and delivered an inspirational speech from the steps of the 
Student Union Building. “I was there, probably not more than 30 feet 
from him,” Briggs recalls.
A short time later, President Kennedy called on Americans to serve 
their country—and public-service television advertisements suggested 
college teaching as one important avenue of service. “It may sound very 
idealistic today,” says Briggs, “but I decided to answer Kennedy’s chal-
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lenge by becoming a college teacher. I have never regretted it” (quoted 
in Rohe 2006, p. 230).
Today, Briggs is an Emeritus Professor of Industrial and Labor Re-
lations at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. He began his teaching 
career while still a graduate student at Michigan State and then moved 
on to full-time positions at The University of Texas at Austin (1964–
1978) and Cornell University (since 1978).1 In Austin, he received two 
coveted teaching awards, and there and at Cornell, Briggs shared with 
countless students his passion for human resource economics and pub-
lic policy.2
This book honors Briggs’s professional contributions. Most of the 
volume’s contributors, including this editor, first encountered Briggs in 
the classroom, either at Texas or Cornell. That is appropriate, of course, 
because despite his tremendous productivity as a scholar and extensive 
involvement as a policy analyst, he has always viewed himself as a 
teacher. Yet the book would be incomplete without contributions from 
his colleagues as well, and the pages that follow include one chapter 
by a university colleague who collaborated with Briggs on a number of 
labor economics projects and another by a professional associate spe-
cializing in immigration research.
ECONOMICS FOR THE REAL WORLD
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the development and contours of Briggs’s 
institutional labor economics. Before preparing Chapter 2, William P. 
Curington, who was inspired to become an economist by Briggs, turned 
the tables on his University of Texas professor and engaged Briggs in 
a series of interviews to explore his influences. The resulting chapter 
traces Briggs’s intellectual development from College Park to Ithaca. 
A number of important influences appear at each stop along the way, 
including Alan G. Gruchy, a major contributor to the institutionalist tra-
dition; Charles C. Killingsworth, who introduced Briggs (his teaching 
assistant) and the nation to structural unemployment in the early 1960s; 
and Ray Marshall, Briggs’s Texas colleague and research collaborator. 
Yet we discover that Briggs also learned from his students. Indeed, it 
Introduction   3
was his Mexican-American students that encouraged Briggs’s study of 
rural labor markets and U.S.–Mexico border issues, which led to his 
research focus on immigration policy.
Chapter 3—written by the editor, a student of Briggs at Cornell—
continues to highlight Briggs’s real-world economics. It traces and 
outlines Briggs’s conception of a policy-oriented, human resource eco-
nomics (HRE) that emerged in the United States and other industrial 
democracies just after World War II. This HRE received considerable 
attention from economists and national policymakers for about two 
decades, until its associated policies were put on the fiscal chopping 
block during the Reagan–Bush era—and then, due to federal deficit 
concerns, largely ignored during the Clinton era and beyond (Greider 
1981; Thomas 1997).
My chapter shows that, even when the political winds were solidly 
against him, Briggs continued to forcefully make the case for a revival 
of active human resource development initiatives. Briggs argued that 
the nation would likely “pay a high price” for its failure to support hu-
man resource development (Briggs 1987, p. 1218), and looking back at 
a decades-long trend of rising worker insecurity and inequality, it is dif-
ficult to disagree with him (Whalen 2008). Moreover, while the United 
States dragged its feet, China and a number of other nations sought to 
advance by securing their position as a “knowledge” economy (Grewal 
et al. 2002; Kao 2007, pp. 83–91).
At the time I am writing this introduction in early 2009, a new 
U.S. presidential administration is coming into office in the wake of a 
campaign that gave renewed attention to human resource development. 
Thus, there is some reason to be hopeful. Yet it remains to be seen 
whether President Barack Obama and his team will succeed at revital-
izing U.S. human resource policies.
IMMIGRATION POLICY
Chapters 4 through 7 are devoted, at least in part, to some aspect 
of immigration. Philip L. Martin, a distinguished scholar in the field of 
labor migration, opens the section with a broad examination of the di-
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mensions and impacts of contemporary international migration. Topics 
addressed include the factors contributing to immigration, government 
efforts to manage it, and trends in the international migration to the 
United States. Special attention is given to immigration’s labor-market 
effects and to policy trade-offs. As Martin indicates in the introduction 
to his essay, its topics “are among those that figure most prominently in 
Briggs’s policy-oriented writings.”
Larry Nackerud, another of Briggs’s students at Cornell, focuses 
on political refugee and asylee policy. Noting that Briggs wanted im-
migration policy to be driven by three considerations—economic 
accountability for each entry decision into the United States, neutral-
ity with respect to political ideology, and societal equity—Nackerud 
considers the extent to which this is possible. Nackerud is not as san-
guine as Briggs about the possibility, or even the desirability, of using 
these three considerations as a foundation for policy, but he offers a 
sympathetic assessment of the Briggs position and makes a number of 
constructive suggestions that advance the position by means of clarifi-
cation and extension.
Ernesto Cortés Jr. is the only contributor to the volume who has 
devoted himself entirely to the world of practice, rather than to a career 
in the academy. For most of the more than 40 years since he attended 
Briggs’s University of Texas classes, Cortés has worked to build com-
munity organizations, especially in the Southwestern United States. 
Still, as Cortés writes, Briggs’s insights echo in his work every day—
and Briggs’s economics has always been about moving beyond theory 
and into the realm of action and concrete problem solving.
Cortés addresses two subjects—training and immigration. In dis-
cussing training, Cortés explains that his organizations have relied on 
Briggs’s ideas and input when establishing labor-market training inter-
mediaries. In discussing immigration, Cortés outlines a policy stance 
that diverges from the one held by Briggs, yet he acknowledges that 
it still remains fully in the Briggs tradition, which gives special at-
tention to unintended consequences and issues of practical policy 
implementation.
Among the points made by Cortés is that immigration policy should 
be considered as part of a broader discussion that includes attention to 
international economic-development policies. This view is developed 
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further in Chapter 7 by James T. Peach. According to Peach, who was 
also a student of Briggs in Austin, traditional approaches to immigration 
should be augmented by policies that accelerate economic development 
within migrant-sending nations. Such policies would be not only com-
patible with the Briggs immigration strategy, but as Peach notes, also 
consistent with Briggs’s recommendations for over three decades.
LABOR MARKETS
Chapters 8 and 9 examine labor markets and worker well-being. 
Marta Tienda—who audited Briggs’s courses in Texas and co-edited 
a book with him in the 1980s—teams up with V. Joseph Hotz, Avner 
Ahituv, and Michelle Bellessa Frost to report on the labor-market expe-
rience of women in Chapter 8. 
Tienda and her colleagues study the education and employment pat-
terns of young black, white, and Hispanic women in the United States 
between the late 1970s and early 1990s. (At the start of the period ex-
amined, the women were aged 13–16, and at the end of the period, they 
were aged 28–31.) The chapter sheds light on how women’s invest-
ments in education and work experience—and their family formation 
choices—vary along racial and ethnic lines. It also considers the im-
plications of these differences for workforce behavior and adult wage 
inequality, as well as the sensitivity of young women’s labor-force deci-
sions to local labor-market conditions.
A notable finding of Tienda, Hotz, Ahituv, and Frost is that young 
women enjoyed a substantial wage return for acquiring college degrees 
but none for completing high school or obtaining its GED equivalent. 
As they note, this is consistent with numerous studies indicating ris-
ing returns on skill during the 1980s. That finding—and another that 
suggests life-cycle earnings are optimized by “maximizing formal 
schooling before acquiring work experience”—is also consistent with 
Briggs’s longstanding belief in the importance of human resource devel-
opment in an age of increasing technological complexity and economic 
internationalization.
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In Chapter 9, Seth D. Harris, a Briggs student from Cornell, focuses 
on the employment of people with disabilities after the enactment of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Harris suggests the im-
portance of human capital investments as well, but he also underscores 
another theme of Briggs’s writing and teaching: the persistence of dis-
crimination and the need for government regulation to ensure equal 
employment opportunity for all workers. By unmasking the faulty 
assumptions that have misdirected the debate over the economics of 
workplace disabilities accommodation, Harris seeks to get the debate 
back on the right track to include attention to matters such as educational 
opportunities and attainment, job discrimination, and the availability of 
employee health insurance.
PUBLIC POLICY
The book concludes with two chapters that look at broad and vital 
parts of the public policy terrain. In Chapter 10, Ray Marshall, Briggs’s 
Texas colleague and collaborator, focuses on the need to modernize the 
nation’s education and workforce-development policies and institutions. 
The discussion is based on his work with the bipartisan Commission on 
the Skills of the American Workforce in the late 1980s and the New 
Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce in the mid 2000s. 
Marshall calls for far-reaching, systemic changes in the nation’s learn-
ing systems in the face of what he describes as serious and growing 
economic difficulties that threaten the nation’s ability to restore broadly 
shared prosperity. His chapter underlines the important human resource 
problems and policies that Briggs has been discussing for decades and 
further confirms Briggs’s prediction that the country would pay a high 
price for inaction.
Robert W. Glover and Christopher T. King, who both studied 
with Briggs in Austin, bring the volume to a close in Chapter 11 by 
complementing Marshall’s contribution with an examination of exist-
ing labor-market policies and a discussion of the new policies that are 
required to address the current situation. Like Briggs and Marshall, 
Glover and King stress the need to rethink U.S. labor-market policy for 
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a global economy. They focus on a new direction for such policy, one 
involving sectoral approaches that connect workforce- and economic-
development strategies at the regional level.
PEOPLE AND THEIR WELL-BEING
It has been just over a half-century since Vernon Briggs’s life-altering 
experience in downtown Detroit. In the intervening years, he has in turn 
altered the lives of many others and, by example, has even encouraged 
some to follow his footsteps into a career of service through college-
level teaching. Economics is often criticized for being overly abstract 
and out of touch with the real world, but as long as there are labor 
economists drawn to the profession by Briggs and others like him, there 
will always be at least one sub-field that “deals directly with people and 
their well-being.”
Notes
1. Briggs also taught at Michigan State University (as a visiting associate profes-
sor) in the summer of 1969 and at the John F. Kennedy School of Government 
at Harvard University (in the Institute for Employment and Training) during the 
summers from 1972 to 1981 (Briggs 2008).
2. Briggs won a teaching excellence award from the University of Texas student 
yearbook in 1971 and another from the university’s College of Arts and Sciences 
and the Ex-Students Association in 1974 (Briggs 2008). Consistent with his mod-
est nature, Briggs never mentioned these awards (or having been elected student 
government president as a senior at the University of Maryland) during extensive 
interviews with William P. Curington as part of this book project. It should also be 
noted there is really no need to add “and public policy” when discussing human 
resource economics from Briggs’s vantage point; as I discuss later in this volume, 
public policy is an inherent part of his human resource economics.
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Vernon Briggs:
Real-World Labor Economist
William P. Curington
University of Arkansas
Vernon Briggs stepped into a wastebasket and launched my career 
as a labor economist. In the spring of 1969, I was sleepwalking through 
the undergraduate economics program at the University of Texas and 
sitting in Dr. Briggs’s labor economics class. He was vigorously mak-
ing a point when his misstep off the small classroom stage produced a 
roar of laughter but did not break his train of thought. He woke me up; 
I thought, “Man, I want to be as passionate about my life’s work as this 
guy.”1
When I earned an “A” in the course, not the dominant grade on 
my transcript at that time, Briggs sent a letter congratulating me and 
inviting me to visit during his office hours. This is the only such letter 
I ever have received in my academic career. When I did visit the next 
semester, conversations led to discussion of the graduate program at 
Michigan State University’s School of Labor and Industrial Relations, 
and I was on my way.
My story is not unique. Briggs was an important influence on many 
students. Therefore, it seems appropriate to begin this chapter’s discus-
sion of his career by turning the clock back a bit and focusing on the 
people who had a significant influence on him. It was with this intent 
that I initiated a series of conversations with him in May 2007. We 
started with a discussion of his years as a student at the University of 
Maryland and Michigan State University, and then we focused on his 
work as a faculty member at the University of Texas and Cornell Uni-
versity. This chapter is based on those discussions (Curington 2007).
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MARYLAND AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Briggs was born in 1937 in Washington, D.C., and grew up in the 
Washington suburbs of Silver Spring and Bethesda, Maryland. After high 
school, he enrolled in the College of Business and Public Administra-
tion at the University of Maryland, from which he received a bachelor’s 
degree in economics in 1959. Asked to reflect on his undergraduate ex-
perience, Briggs focused on two economics professors whom he found 
“extremely influential,” Dudley Dillard and Alan Gruchy.2
Dillard, who was chairman of the university’s economics de-
partment at the time, taught Briggs’s first economics course. It was a 
yearlong, first-year course on European and United States economic 
history. The course emphasized the rise of the market system and a his-
torical perspective on the role of government, business, and labor.
Dillard’s course indicated the importance of history as a part of 
the field of economics. “In many ways, economics should be guided 
by what historically has happened and does happen, not by what is 
theoretically supposed to happen,” says Briggs, drawing on Dillard’s 
core message. “Since then, I have always thought that the proper way 
to study economics is to take a year of economic history during your 
beginning year. Dillard was an enormous influence on my view that 
economics and history are linked.”
Even more influential than Dillard was Alan Gruchy, with whom 
Briggs had three courses. Gruchy was an institutional economist, who 
introduced Briggs to “a great perspective” rarely found in economics 
departments these days. “The vital role that institutions play has al-
most been factored out of the equation in most economics courses—as 
has economic history.” In Gruchy’s “Comparative Economic Systems” 
course, Briggs was introduced to “a critical analysis of neoclassical, 
mainstream economics as well as of socialist and communist systems 
of economic organization.”
In Gruchy’s “Modern Economic Thought” course, Briggs was ex-
posed to the institutionalist writings of Thorstein B. Veblen, John R. 
Commons, John M. Clark, Wesley C. Mitchell, Rexford G. Tugwell, 
John Kenneth Galbraith, and Clarence E. Ayres, all of whom were criti-
cal of mainstream economics due to “its predilection for theoretical, 
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abstract reasoning rather than dealing with real policy issues.” The in-
stitutionalist perspective made an indelible impression on Briggs. “My 
career has been all about trying to apply economics to real issues and 
trying to deal with public policy responses.”
In Gruchy’s “National Economic Planning” course, Briggs stud-
ied the type of planning found in the Scandinavian market economies. 
“You can have free, civilized societies in which there is planning that 
sets priorities for an economy to achieve,” says Briggs. “When you seek 
to set priorities, you really are planning. This perspective influences my 
thinking to this day.”
In short, Dillard’s course pointed Briggs in the direction of econom-
ics, while Gruchy’s masterful teaching “locked in” his decision to major 
in the field. In the early 1990s, Briggs was asked to speak at memorial 
services for both professors. The remarks demonstrate the long-lasting 
influence of these two undergraduate influences (Briggs 1990, 1993). 
Reflecting on Gruchy, for example, Briggs wrote: “It was the power of 
his ideas, the breadth of his knowledge, and the manner of his delivery 
that held us in his sway—then and since” (Briggs 1990, p. 9).
MICHIGAN STATE AND LABOR ECONOMICS
Briggs became interested in labor economics after seeing thousands 
of unemployed people on a 1958 trip to his college roommate’s home-
town of Detroit, Michigan. They filled the sidewalk for several blocks 
in a wait to register for unemployment compensation. “Of all the areas 
of economics, I thought that labor issues were the most important be-
cause labor economics was the one area that most directly involved the 
welfare of human beings.”
Dillard advised studying in Michigan, which would allow the chance 
to study near an industrial environment. “I had never been around big 
factories or unions or anything like that, so I applied to Michigan State 
University (MSU).” Briggs believes Dillard gave him excellent advice. 
“Part of the process of becoming a scholar is more than mastery of a 
technique and theory. It’s beginning to have some genuine feeling for 
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the subject matter . . . I was able to begin to understand how big busi-
ness, big labor, and big government functioned.”
At MSU, Briggs had an “outstanding” doctoral committee. Charles 
Killingsworth, a professor of both economics and labor and industrial 
relations, served as the committee’s chair. The other members were 
John Henderson, Abba Lerner, and Walter Adams. Henderson taught 
the history of economic thought, which Briggs sees as an essential area 
of study because it provides “the intellectual foundation” for the entire 
field. Lerner, a student of John Maynard Keynes and one of the great 
macroeconomists of the twentieth century, taught economic theory. 
Adams, “one of the most inspiring teachers you could ever imagine,” 
taught industrial organization.
Briggs recalls that Lerner was “world-class” as both a theoretician 
and a professor. Lerner’s classes were not a battleground for disputes 
between various schools of thought over the way the world actually 
operates. Instead, he offered philosophy-oriented courses that probed 
economic principles and assumptions. “All of his courses were like 
that—about a theoretical world of markets, economic decisions, and 
resource allocation. I had four wonderful graduate courses with him in 
macro- and microeconomics.”
Adams coordinated the graduate program while Briggs was at MSU. 
He used the Socratic form of teaching, which gave him a reputation for 
being “rough and tough in class,” but he also had a gentle heart. “The 
students could always tell he had our well-being first in mind.”3
In addition to majoring in economics, Briggs had a minor field 
in twentieth century U.S. history with Madison Kuhn from the MSU 
history department. “I don’t think economics doctoral students have 
a minor field anymore or, if they do, it would probably be in statistics 
or mathematics.”4 Consistent with the perspective he acquired as an 
undergraduate, Briggs explains his decision to study history as follows: 
“History is a check on theory in that it gives you real data and real 
events to try to explain . . . You deal with what actually happens when 
you have wars, plagues, oil boycotts, strikes, and all the kind of things 
that make studying economics so important and interesting to me.”
It was a combination of Briggs’s interest in public policy and some 
good fortune that led to Killingsworth becoming the chair of his dis-
sertation committee. In the 1962–1963 academic year, when Briggs 
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was scheduled to take his doctoral exams and select his thesis topic, 
he was assigned to serve as Killingsworth’s grading assistant. “That 
was probably the only time in his career that Killingsworth taught the 
economics department’s introductory labor course for the whole year,” 
says Briggs. “It was taught in a large lecture format of around 300 stu-
dents in each of the fall, winter, and spring quarters.” Briggs was the 
class’s only graduate assistant.
Briggs recalls that Killingsworth’s course was a blur between labor 
economics and industrial relations, which is the way all labor courses 
used to be taught in economics departments. “You were expected to 
know not just microeconomic theory pertaining to labor markets but 
also labor history, labor law, collective bargaining, and all of the institu-
tional applications of public policy to the labor market.”
The timing of the assignment to Killingsworth’s course was fortu-
nate because it came in the same year that the structural unemployment 
issue exploded onto the national agenda. The administration of President 
John F. Kennedy had proposed tax cuts to stimulate demand. Republi-
can legislators vigorously opposed the cuts because they believed the 
result would be an unbalanced budget.5 Killingsworth was the leading 
critic of the administration’s tax-cut proposals from the left—not be-
cause he thought they could be harmful, just that they “were likely to 
be insufficient.”
Killingsworth’s criticism of the tax cuts stemmed from a concern 
over the effects of structural economic change associated with the com-
ing of the computer, which he saw as having the potential to cause 
revolutionary labor-market changes. He argued that coping with such a 
major impact on labor markets would require policies to help the supply 
of labor adjust to the coming shift in demand for labor. The structural 
change that Killingsworth anticipated involved the demand for a more 
highly skilled and educated workforce, combined with fewer opportu-
nities for unskilled, poorly educated workers.
In those days, “there were probably only 100 computers in the 
entire United States” and few students had even seen one.6 Neverthe-
less, Killingsworth insisted that education, training, labor mobility, and 
antidiscrimination policies were crucial to dealing with the coming 
structural shift. “He was a ‘real’ supply-side economist,” says Briggs.
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Shortly after President Kennedy’s assassination, the nation got both 
the tax cuts and employment policies. The latter—called manpower 
programs—were enacted as part of Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Pov-
erty.” There was also federal aid to education, including the Elementary 
and Secondary School Act and the Higher Education Act. This federal 
involvement in education is often taken for granted today, “but these 
were enormous issues in the 1960s because there was no precedent for 
them.”
In the midst of this major policy controversy, Briggs became well 
acquainted with Killingsworth and acquired valuable teaching experi-
ence. Regarding Killingsworth, Briggs recalls:
The class was way down on the southern part of the campus, so I 
would meet him at the classroom before class and then he’d drive 
me back to the economics department after class. That gave us a 
chance to talk before and after class three times a week. It was an 
opportunity few graduate students have with their professor. So I 
got to know him quite well.
This relationship led to Killingsworth’s supervision of Briggs’s disser-
tation and provided the foundation for Briggs’s teaching career:
Over the course of the year, he had to miss several classes to testify 
or give advice to policymakers in Washington. On these occasions 
he would let me do the teaching. That’s how I got started teach-
ing a junior-senior-level labor economics course that incorporated 
many of Killingsworth’s ideas. I would have to write the substitute 
lectures, but I knew what he wanted to be said.
Looking back, Briggs considers Killingsworth “a brilliant master of 
the issues of those changing times.” Briggs explains:
I think everyone now recognizes how the structure of the economy 
has changed so dramatically. The structural shift has been toward 
mounting employment in the service sector and a rapid decline in 
manufacturing and mining employment…Killingsworth was one 
of the first to predict this massive shift in the economy and to pro-
pose policy remedies. He was light years ahead of the profession, 
and I don’t think he’s ever gotten the credit that he deserves. He 
took a lot of criticism in those days, but by the 1970s, most people 
began to realize that he was right.
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In time, economists, policymakers, and the public began to recognize 
“the importance of human resource policies as a necessary part of the 
nation’s arsenal of economic policies.”
Killingsworth’s influence stuck with Briggs throughout his career. 
One stream of influence leads into the classroom: “Over the years, my 
students have heard a lot of Killingsworth’s ideas, and they probably gave 
me a lot of the credit for things I learned from him firsthand.” Another 
channel leads to professional service, especially Briggs’s involvement 
in the National Council on Employment Policy. Killingsworth was an 
early member, along with labor economists such as George P. Shultz, 
John T. Dunlop, Ray Marshall, Juanita Kreps, and Eli Ginzberg. Briggs 
became an associate member of the Council in the late 1960s, along 
other young economists, including Michael Piore, Peter Doeringer, and 
Orley Ashenfelter. He became a full member of the Council in 1977 and 
served as chair of the organization from 1985 to 1987.
Despite Killingsworth’s impact on Briggs’s thinking, Briggs’s dis-
sertation did not deal with structural unemployment. “It was a study of 
strike subsidies, which was a straight collective bargaining issue at the 
time.”7 The human resource economics that Killingsworth was teaching 
his undergraduates was so new that it had not yet been incorporated into 
the graduate labor courses. Briggs’s doctoral thesis led to his first two 
academic articles, one on an employers’ mutual aid pact in the airline 
industry and the other on the railroad industry’s “strike insurance plan” 
(Briggs 1965, 1967).
TEXAS AND LABOR-MARKET STUDIES
Briggs began his first full-time teaching job, with the University of 
Texas, at the start of the 1964–1965 academic year.8 The Texas depart-
ment chair, Carey Thompson, was looking for someone in the labor 
area because Ray Marshall, the only labor economist at Texas at the 
time, was going on a two-year leave of absence. Thompson contacted 
Briggs on the recommendation of Roger Bowlby, who studied econom-
ics in Austin and taught labor law at MSU. Although there were other 
candidates, Briggs believes he was chosen in part because he had “in-
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stitutionalist training going back to Maryland.” He adds: “Texas was an 
institutionalist department at the time, a real center of it. Clarence Ayres 
[one of the nation’s leading institutionalists] was still actively teaching 
in the department.”
In each semester during his first year at Texas, Briggs taught a labor 
course, a principles course, and an intermediate micro-theory course. 
He was assigned the intermediate microeconomics course because he 
had studied with Lerner, who was widely considered “one of the great 
gods of economic theory.” In the spring of 1965, he began to teach a 
course called “Manpower Economics and Public Policy”—one of the 
earliest courses in the nation on human resource economics. It was, of 
course, “what Killingsworth was working on all these years. I was con-
tinuing his tradition with this course,” Briggs explains.
“Manpower Economics and Public Policy” examined the impor-
tance of the “employability” of the nation’s labor force. Topics included 
education, training, labor mobility, labor-market information, and anti-
discrimination policies: “All the things which were now becoming so 
prominent a part of President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ pro-
gram—and I was right in Lyndon Johnson’s backyard,” says Briggs. “It 
was an exciting time.”
When Marshall returned to Austin, Briggs collaborated with him on 
a variety of labor-market projects. “Ray Marshall was one of the great 
influences on me . . . And he and I made a wonderful team. We wrote 
several books and articles together.”9
Their first project involved developing a national apprenticeship 
outreach program. Apprenticeship—which combines classroom in-
struction and hands-on experience—seemed like the ideal form of 
training for skilled labor, and yet it was an exclusionary system. “It 
was an enormous civil rights issue. The labor movement had supported 
the Civil Rights bill, but most craft unions were simply closed to black 
members,” says Briggs. With a U.S. Department of Labor grant, he and 
Marshall showed how the apprenticeship system could be retained in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.10
The key was reaching out to find people who could meet an ap-
prenticeship program’s qualifications but who had no idea that these job 
opportunities were available. “Simply saying ‘we don’t discriminate 
anymore’ wasn’t going to cut it,” Briggs explains. He adds: “Bobby 
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Kennedy, who was a senator at the time, praised the study as the most 
worthwhile study he’d ever seen from academia, dealing with a real 
problem and coming up with a real solution.” In the end, the labor 
movement endorsed the program and the federal government financed 
its operation nationwide.
Briggs and Marshall then worked on studies of African-American 
employment in the South. One project looked at the labor market in 
Houston, Texas. “Houston had a very tight labor market at the time, 
but there was no improvement in the economic status of black Ameri-
cans,” Briggs recalls. His conclusion was that tight labor markets alone 
would not change racial patterns of employment or eradicate job dis-
crimination. Policy intervention was essential: “Not only to see to it 
that antidiscrimination policies were enforced, but also to deal with the 
fact that many blacks needed to have the educational skills that un-
equal schools and traditions of discrimination had denied them for over 
a century.” This research caused the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to convene public hearings in Houston in June 1970, and 
the testimony reinforced the findings and conclusions of Marshall and 
Briggs.11
Briggs was soon teaching undergraduates, graduate students, and 
union members on a regular basis. “Labor unions often needed speak-
ers to come in to do training sessions. Well, it was either Ray or me, or 
both of us . . . Quite often they wanted Ray, but he was so busy that he 
started sending me—some people even began to think I was Ray. They 
would write an invitation letter to him and I’d show up.” Despite the 
heavy demands on his time, Briggs considers the work with unionists 
a valuable experience: “I was actually seeing people who were doing 
negotiating, being involved with arbitration, and dealing with labor law 
and the rest of the things you just talk about in the classroom.”
At the same time, Briggs’s students encouraged him to study the 
South’s rural labor markets. He recalls:
In those early years at Texas, when I was working on this appren-
ticeship study, a number of Chicano students I had in class were 
asking why I didn’t talk about issues of Texas and Mexican Ameri-
cans. And of course, I didn’t know anything about either . . . Sev-
eral of these Chicano students were instrumental in introducing me 
to Cesar Chavez when he came through Texas on his way down to 
organize farm workers in the spring and summer of 1966 . . . My 
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students were instrumental in getting me involved with the Farm 
Workers’ Assistance Committee that year.12
The 1966 struggle centered on an organizational strike at La Casita 
Farms in rural Starr County, located on the Mexico border. The Assis-
tance Committee gathered money or food in Austin during the week, 
and then on the weekends someone would drive it down to the Rio 
Grande Valley. “One day it came my turn to drive the food down and 
to spend the weekend in Starr County . . . On a Saturday morning, I 
went to the border, and I saw buses picking up strikebreakers, driving 
them to La Casita Farms and then taking them right through the picket 
lines. I knew immediately that the strike was lost,” Briggs recalls.13 
The experience impressed upon him the need “to learn about the border 
and influence of the border on the labor supply of South Texas.” Upon 
returning home, Briggs began to include immigration and border issues 
in his manpower course.
In the early 1970s, Briggs participated in a three-year study of the 
Starr County labor market as part of a rural labor-markets consortium 
project with three other southern universities. He found that the rural 
labor supply was in constant surplus, largely due to border commut-
ers and immigration, which prevented most wages from rising beyond 
the legal minimum. In fact, says Briggs, “Even with these low wage 
levels, there was a lot of corruption by employers demanding wage 
kickbacks if you wanted to get a job. If they paid the minimum wage, 
they expected people to kick back 20 cents an hour as a reward for be-
ing hired.” His University of Texas work on this subject culminated in 
a 1977 book, The Chicano Worker, coauthored with two professors at 
UCLA, Fred Schmidt and Walter Fogel. It was one of the first books to 
address the topic (Briggs, Fogel, and Schmidt 1977).
The Chicano Worker represents a beginning as well as an ending. 
“My interest in immigration started with this work, and the issue has 
become the dominant concern of my work in the last couple of de-
cades,” Briggs observes. “I gradually got more and more interested in 
immigration primarily because of my interest in the economic status 
of Chicanos and in trying to understand why it didn’t seem to make 
any difference whether most of them had any education or training or 
not.” For those not attending college, it did not matter whether they 
completed high school or dropped out; their wage would still be at just 
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about the legal minimum. “The whole human capital model was being 
refuted because you couldn’t prove that there was any real reward to 
education or training for most of this rural workforce.”14
CORNELL AND IMMIGRATION POLICY
Briggs moved to Cornell University’s New York State School of In-
dustrial and Labor Relations in time to begin the fall semester of 1978. 
It was not easy to leave Austin, and he still misses Texas. There were, 
however, some frustrations and attractions that contributed to the deci-
sion to move northward.
One frustration was an ongoing conflict that the Texas faculty and 
students had with Frank Erwin, chairman of the university’s Board of 
Regents. Erwin “constantly harangued the faculty” and broke up the 
College of Arts and Sciences in 1970, leading to the departure of John 
Silber, who had been dean of the College, and many prominent faculty 
members. “There were also constant confrontations between the stu-
dents and the Regents over a large range of issues,” Briggs recalls.
Even more important were the attractions associated with Cornell. 
The flagship institution in labor and industrial relations had invited him 
to teach the human resource economics course he pioneered at Texas, 
provided him access to outstanding research facilities, and offered him 
an opportunity to teach elective courses such as immigration policy. “I 
probably never would have gotten the chance to teach a course in im-
migration at Texas” because the department was spread so thin. In fact, 
when the Cornell offer came, Ray Marshall was serving in Washington, 
D.C., as Secretary of Labor in the Carter administration. “I envisioned 
that he wasn’t coming back for eight years . . . So, when the Cornell 
offer came I thought maybe I should take the chance and go.” Looking 
back, he concludes the decision was a good one; “I’ve had a wonderful 
career at Cornell.”
For a number of years, Briggs continued to address human resource 
issues such as youth employment, apprenticeship, and public-service 
employment, but his research gradually shifted to a focus almost ex-
clusively on immigration. “Immigration is one of those fields that you 
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can never learn enough about,” he explains. “It’s so complicated with 
illegal immigration, legal immigration, refugees, asylum seekers, bor-
der commuters, non-immigrant temporary workers, and the list goes 
on.” While human resource economics remained the mainstay of his 
teaching, Briggs added a course called “Immigration and the American 
Labor Force” to his regular course offerings starting in 1981.
Briggs became an emeritus professor at Cornell in 2006, but he 
continues to follow and write about U.S. immigration policy debates. 
Indeed, he believes the topic is perhaps more important than ever. 
Briggs explained:
Immigration has an enormous influence on the labor force in the 
United States, and it’s got an enormous influence on the nation’s 
future in a sense that now we’re not getting much growth from de-
mography anymore. The “baby boom” generation is heading into 
retirement and the movement of women into the labor market is 
probably not going to go up much more. So the major source of 
growth of the labor force is going to be from immigration.
Looking at immigration reform bills on the horizon in 2007, Briggs 
was concerned that low-wage workers would be adversely affected by 
the proposed legislation:
We have about a third to a half of the growth of the labor force 
right now coming from immigration—and the percentage is going 
to go up enormously should any of the pending immigration re-
form bills pass, with all the amnesties and the family reunification 
that will ensue. There will be an enormous growth in size of the 
labor force, and most of the new entrants are going to be poorly ed-
ucated, poorly skilled, and non-English speaking job seekers. This 
is going to be a nightmare for public policy to deal with should this 
legislation pass.
Briggs wants an immigration policy “that’s consistent and congru-
ent with the national interests.” That means decisions would be driven 
by employment-based considerations—labor-market needs and immi-
grant skills—rather than the recent emphasis on family unification. And 
he is “not very optimistic” that Congress will move in this direction. 
Briggs believes that immigration policy and immigration reform efforts 
are so heavily shaped by political expedience that there’s little chance 
for much progress in low-wage markets. “The policy is being formed 
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by special interests seeking cheap labor or trying to get immigration or 
amnesty priority for their particular groups.”15
LEGACY OF TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP
Since Briggs is quite modest, I knew he would be reluctant to say 
much about his legacy. Still, Briggs mentioned two areas where he 
hopes he has been successful. One is in the realm of university teaching. 
Recalling Dillard, Gruchy, Killingsworth, Lerner, Marshall, Grubbs, 
and the other professors and colleagues that influenced his own think-
ing, Briggs said he hopes his legacy as a teacher would be “first and 
foremost.” His primary aim, Briggs says, has been “to stimulate minds 
like the people who stimulated mine when I was a student . . . [and] to 
inspire others as I was inspired.”
The other area he mentioned is that of applied research. “I hope I 
have mastered my subject matter and done my research in a way that is 
not just for the advancement of my own career, but also for the advance-
ment public policy,” Briggs says. He adds:
I’ve always tried to select subjects that were important to the pub-
lic and to the nation. For me, that’s what economics is about. It’s 
an operational field that should be dealing with the real world and 
real world issues, and coming up with public policies that can be 
actually implemented. I have sought to address public policies that 
have an influence on the nation’s welfare.
True to form, however, Briggs concluded that his ability to suc-
ceed as a teacher and real-world labor economist would be for others 
to judge. Well, let there be no mistake: as a former student and fellow 
economist, I can report that Vernon Briggs has not merely succeeded; 
he has also set a high bar for those he inspired.16
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Notes
1. While I am most comfortable addressing him as Dr. Briggs (during the course of 
this project, I have had to force myself to call him Vernon), subsequent references 
to Vernon Briggs in this chapter yield to the conventions of academic writing and 
refer to him as Briggs. I would like to thank Dr. Briggs for helpful comments and 
edits of the interview transcript, the Sam M. Walton College of Business for finan-
cial support, and Charles Whalen for the opportunity to participate in this volume. 
Any remaining errors are my own. A copy of the full transcript has been deposited 
in the Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, located 
at the Martin P. Catherwood Library, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes in this chapter are Briggs’s remarks in re-
sponse to the interview conducted by this author in May 2007 (Curington 2007).
3. The affection MSU economics graduate students had for Adams was particularly 
evident when he took a leave of absence to serve in the administration of President 
John F. Kennedy. “We were petrified when he went to Washington in January 
1961,” says Briggs, who also recalls that upon his return, Adams said, “The duty 
of a professor is to profess in the classroom.” Since Briggs holds the same view, it 
is not surprising that he and Adams became great friends over the later years.
4. “We had to have the statistics courses in those days too,” Briggs adds. “Economet-
rics was not an independent field of study as it has become today. You had to take 
statistics courses as part of your doctoral program, but they weren’t considered to 
be a field . . . I had to take four courses in statistics taught by the statistics depart-
ment, not the economics department.” In addition to statistics and a field outside 
economics, Briggs’s doctoral degree required four fields within economics (his 
were economic theory, labor economics, industrial organization, and the history of 
economic thought) and two foreign languages (his were Spanish and German).
5. Reflecting on the Republican opposition to Kennedy’s proposal, Briggs says, “It 
is ironic that every Republican since Ronald Reagan has based their rationale for 
cutting taxes to stimulate the economy on the Kennedy experience.” (Of course, 
the Kennedy tax cuts were enacted three months after his death.)
6. The computer at MSU, constructed in 1956, “occupied a 25 foot by 30 foot room 
on the fifth floor of the Electrical Engineering Building” (Ball 2006).
7. The strike subsidy was a defensive device that companies used in strike-prone 
sectors of the economy, such as the airline, railroad, and newspaper industries. 
The tendency was for unions to strike one employer and then use the settlement 
as a “whipsaw” to get the same benefits from the industry’s other companies. In 
response, companies devised agreements that provided assistance to the company 
that was shut down.
8. Briggs defended his dissertation in 1965.
9. Regarding Ray Marshall’s influence on his thinking, Briggs says:
He was a true pioneer in the study of the economics of discrimination and 
a real critic of Gary Becker’s theoretical propositions. Ray dealt with dis-
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crimination as it was—noting that it is often institutionalized and covert 
in its manifestations. It often involves the lack of the opportunity to be 
prepared for jobs and the lack of information and all the rest of the really 
hardcore issues that Becker’s thesis ignores. Becker’s thesis is a pretty 
narrow definition of discrimination: only if people are equally productive 
but paid differently can there be discrimination. It is more a theory of 
wages than a theory of discrimination.
10. On the decision of Briggs and Marshall to address labor-market discrimination, 
Briggs says, “One thing we both had in common was an understanding of segrega-
tion, discrimination, and the South. He was from Mississippi . . . I grew up in the 
suburbs of Washington, D.C., when it was a totally segregated city as were all the 
public institutions in Maryland . . . We knew first-hand how terrible and cruel that 
was, how unfair it was.”
11. In addition to Marshall, the other “enormous influence” on Briggs while at Texas 
was his economics-department colleague, Cliff (Clifton M.) Grubbs. Although 
Grubbs was hired to teach mathematical economics, he was mainly interested 
in how the economy of the West developed and how the United States had be-
come such a technologically advanced society. As a result, Briggs had lengthy 
discussions with Grubbs that “fed right into the Killingsworth emphasis on com-
puters and technology as guiding forces affecting the labor market.” Grubbs was 
an outstanding teacher; after winning the highest teaching honors in Austin, he 
eventually received the Danforth prize, awarded to the finest college teacher in 
the nation. “He was a great inspiration to me about the importance of teaching and 
the importance of science and technology on the development of the American 
economy . . . Our families bought some land together in Colorado. We spent many 
summer evenings discussing issues from [his] reading lists.” For remarks deliv-
ered at Grubbs’s memorial service, see Briggs (1995).
12. Briggs adds that Chicano, not Hispanic or Mexican American, “was the preferred 
term at the time.”
13. The strikebreakers lived in Mexico but were permanent resident aliens. They 
had “green cards” that permitted them to work in the United States. Briggs adds, 
“Technically, it is illegal to do this, but laws do not enforce themselves.”
14. Briggs adds that the Kerner Commission (the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders) found that many African Americans had a similar labor-market 
experience in the nation’s urban centers: “For those who didn’t go on to college, 
it really didn’t make any difference whether they stayed in high school or dropped 
out of school.”
15. For Briggs, “It is very unfortunate that the recommendations of the Commission 
on Immigration Reform have never been followed.” He explains:
Barbara Jordan, who I got to know through my work in Houston back in 
the late 1960s when she was a Senator in the Texas legislature, chaired 
the commission in the 1990s. I testified before them several times and 
their recommendations are consistent with my views . . . However, today 
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you have massive immigration without any regard for the human capital 
endowments of the entrants.
16. For additional personal reflections on Briggs’s influences and academic contribu-
tions, see Rohe (2006).
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The Human Resource  
Economics of Vernon Briggs
Charles J. Whalen
Utica College and Cornell University
According to a Cornell University Web site, Vernon M. Briggs Jr. 
came to that university’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations in 
1978 “as a professor who specializes in human resource economics and 
public policy” (Cornell University 2009). In fact, Briggs’s research and 
teaching helped establish that specialty, which I will simply refer to as 
human resource economics (HRE) in recognition of the fact that public 
policy is already inherent in Briggs’s conception of those words. HRE 
resides at the intersection of the academic fields of economics, indus-
trial relations, and public affairs.
This chapter traces and explores Briggs’s conception of HRE. It 
probes the history of economic thought for the intellectual roots of this 
area of specialization. It examines how HRE emerged to address the 
issues of economic growth, stabilization, and efficiency, and to con-
tribute to the public discourse on matters of social equity, economic 
opportunity, and government regulation. It explains the clash between 
human capital theory and HRE. And it outlines Briggs’s five dimen-
sions of human resource development (HRD), which is his term for 
HRE that manifests itself in public policy; although Briggs developed 
his conceptualization decades ago, each dimension continues to warrant 
our attention.
I base the chapter largely on a combination of Briggs’s writings 
(especially Briggs 1987a,b, 1996), biographical interviews (Curington 
2007; Rohe 2006), and my notes to his fall 1980 course, “Public Policy 
and the Development of Human Resources” (later renamed “Human 
Resource Economics and Public Policy”) (Briggs 1980).1 However, my 
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essay is also colored by countless opportunities to read his works, listen 
to him lecture, or talk with him informally over nearly 30 years.
SMITH, MARX, AND COMMONS
Briggs sees HRE as a policy-oriented field that considers human 
resources as a key—indeed, as the key—to economic progress and per-
sonal development. Adam Smith recognized that worker “skill, dexterity 
and judgment” is at the heart of the wealth of nations (Smith 1935, p. 
lvii). In fact, a labor theory of value is a cornerstone in the writings of 
classical economists from Smith to Karl Marx. Nevertheless, Briggs 
argues that HRE is a product of conditions found in post–World War II 
advanced industrial democracies.
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations came close to establishing 
HRE. According to Robert Heilbroner, “To see that labor, not nature, was 
the source of ‘value’ was one of Smith’s greatest insights” (Heilbroner 
1986, p. 49). Smith was even a pioneer in recognizing the harmful ef-
fects of routine work upon labor: “[T]he understandings of the greater 
part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The 
man whose life is spent performing a few simple operations . . . general-
ly becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature 
to become” (Smith 1935, p. 734). Smith’s solution? Public education, 
which would help counteract those effects (Smith 1935, pp. 734–738).
Yet Smith veered sharply away from Briggs’s HRE by stressing the 
self-regulating nature of markets. Smith argued that self-interested indi-
viduals, engaging in market transactions, are led “by an invisible hand” 
to promote the interests of society as a whole (Smith 1935, p. 423). The 
result of that emphasis, intended or not, was an economic science that 
saw very little room for government intervention in economic life.
Marx also waded into territory that might have led to HRE, but 
taking a different turn than Smith, he concluded that “the proletarian-
ization of the work force” would inevitably result in “a new socialist 
society” (Briggs 1987b, pp. 1208–1209). Briggs was not persuaded to 
follow Marx down that path. In the first chapter of the main textbook 
used in Briggs’s fall 1980 course, “Public Policy and the Development 
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of Human Resources,” Garth L. Mangum writes, “Those who criticize 
American capitalism suggest no better alternative” (Mangum 1976, 
p. 27). Briggs was open to learning from other advanced industrial-
ized nations, especially those in Western Europe (Briggs 1987a, p. 8; 
1987b), but he definitely shared Mangum’s preference for capitalism 
over socialism.
Looking for a “third way” between Smith and Marx, Briggs saw a 
foundation for HRE in the institutional economics of John R. Commons. 
It is from Commons’s “Wisconsin School” brand of institutionalism 
that Briggs’s HRE gets its reformist bent. Rejecting centralized plan-
ning, institutionalism seeks “pragmatic ways to address the inevitable 
human adjustment problems associated with the advances of industrial-
ization.” The aim is practical problem solving, “designed to achieve a 
‘reasonable’ and harmonious society” (Briggs 1987b, p. 1209).
Institutionalism is sometimes called evolutionary economics. This 
is because institutionalists recognize that societal institutions are always 
in an “evolving” state. Thus, any economics based on an institutionalist 
foundation must aim to deal with changing circumstances in a dynamic 
setting (Briggs 2007). Moreover, evolutionary economists must accept 
that such changes place certain limitations on their work: Briggs ap-
provingly quotes Edwin Witte—a student and colleague of Commons 
at the University of Wisconsin—who notes that, in dealing with public- 
policy questions, the institutionalists “seek not universal laws, but solu-
tions applicable to a particular time, place and situation” (Briggs 1996, 
p. 373).
Although Commons provided HRE with an intellectual ground-
ing, Briggs argues that economists did not begin to treat national public 
policies in this realm as a coherent and unified whole until the 1960s. In 
the opening paragraph to a 1987 article on HRD, Briggs writes, “One 
of the most insightful explanations for economic progress in industrial-
ized nations during the last half of the twentieth century has been the 
recognition of ‘human resources as the wealth of nations.’” He contin-
ues: “The notion has long enjoyed rhetorical appeal by politicians in 
democratic societies. But awareness that the principle has enormous 
implications for national and international well-being has essentially 
been a post–World War II phenomenon.” In particular, Briggs main-
tains it was only then that many economists and policymakers began 
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to realize that HRD could play a central role in “efforts to address such 
difficult issues as efficiency, equity, stabilization, and growth” (Briggs 
1987b, p. 1207).
GROWTH, STABILIZATION, AND EFFICIENCY
Briggs’s reference to “human resources as the wealth of nations” 
comes from a 1973 Frederick H. Harbison book with that title (Harbison 
1973). However, one can trace this literature back to the 1964 book by 
Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Education, Manpower, and Economic 
Growth.2 Harbison and Myers examined 75 countries on the basis of a 
composite HRD index and compared those findings with national in-
dicators of economic development and growth. Their main conclusion 
was that, to make the greatest strides in terms of growth and develop-
ment, each nation needs to develop and implement a coherent HRD 
strategy that sets clear priorities and integrates them into an overall na-
tional economic-development agenda (one that recognizes and reflects 
broad social goals, not merely narrow economic objectives) (Harbison 
and Myers 1964).
Decades after publication of Education, Manpower, and Economic 
Growth, Briggs continued to stress the link between human resources 
and aggregate economic growth. Citing the work of both Edward 
Denison and Anthony Carnavale, Briggs demonstrated in 1987 that 
“while economists in general and public policymakers in particular 
have focused upon physical capital as the explanation for [productivity 
increases and] long-term growth, it has actually been human resource 
development that has been the major contributor . . . It is a fact of eco-
nomic life that deserves prominence in policy formulation” (Briggs 
1987b, pp. 1213–1214).
While economists’ attention to the link between human resources 
and growth can be traced to the 1960s, the place of human resources 
in economic stabilization took center stage in the 1970s. In 1971, Sar 
A. Levitan, Garth L. Mangum, and Ray Marshall produced a textbook 
entitled Human Resources and Labor Markets: Labor and Manpower
in the American Economy. In one of its final chapters, the authors 
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wrote, “Manpower expenditures and programs expanded continuously 
throughout the 1960s, but were applied without any countercyclical 
intent.” Still, they concluded that such human resource policies could 
constructively play a more active role in addressing economic fluctua-
tions (Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall 1972, p. 517).3 In fact, another 
chapter in their book mentions the just-enacted Emergency Employ-
ment Act (EEA) of 1971, which did indeed seek to address the business 
cycle by offering temporary positions in periods of high unemployment 
(Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall 1972, p. 359).4
The nation’s first experiment with countercyclical job creation 
since the Great Depression ran from 1971 to 1978, first under the EEA 
and then under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA).5 This direct job-creation initiative involved public-service 
employment: local governments (and later also nonprofits) hired the 
unemployed to serve in any of a range of positions, including teacher’s 
assistant, home-health aide, and police dispatcher, or to work on com-
munity conservation and weatherization projects. Studies by Briggs and 
others assessing this experiment concluded that “concerns about local 
governments substituting public-service employment for local funds 
were largely unfounded.” They also found that the public-service em-
ployment programs “accomplished their desired fiscal effects,” namely 
that they boosted aggregate spending and employment more quickly 
than tax cuts and that they directly targeted the unemployed (Marshall 
and Briggs 1989, pp. 598–601). President Ronald Reagan brought the 
public-service employment experiment to an end in 1981, but the expe-
rience of the 1970s demonstrates that Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall 
had been right when suggesting that human resource policy could serve 
as an “important adjunct to monetary and fiscal policies” (Levitan, 
Mangum, and Marshall 1972, p. 517).
Although Briggs discussed the countercyclical aspects of public- 
service employment when I was his student in 1980, I recall more 
vividly his suggestion that human resource policy can serve as an 
anti-inflationary device. Conventional fiscal policy addresses unem-
ployment by increasing aggregate demand. From the vantage point of 
1980, however, there was considerable anxiety that employing such a 
strategy would exacerbate an already serious inflation problem. In other 
words, the fear was that more demand stimulus would simply yield a 
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movement along the Phillips Curve (which depicts an inverse relation-
ship between unemployment and inflation). At a time when a number of 
politicians and economists were actively promoting permanent tax cuts 
as “supply-side” economics, Briggs was offering a genuine supply-side 
solution: attacking joblessness in a way that reduces labor bottlenecks 
in the economy, thereby shifting the Phillips Curve in a manner that 
lowers the inflation rate associated with any given level of unemploy-
ment (Briggs 1980).6 In short, Briggs’s HRE draws attention to training 
and labor-market services that have the potential to enhance both eco-
nomic efficiency and stability in the face of rising prices.
In attempting to enlist labor-market policies in the fight against in-
flation, Briggs and other human resource economists underscored the 
distinction between cyclical, frictional, and structural unemployment. 
Cyclical unemployment—long explained with reference to a manufac-
turer who temporarily “lays off” employees during a recession and fully 
intends to rehire them when the slump abates—is the sort of joblessness 
that responds best to an aggregate-demand stimulus.7 Frictional unem-
ployment, in contrast, is joblessness that signals a less than perfectly 
efficient labor market in the sense that, although appropriate work is 
available for job seekers, the unemployed and employers with vacancies 
have not yet located each other. To address this sort of unemployment 
and simultaneously combat price increases, human resource economists 
advocate not only better placement services, job-search counseling, and 
outreach programs that let workers know about employment opportu-
nities, but also relocation assistance and other measures that enhance 
worker mobility (Levitan, Mangum, and Marhsall 1972, p. 515; Briggs 
1980). Structural unemployment, meanwhile, involves a mismatch be-
tween the skills or characteristics of the jobless and the requirements 
of available positions; remedying this problem can also help attenuate 
inflation, but it often requires training and other interventions that reach 
beyond what is required to tackle frictional unemployment.
Labor economists were addressing frictional and cyclical unemploy-
ment long before the Great Depression (see, for example, Commons and 
Andrews 1916, pp. 261–290), but structural unemployment received 
considerably less attention until after World War II.8 In the early 1960s, 
though, the problem of structural unemployment was thrust into the 
national policy spotlight. Indeed, according to Briggs, this development 
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is a major reason for the emergence of HRE as an academic area of 
specialization (Briggs 1980, 1987b, p. 1214–1218; Marshall and Briggs 
1989, pp. 590–593).9
Careful observers of the early post–World War II economy noted 
that the average U.S. unemployment rate was rising with each successive 
period of cyclical prosperity. This “creeping prosperity unemployment” 
triggered a “full-scale debate among economists over whether struc-
tural changes in the economy had become more severe than in the past” 
(Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 590). At the core of this debate was the 
concern expressed by a number of economists (most notably Briggs’s 
professor at Michigan State University, Charles C. Killingsworth) 
that automation, the emergence of computers, and associated techno-
logical change was eliminating the need for many unskilled workers 
and increasing the demand for skilled workers—such as “engineers, 
statisticians, programmers, mathematicians, and repairmen”—in “a 
broad array of industries” (Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 591). If these 
economists were right, then stimulating aggregate demand would be an 
inefficient and perhaps even ineffective way of addressing the resulting 
unemployment. Thus, they argued, with some success, for “interven-
tionist human resource policy . . . especially for government-financed 
training, education, labor-mobility programs, and job-information sys-
tems that could focus on the groups who needed special assistance” 
(Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 592).10
Soon after the notion of structural unemployment caught their at-
tention, a group of labor economists—especially those most heavily 
influenced by the institutionalist tradition and its appreciation of inces-
sant economic change—began to realize that “other structural changes 
were also transforming the labor force” (Marshall and Briggs 1989, 
p. 591). These changes included the shift from an economy heav-
ily dependent on goods production to one more focused on services; 
a geographic movement of economic activity from the Northeast and 
Midwest and toward the South; an accelerated decline in agricultural 
employment; and the transition of baby boomers from school to work 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Still other changes appeared as well, along 
with a new term—the “dislocated” worker (Marshall and Briggs 1989, 
pp. 591–593). Thus, HRE began as, and continues to be, an area that 
gives attention to structural economic change and its implications for 
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the study of employment, and it couples that attention with a discus-
sion of pragmatic policies that can foster more efficient and smoothly 
functioning markets.11
EQUITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND REGULATION
The civil rights movement is another major development contribut-
ing to the emergence of HRE and national human resource policy in 
the United States. Briggs addressed this in his 1980 course and in his 
textbook with Ray Marshall (Briggs 1980; Marshall and Briggs 1989, 
pp. 593–594). From those sources, it is clear that he views civil rights 
as a matter of human rights, social equity, individual economic oppor-
tunity, and national economic efficiency. For Briggs, ensuring equal 
opportunity means that government needs to tackle not only overt dis-
crimination, but also institutional forms of discrimination, which range 
from procedural matters that affect hiring decisions to “the preparation 
of people for jobs” (Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 593). He also sees this 
matter as moving HRE beyond Keynesianism’s single-minded focus 
on the level of employment and toward the study of both the level and 
composition of employment (Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 594).12
Of course, Briggs has never been interested in equity and opportu-
nity for racial and ethnic minorities alone; he has consistently been an 
advocate of equal opportunity for all. Thus, he was supportive of the 
“new” structuralist research of the 1970s. It demonstrated that minori-
ties, women, and youth were entering the labor force in larger numbers 
and often faced employment challenges, which put upward pressure on 
the unemployment rate. Briggs stressed that the “original” and “new” 
structuralist positions dovetailed. According to Marshall and Briggs, 
both structuralist variants are united in that they “stress the necessity 
of human-resource policies as the most equitable and efficient way to 
reduce aggregate unemployment rates” (Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 
592).
The preceding quote indicates Briggs’s HRE rejects the common 
assertion that equity and efficiency confront society in the form of an 
inescapable trade-off. Like Robert Kuttner, author of The Economic Il-
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lusion: False Choices between Prosperity and Social Justice, Briggs 
has argued instead that this trade-off is often an “economic illusion” 
and that equity and efficiency are frequently “mutually reinforcing” 
(Kuttner 1984, p. 1). His essay “Efficiency and Equity as Goals for 
Contemporary U.S. Immigration Policy” provides just one of many ex-
amples of this, as even its title indicates (Briggs 1989).
Nevertheless, Briggs does not have a slavish devotion to markets. 
As an institutionalist, he rejects the mainstream economists’ conven-
tional assumption that economic efficiency is a “value neutral” concept. 
He also rejects their assertion that the neoclassical model of perfectly 
competitive markets is the only appropriate professional standard 
against which real-world markets should be judged.
Thus, Briggs’s HRE is explicitly and unapologetically normative. In 
1980, the final topic examined in his human resources course was “The 
Relationship of Research and Policy in the Human Resource Field,” 
and one of the assigned readings was Objectivity in Social Research, 
by the institutionalist Gunnar Myrdal. The main point of Myrdal’s slim 
volume is that there is no such thing as “objective” social research and 
that the closest a researcher can come to “objectivity” is to make value 
premises explicit—that is, to “expose the valuations to full light,” and 
“make them conscious, specific, and explicit” in both theoretical and 
policy research (Myrdal 1969, pp. 55–56).13
The institutionalist way of thinking shapes Briggs’s approach to 
the entire subject of labor-market regulation. Although Briggs has of-
ten called on the state to help labor markets operate more efficiently, 
he believes there are situations that require government to step in as a 
regulator, not merely as a facilitator. Policy views must be informed by 
theory but also by one’s values—and (consistent with the institutional-
ist appreciation of a dynamic world) by an understanding of history.
This approach to regulation surfaced unmistakably in the mid 
1980s during the fortieth anniversary celebration at the Cornell Univer-
sity School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR). Participating in a 
panel devoted to examining the role of government in the workplace, 
Briggs began his remarks by reminding his audience why labor mar-
kets have become regulated: experience has shown that labor-market 
competition can often have serious adverse effects on workers. As a 
result, “[W]e now have a battery of worker protections sanctioned by 
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laws and regulations. I think this is a very fundamental and justifiable 
outcome.” In short, Briggs based his support for regulation on history 
and on a value judgment about what is the right way to operate an in-
dustrial society. “We don’t want inadequate health and dangerous safety 
conditions, regardless of what any benefit–cost study might say . . . 
We cannot let exposure of workers to cancer-causing substances be 
determined by what happens in the marketplace. Period!” Briggs con-
cluded: “As I see the world from my ivory tower, these interventions in 
labor markets—which may end up distorting the perfectly competitive 
market model (the standard often used to evaluate deviations by these 
policy interventions)—serve to improve the imperfect world in which I 
live and in which our workers work” (Briggs 1987a, p. 8).14
HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY VERSUS HUMAN 
RESOURCE ECONOMICS
HRE was not the economics profession’s only post–World War II 
development that focused on the importance of human skills and knowl-
edge. The other tradition, called human capital theory, emanated from 
the department of economics at the University of Chicago. Much of 
that work can be traced to the influence of Theodore W. Schultz, whose 
1960 presidential address before the American Economic Association 
was entitled “Investment in Human Capital” (Schultz 1961).
A human resource economist in the Briggs tradition would prob-
ably quarrel with little in Schultz’s address. His main point was to stress 
that investments in people are perhaps the most important of all de-
terminants of economic growth, a notion that served as the point of 
departure for the work of Harbison and Myers (1964) and many others. 
The address does contain a brief discussion of research by Gary Becker 
regarding on-the-job training, which suggests that Becker’s reliance on 
a competitive-market model sets the stage for “meaningful economic 
studies” on that subject (Schultz 1961, p. 10). Still, Marshall and Briggs 
present Schultz’s contributions without much critical commentary in 
their labor economics text (Marshall and Briggs 1989, pp. 24–25 and 
213–214).
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In contrast, Becker and other human capital theorists receive much 
more critical scrutiny from Marshall and Briggs (1989, pp. 177–192) 
and from Briggs on his own (1987b, pp. 1210–1213). Part of that cri-
tique relies on an essay by Michael J. Piore, which stresses that there 
is a huge gulf between the endeavors of human capital theorists and 
human resource economists. According to Piore, human capital theory 
is “applied theory concerned with the application of certain principles” 
derived from neoclassical economics (such as principles related to max-
imizing behavior and, as seen in the previous paragraph, the functioning 
of competitive markets). In contrast, HRE, rooted in institutional labor 
economics and informed by the manpower policy experience of the 
1960s and 1970s, is “an applied field concerned with the solution of 
particular problems” (Piore 1974, p. 253).
Of course, Briggs’s concern is not simply over the highly flawed 
nature of the assumptions of human capital theory. It is also that those 
assumptions lead to analyses that claim to be relevant to the real world. 
Building on a neoclassical foundation, human capital theory does not 
recognize “the significance of complex institutional practices and his-
torical factors that influence labor-market operations,” writes Briggs 
(1987b, p. 1211). He continues:
There is no allowance made for the ways that societal institutions 
(for example, schools, businesses, unions, government, or the 
military) can limit through their customs, practices, and policies 
the efforts of individuals to maximize opportunities to improve 
themselves. Nor is there any recognition of the historical barriers 
that have been placed in the paths of subgroups of the labor force 
to attain levels of human capital or to apply equally those human 
capital attributes that they do possess. Studies, for example, have 
found that many such workers often already have human capital 
endowments that exceed the limited range of jobs that are gener-
ally available to them. (Briggs 1987b, p. 1211)
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Drawing on a 1987 essay by Briggs entitled “Human Resource De-
velopment and the Formulation of National Economic Policy,” one can 
36   Whalen
identify five HRD dimensions. The first three are national and econom-
ic in nature: workforce quantity, quality, and opportunity. The other two 
are personal development and international well-being.
Workforce Quantity
One way to look at the quantitative dimension of HRD is to begin 
with the number of employed people in the United States. In January 
2009, the official number was just under 142.1 million. To be counted 
among the employed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), a 
person must first be viewed as part of the civilian labor force. To be 
included in the labor force, one must be 16 years of age or older, reside 
in one of the 50 States or the District of Columbia, and not be confined 
to an institution (home for the aged, prison, or mental-health facility). 
There were 153.7 million people in the U.S. labor force in January 2009 
(U.S. BLS 2009).
Of course, not everyone in the labor force is counted as employed, 
a category that requires a minimum number of hours worked within a 
certain BLS reference period. A member of the labor force can also be 
“unemployed,” which requires one to be available and either searching 
for work or waiting to be recalled by an employer. There were 11.6 
million unemployed people in the United States in January 2009, 7.6 
percent of the labor force (U.S. BLS 2009).
The 7.6 percent unemployment rate of January 2009 is one measure 
of unutilized labor, but there are also potential workers who are part 
of the U.S. population and not currently part of the labor force. Many 
of those potential workers fall within a BLS category of people who 
are “marginally attached” to the labor force. These are “persons not 
in the labor force who want and are available for work, and who have 
looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months (or since the end of 
their last job if they held one within the past 12 months), but were not 
counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 
4 weeks preceding the [most recent BLS employment] survey” (U.S. 
BLS 2008). There were about 2.1 million marginally attached workers 
in January 2009, including 734,000 “discouraged workers,” who were 
no longer looking because they believed no jobs were available to them 
(U.S. BLS 2009).15
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There is also underutilized labor. For example, the BLS identified 
7.8 million of the employed labor force as involuntary part-time work-
ers in January 2009. These people would like to work full time but had 
their hours cut back or were unable to find full-time jobs (U.S. BLS 
2009). Another category of underutilized labor is underemployment, 
which involves people working in positions that require less skill and 
education than they possess.
Looking over this terrain, Briggs has often called for a comprehen-
sive national human resource strategy that would include a commitment 
to full employment. He envisions a strategy that would address not just 
the unemployment rate but also the challenges surrounding marginal 
attachment and underutilization. This strategy would have a macroeco-
nomic component involving fiscal and monetary policies, but it would 
also include a battery of labor-market and education policies that rec-
ognize the need for remedies tailored to fit different circumstances. 
He writes: “Different groups in the labor force have different needs. 
Hence, a menu of policy options needs to be offered” (Briggs 1987b, 
pp. 1216–1217).
Immigration is also an important part of the quantitative dimension 
of HRD. In fact, its role has been growing for decades. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, immigration accounted for 37 and 47 percent of the growth 
in the U.S. population, respectively. In the first half of the twenty-first 
century, two-thirds of the nation’s population growth “will be the con-
sequence of the arrival of immigrants themselves and of their future 
children who will be born in this country” (Briggs 2003, p. 4). Quoting 
from a National Research Council report, Briggs writes that immigra-
tion to the United States “will obviously play the dominant role in our 
future population growth” (Briggs 2003, p. 4).
According to Briggs, there are few nations in the world that accept 
significant numbers of immigrants each year, and the tendency among 
these nations is to adjust the numbers annually according to labor- 
market conditions. In contrast, immigration policy in the United States 
focuses heavily on family unification and “has been allowed to function 
independently of its economic consequences” (Briggs 1987b, p. 1221; 
2003).
The United States is also the destination for many illegal immi-
grants. “An estimated 11.8 million unauthorized immigrants were living 
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in the United States in January 2007 compared to 8.5 million in 2000,” 
according to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security report (Hoefer, 
Rytina, and Baker 2008, p. 1).
In his presidential address before the institutionalist Association for 
Evolutionary Economics, Briggs explained his concerns about the im-
pact of immigration upon the U.S. economy:
The flow of immigrants into the United States has tended to be 
bimodal in terms of human capital attributes (as measured by edu-
cational attainment), but the highest concentration by far is in the 
lowest end of the nation’s human capital distribution . . . In the 
low-skilled labor market, immigration has increased the competi-
tion for whatever jobs are available . . . As for skilled jobs, im-
migration can be useful in the short run as a means of providing 
qualified workers where shortages of qualified domestic workers 
exist. But, the long-term objective should be that these jobs should 
go to citizens and resident aliens. (Briggs 1996, p. 381)16
Thus, Briggs believes that immigration policy must be treated as 
an integral part of the nation’s human resource strategy. During an in-
terview in 2006, for example, he summarized his position as follows: 
“Immigration should primarily be linked to filling skill gaps in the labor 
force until the nation’s own education and training system can meet 
those needs. The human capital of immigrants should not run counter to 
these needs” (quoted in Rohe 2006, p. 233).17
Workforce Quality
In addition to a quantitative dimension, HRD must also have a 
qualitative dimension. For Briggs, a nation interested in the qualitative 
dimension of human resources must address the needs of its most eco-
nomically disadvantaged residents, but it must also do more, including 
engage in “preventive maintenance” and embrace the notion of “long-
run educational development” (Briggs 1987b).
In the case of those who cannot find employment on a regular and 
self-supporting basis, or who must rely on the underground economy, 
Briggs stresses that society must “provide a lifeline of opportunity to 
prepare for legitimate employment” (Briggs 1987b, p. 1225, emphasis 
added). Doing so is both just and economically pragmatic, he argues. 
His 1987 essay on HRD illustrates this need with a discussion of three 
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U.S. economic problems: the declining labor-force participation of 
black males, the poverty challenge facing female-headed households, 
and increasing adult illiteracy (Briggs 1987b, pp. 1225–1227).
The problems facing black males have not receded. A 2006 volume 
edited by Ronald B. Mincy for the Urban Institute finds the labor-force 
participation rate for black men continued to decline even during the 
economic boom of the 1990s (Mincy 2006). A 2004 report by Andrew 
Sum and his colleagues at Northeastern University, meanwhile, finds a 
decline in the employment-to-population ratio of black men that began 
in the mid 1950s and continues into the mid 2000s. It also finds a high 
and rising rate of year-round joblessness among black men (one out of 
every four were idle all year in 2002) (Sum et al. 2004b). Moreover, 
both of these recent studies advocate the sort of targeted education and 
workforce-development strategies that Briggs has been promoting for 
decades.
Poverty among female-headed households and the illiteracy prob-
lem also remain serious. Briggs’s HRD essay indicated that “one out of 
every three families headed by a woman was living in poverty” in 1985 
(Briggs 1987b, pp. 1225–1226). In mid 2005, the poverty rate for such 
families was 29 percent—10 times the rate found in two-parent families 
(Gosling 2008, pp. 175–176). A 2002 report on an adult literacy survey, 
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education, concluded that about 
44 million of the 191 million adults in the United States have skills that 
place them in the lowest of five possible levels on prose, document, and 
quantitative proficiency. Many respondents “had such limited skills that 
they were unable to respond to much of the survey” (Kirsch et al. 2002, 
p. 18). The following year, another literacy program estimated that 50 
million Americans cannot read or comprehend above the eighth-grade 
level and that nearly 75 percent of the unemployed are illiterate (Morry 
2003).
Along with a lifeline for the unemployed and working poor, 
Briggs’s national system of HRD would have a preventive maintenance 
component that offers assistance to anyone who becomes vulnerable to 
unemployment, regardless of salary history. In his 1987 essay on HRD, 
Briggs stressed the increasingly dynamic nature of the workforce in 
addition to the increased skill and educational requirements associated 
with the fast-emerging service-based economy. He also highlighted the 
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inefficiency and impracticality of depending entirely on individuals to 
adjust to these changing employment patterns on their own. Thus, he 
called on government to develop a network of programs that would 
assist individuals with this readjustment process by providing reliable 
information on labor-market trends and job requirements and by offering 
workers ample opportunities for educational upgrading, job retraining, 
employment counseling, and even relocation when appropriate (Briggs 
1987b, pp. 1227–1230).
Since education is the cornerstone of Briggs’s strategy for achieving 
national success in a dynamic, global economy, long-run educational 
development is also essential to his conception of the qualitative dimen-
sion of HRD. In particular, he has often called for a major national effort 
toward five educational objectives: preventing students from dropping 
out of school; boosting the average literacy and educational proficiency 
level across American society; ensuring that education is contingent on 
ability to learn, not ability to pay; making educational opportunities 
accessible to adults throughout their working lives; and linking educa-
tion reform to a national industrial policy.18 Briggs recognizes this will 
require extensive changes within U.S. educational institutions (affect-
ing administrative practices, teacher certification and compensation, 
decision-making within schools, student assessment methods, and 
more), but he insists such changes are needed for education “to con-
tribute to the answer and not worsen the problem of contemporary 
labor-force adjustment” (Briggs 1987b, pp. 1230–1231).
Equal Employment Opportunity
A workforce-opportunity dimension to HRD exists alongside the 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions. As with labor-market regu-
lation in general (discussed earlier), Briggs addresses employment 
opportunity by beginning with the historical record. Whereas conven-
tional economics argues that discrimination is irrational and thus should 
not persist, Briggs responds, “Experience, however, has demonstrated 
that it cannot be realistically assumed that labor markets function solely 
on the basis of merit and productivity.” Instead, he argues, “It has been 
revealed that the roots of discrimination run deep into the institutional 
practices that prepare workers to compete in the labor market” (Briggs 
1987b, p. 1231).
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In Briggs’s view, equal employment opportunity must begin by 
requiring antidiscrimination mechanisms that not only monitor hiring 
practices and patterns but also offer redress in the event of discrimi-
natory actions. As he wrote in 1987, for some women and minorities, 
it is enough to ask for hiring requirements to be job related and for 
employment practices to be fair. This alone can sometimes “open up 
employment opportunities where they previously did not exist” (Briggs 
1987b, pp. 1231 and 1234).
Other times, however, biases and discrimination go much deeper 
and help explain why certain groups within the labor force might not 
appear in the applicant pool of a fair-minded employer. For example, 
recruitment and job-posting practices can be structured (even inad-
vertently) in a way that favors some groups over others. In addition, 
inequality and discrimination can shape the institutions that educate, 
train, and prepare people for employment, and past patterns of discrimi-
nation can cause even those with educational or training opportunities 
to temper their occupational aspirations and forego such opportunities 
out of discouragement. Thus, Briggs has always believed that active 
outreach, training, apprenticeship, and placement programs are indis-
pensable tools in the pursuit of equal employment opportunity (Briggs 
1987b, pp. 1231–1234).19
Personal Development and International Well-Being
Briggs’s final two HRD dimensions look beyond the national econo-
my and focus on personal development and international well-being. As 
mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Briggs believes human resources 
are the key to personal development as well as to a healthy national 
economy. Thus, it is not surprising that part of the benefit accruing to an 
individual from HRD is economic and comes from opportunities asso-
ciated with being adequately prepared for employment (Briggs 1987b, 
p. 1235). At the same time, another part of the individual benefit of 
developing one’s human resources is that it provides the chance to be a 
more informed member of society—in Briggs’s words, HRD heightens 
“one’s broader awareness of the quality of the society of which he or 
she is a part” (Briggs 1987b, p. 1235).
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Of course, economists have long recognized there are social as well 
as individual implications of an investment in human resources (indeed, 
education offers the classic case of a good with a positive external-
ity), and Briggs believes the civic benefits of an educated and informed 
citizenry can be as potent as the economic ones. He surveys the awe-
some ability of science and technology to create, destroy, and “reshape 
the relationship of human beings to their natural environment,” and he 
writes, “It is imperative that the uses of these forces be the result of the 
decisions made by an informed citizenry and not by an opinionated or 
indifferent society” (Briggs 1987b, p. 1235).
That last point connects the personal to the political, but it also con-
nects the individual to the rest of humanity. Much of Briggs’s work has 
focused on well-being at the national level, but he has always viewed 
a prosperous and humane U.S. economy as providing us with the best 
position from which to address problems on an international scale. 
Moreover, over the years, he has given increasing attention to inter-
national issues. Not surprisingly, his message centers on leveling the 
playing field in a way that brings up those at the bottom, rather than 
encouraging a global race to the bottom.
I recall finding evidence of this in his remarks delivered as part of 
the ILR School’s fortieth anniversary celebration. Toward the end of his 
talk on government regulation, Briggs noted: “In the 1980s, we have 
seen the coming of the internationalization of our economy. This raises 
a whole new series of concerns about regulation . . . The next step will 
be the need to establish international labor standards. It is a difficult 
task, but I do think it is possible” (Briggs 1987a, p. 7).
Briggs returned to this theme more recently in an e-mail message. 
Responding to the draft of an article I composed for the sixtieth anni-
versary of the Labor and Employment Relations Association, he wrote: 
“In the conclusion, you might consider adding something to the effect 
that the reality in this present era of globalization is that many of the 
identical issues that confronted the founders of our organization and 
resulted in their focus on the national economy of the United States are 
rapidly becoming international issues. Whereas our organization helped 
set the buoys for intellectual inquiry [that involved] national studies, the 
challenge now is to try to do the same at the international level” (Briggs 
2007).
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HUMAN RESOURCES: THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
Briggs’s quantitative, qualitative, and opportunity dimensions of 
HRD have always focused on national economic well-being. His per-
sonal development and international dimensions, however, address 
broader themes of individual fulfillment, civic virtue, and global re-
sponsibility. Reflecting on all of this, it is easy to see what I have found 
so compelling about Briggs’s brand of economics. It is fitting, of course, 
to give him the last word, and what better way to do so than with a quote 
that ties together each of these dimensions and themes? “If human re-
sources are truly ‘the wealth of nations,’ their development carries with 
it the parallel responsibility to recognize that their contribution to the 
economy must enhance the quality of life on this planet and not lead 
to its enslavement, impoverishment, or extinction” (Briggs 1987b, p. 
1236).
Notes
1. Rather than rely on my course notes as a definitive source, I have tried to use them 
(and the course syllabus) primarily as a “road map” to further reading on the origin 
and development of HRE.
2. The book by Harbison and Myers is a direct precursor to the 1973 Harbison vol-
ume. Still, Eli Ginzberg, an early pioneer in HRE, stressed the importance of 
human resources to the wealth of a nation in an even earlier volume (Ginzberg 
1958).
3. In the final edition of the Marshall and Briggs textbook, Labor Economics, they 
explain that the term “manpower policy” came into being in the 1960s “to define 
the new set of labor market policies designed to develop the employment potential 
of the nation’s human resources . . . The European nations referred to these en-
deavors as ‘active labor-market policies.’ By the [late] 1970s, the term manpower 
itself had been replaced (it was felt to be a sexist term) by employment and training 
policies or human resource policies” (Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 588).
4. The second edition of Human Resources and Labor Markets: Labor and Man-
power in the American Economy (1976) was one of two books listed as “general 
background references” in Briggs’s 1980 course syllabus (the other was CETA: 
Decentralization on Trial, by Bonnie B. Snedeker and David M. Snedeker, 1978) 
(Briggs 1980).
5. According to Briggs, CETA’s public-service employment programs “were essen-
tially counterstructural,” not countercyclical, from 1978 to 1981, when funding 
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was eliminated in the first year of the presidential administration of Ronald Rea-
gan (Briggs 1982, p. 260).
6. The suggestion of shifting the Phillips Curve through human resource policies was 
also put forth in the early 1970s by Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall (1972, pp. 
514–515). In addition, see Marshall and Briggs (1989, p. 594).
7. Indeed, Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall (1972, p. 515) called cyclical unemploy-
ment “demand-deficient unemployment.”
8. To be sure, discussions of structural unemployment and its remedies are not absent 
from the pre–World War II economics literature; see, for example, Watkins (1922, 
pp. 222 and 234).
9. For a discussion of structural unemployment in the context of HRE, see also 
Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall (1972, pp. 515–517). For early discussions of 
structural unemployment, see Killingsworth (1965a,b); for a later reexamination, 
see Killingsworth (1979).
10. In the wake of the early 1960s debate between structuralists and advocates of an 
aggregate-demand stimulus in the form of tax cuts, Congress passed the Economic 
Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 in addition to tax cuts. The EOA included “a 
number of experimental human resource programs” (Marshall and Briggs 1989, p. 
595). Other programs with structural components would follow, including CETA.
11. For my own analysis of recent U.S. economic performance from a perspective 
emphasizing economic change and focusing on implications for working families, 
see Whalen (2009).
12. Reflecting on the civil rights era from the vantage point of the mid 1980s, Briggs 
wrote: “There had to be changes in the racial and gender composition of employ-
ment patterns, as opposed to an exclusive policy focus merely on the level of 
employment. As a black leader once expressed it, ‘After all, we had full employment 
back on the plantations.’” At the same time, an equal-employment opportunity 
strategy must be accompanied by a full-employment strategy or the former will 
only heighten job-security concerns among groups that previously benefited from 
exclusionary employment practices (Briggs 1987b, pp. 1233–1234).
13. Myrdal’s book also stresses that real-world problems often cut across the bound-
aries of academic disciplines: “In reality, there are not economic, sociological, 
or psychological problems, but simply problems, and . . . as a rule they are all 
complex” (Myrdal 1969, p. 10). Still another point offered in the same section 
of Briggs’s course is Robert A. Gordon’s call for economic scholarship that has 
“‘[real-world] relevance with as much rigor as possible’ and not ‘rigor regardless 
of relevance’” (quoted in Dunlop 1977, p. 282). Briggs, of course, accepts both of 
these points.
14. Even when defending regulation regardless of the extent to which it causes a 
market to deviate from the perfectly competitive model, Briggs still stressed the 
possibility that workplace efficiency and equity may be compatible objectives: 
“In many ways, the coming of regulation . . . has probably led to more efficient 
labor markets in the process, because they are now more equitable . . . Companies 
which have strong social consciences should not be forced to compete with those 
that have the least social conscience” (Briggs 1987a, p. 7). Briggs also recognized 
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there are limits to government’s ability to regulate effectively. His solution was 
squarely in the John R. Commons tradition: “What needs to be done in the health 
and safety area, for example, is to establish health and safety committees in the 
workplace and empower these committees to close down or stop production if 
they think there are violations. At the enterprise level, they know better than some 
inspectors if there is some danger or violation” (Briggs 1987a, p. 8).
15. Other marginally attached workers indicate they have not recently looked for work 
due to reasons such as family responsibilities and school attendance (U.S. BLS 
2009).
16. For evidence that supports Briggs’s concern about the harmful impact of immi-
grants upon low-skill U.S. labor markets, see Sum et al. (2004a).
17. For more on Briggs’s view on immigration policy, see Chapter 2 by William P. 
Curington (which is based on Curington 2007). See also Briggs (1996, especially 
p. 381), which indicates a wariness regarding short-term immigration measures 
designed to relieve shortages (because such measures may cause us to “miss the 
opportunity to draw additional U.S. workers into the economic mainstream”).
18. On linking education and training with industrial policy, Briggs writes: “There 
can be little purposeful long-term educational preparation of the labor force for 
employment if there is little direction provided as to where the economy is thought 
to be going” (Briggs 1987b, p. 1231).
19. Writing in 1987, Briggs argued that antidiscrimination policies must continue be-
cause “it is unlikely that the principles of equal employment opportunity have 
yet been fully institutionalized to the degree that they can be taken for granted” 
(Briggs 1987b, p. 1234). Even with the passage of more than 20 years and the re-
cent election of an African-American president, I suspect Briggs continues to hold 
the same view today. Indeed, in Chapter 9, Seth D. Harris provides evidence that 
would support Briggs in this stance.
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Immigration and the  
U.S. Labor Market
Philip L. Martin
University of California, Davis
On a typical day, about 100,000 foreigners arrive in the United 
States. Most are temporary migrants or visitors, including tourists, busi-
ness people, students, and workers, who are welcomed at airports and 
border crossings. About 2,600 are legal immigrants or refugees who 
have been invited to become permanent residents of the United States, 
94,000 are temporary visitors, and 3,200 are unauthorized foreigners, 
usually Mexicans, about half of whom are apprehended just inside the 
Mexico–U.S. border.
Vernon Briggs’s career has focused on low-wage U.S. workers. 
Briggs consistently urged enactment and enforcement of policies that 
would help low-wage workers to help themselves. The self-evident 
truth that “a tight labor market is a worker’s best friend” has been a cor-
nerstone of Briggs’s analysis of immigration policy, which stresses that 
periods of less immigration in U.S. history were associated with faster 
increases in wages for low-wage U.S. workers.
This chapter provides a global and national perspective on contem-
porary immigration patterns. It does not prescribe but aims to show 
the dimensions and impacts of migration. Among the topics covered 
are the factors contributing to international migration, government ef-
forts to manage immigration, trends in the types of migrants entering 
the United States, migration’s labor-market effects, and immigration 
policy trade-offs. The topics addressed are among those that figure most 
prominently in Briggs’s policy-oriented writings.
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GLOBAL MIGRATION
Migration is the movement of people from one place to another. 
Migration is as old as humankind wandering in search of food, but in-
ternational migration is a relatively recent development. It was only 
in the early twentieth century that the system of nation-states, pass-
ports, and visas developed to regulate the flow of people across borders 
(Torpey 1999).
International migration is the exception, not the rule. The most sig-
nificant form of migration control is inertia—most people do not want 
to move away from family and friends. The use of passports, visas, and 
border controls has also given modern governments significant capacity 
to regulate migration, and they do. One item considered by many gov-
ernments when deciding whether to recognize a new entity that declares 
itself a nation-state is whether it is able to regulate who crosses and who 
remains within its borders.
There were 190 million international migrants in 2005, meaning 
that 3 percent of the world’s people left their country of birth or citi-
zenship for a year or more (Table 4.1). The number of international 
migrants increased by almost 4 million a year between 1995 and 2005, 
with almost all of the increase in high-income countries.
Most of the world’s 6.7 billion people never cross a national border; 
most live and die near their place of birth. Those who cross national 
borders usually move to nearby countries, such as from Mexico to the 
United States or from Turkey to Germany. There were 62 million mi-
grants from developing countries in industrial countries in 2005, but 
almost as many migrants, 61 million, had moved from one developing 
country to another, such as from Indonesia to Malaysia. There are also 
large flows of people from one industrial country to another, for ex-
Table 4.1  International Migrants in 2005 (millions)
Destination country
Origin country Industrial Developing
Industrial 53 14
Developing 62 61
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division (2006). 
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ample, from Canada to the United States, and much smaller flows from 
industrial to developing countries, such as Japanese who work or retire 
in Thailand (United Nations Population Division 2006).
PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION
International migration is likely to increase for reasons that range 
from persisting demographic and economic inequalities to improve-
ments in communications and transportation that increase mobility. 
There are also more borders to cross. There were 193 generally rec-
ognized nation-states in 2000, four times more than the 43 in 1900.1 
Each nation-state distinguishes citizens and foreigners, has border con-
trols to inspect those seeking entry, and determines what foreigners can 
do while inside the country, whether they are tourists, students, guest 
workers, or immigrants.
Most countries discourage immigration, meaning that they do not 
encourage foreigners to settle and become naturalized citizens. Some 
also discourage emigration; for example, Communist nations attempted 
to prevent emigration between 1961 and 1989, and North Korea contin-
ues to try to keep its citizens from leaving.
There are five major countries that do plan for the arrival of im-
migrants: the United States, which accepted 1.2 million immigrants in 
2006; Canada (250,000); Australia (125,000); New Zealand (50,000); 
and Israel (25,000).2 The number of newcomers arriving in industrial 
countries exceeds the planned 1.6 million a year, suggesting that many 
of these newcomers are temporary visitors or unauthorized foreigners 
who find ways to settle despite not arriving as immigrants.
Perspectives on the rising number of migrants can be framed by two 
extremes. At one extreme, the Wall Street Journal advocates a five-word 
amendment to the U.S. constitution: “There shall be open borders.”3 Or-
ganizations ranging from the Catholic Church to the World Bank have 
called for more migration, arguing that people should not be confined 
to their countries of birth by national borders and that more migration 
would speed economic growth and development in both the sending 
and the receiving countries.
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At the other extreme, virtually every industrial country has orga-
nizations such as the U.S.-based Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR), which calls for sharp reductions in immigration on 
the grounds that unskilled newcomers hurt low-skilled U.S. workers, 
have negative environmental effects, and threaten established U.S. cul-
tural values. Many European countries have political parties that call 
for reducing immigration, such as the National Front in France, which 
proposed (during the 1995 presidential campaign) removing up to 3 
million non-Europeans from France to reduce the number of Muslim 
residents.4
The first step toward making migration a manageable challenge is 
to understand why people migrate. Most people do not want to cross 
national borders to settle in another country, and, even though the num-
ber of migrants is at an all-time high, international migrants are (as 
mentioned above) just 3 percent of the world’s residents. Furthermore, 
economic growth can turn origination nations into destination nations, 
as has been seen recently in Ireland, Italy, and Korea. The challenge 
is to manage migration in a way that reduces the differences that en-
courage people to cross borders and to understand how investment, 
remittances, and aid can stimulate economic development and reduce 
migration pressures.
DIFFERENCES AND NETWORKS
Differences in demographic and economic conditions encourage 
people to cross national borders, and their movements have been eased 
by revolutions in communications, transportation, and rights.
Most of the world’s people and most of the population growth are 
in developing countries. The world’s population, which reached 6 bil-
lion in October 1999, is growing by 1.3 percent or 80 million a year, 
with 97 percent of the growth in developing countries.5 In the past, sig-
nificant demographic differences between areas prompted large-scale 
migration. For example, Europe had 21 percent of the world’s almost 
1 billion residents in 1800 and the Americas had only 4 percent (Table 
4.2). When there were five Europeans for every American, millions of 
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Europeans emigrated to North and South America in search of eco-
nomic opportunity as well as religious and political freedom.
Will history repeat itself? Africa and Europe have roughly equal 
populations today, but by 2050, Africa is projected to have three times 
more residents. If Africa remains poorer than Europe, the two conti-
nents’ diverging demographic trajectories may propel young people 
from overcrowded cities such as Cairo and Lagos to move to Berlin 
and Rome.
The economic differences that encourage international migration 
have two dimensions, one fostered by inequality between countries and 
the other by inequality within. The world’s almost 200 nation-states 
have annual per-capita incomes that range from less than $250 per 
person to more than $50,000, a difference that provides a significant 
incentive (especially for young people) to migrate for higher wages and 
more opportunities (World Bank 2009).6
The 30 highest income countries had a total of 1 billion residents 
in 2005, about one-sixth of the world’s population; their combined 
gross national income was $36 trillion, about 80 percent of the global 
$45 trillion.7 The resulting average per-capita income of $35,000 in 
high-income countries was 21 times the average of $1,750 in low- and 
middle-income countries. Despite rapid economic growth in some de-
veloping countries, including the East Asian “Tigers” in the 1990s and 
Table 4.2  World Population by Continent, 1800, 2000, and 2050 (Percent 
Shares)
1800 1999 2050a
World (millions) 978 5,978 8,909
Africa 11 13 20
Asia 65 61 59
Europe 21 12 7
South America, Latin America, and 
Caribbean 
3 9 9
North America 1 5 4
Oceania 0 1 1
NOTE: Columns may not total 100 due to rounding.
a Projected.
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division (1999, table 2). 
54   Martin
China and India more recently, the ratio in per-capita incomes between 
high-income and other countries rose between 1975 and 2000 and 
shrank only marginally since 2000. In 2005, average per-capita income 
in high-income countries was 61 times higher than that in low-income 
countries and 13 times higher than that in middle-income countries 
(Table 4.3).
Another aspect of economic inequality between nation-states also 
adds to international migration pressures—international differences in 
labor force growth. The world’s labor force of 3.1 billion in 2005 in-
cluded 600 million workers in the high-income countries and 2.5 billion 
in the low-income countries. Almost all labor force growth is projected 
to be in lower income countries; their labor force is projected to in-
crease by about 425 million between 2005 and 2015, whereas the labor 
force in high-income countries is projected to remain stable at just over 
600 million (Table 4.4).
Internal inequality related to rural–urban migrations also can en-
courage international migration. In lower income countries, 40 percent 
of workers are employed in agriculture, a sector often heavily taxed 
despite the fact that farmers and farm workers usually have lower than 
average incomes.8 With taxes helping to keep farm incomes less than 
nonfarm incomes, there is often migration from rural areas to urban 
areas, one of the reasons why the urban share of the world’s population 
surpassed 50 percent for the first time in 2008 (United Nations Popula-
tion Fund 2007).
Industrial countries had “Great Migrations” off the land, which 
provided workers for expanding factories, fueled population growth in 
cities, and added to emigration pressures. Similar Great Migrations are 
under way today in countries from China to Mexico, and this rural–urban 
migration has three implications for international migration. First, 
ex-farmers and farm workers are most likely to accept 3-D (dirty, dan-
gerous, and difficult) jobs inside their countries or abroad (Martin and 
Midgley 2006).9 Second, rural–urban migrants often have to make cul-
tural as well as physical transitions, and many of them find the transition 
is as easy abroad as at home; for example, rural Mexicans may find it 
as easy to adapt to Los Angeles as to Mexico City. Third, domestic 
rural–urban migrants get one step closer to a country’s exits because it 
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Table 4.3  Global Migrants and Per-Capita Income Gaps, 1975–2005
Countries grouped by 
per capita GDP ($) Ratio
Year
Migrants 
(millions)
World pop. 
(billions)
Migrants 
(%)
Annual 
increase 
(millions) Low Middle High High-low High-mid
1975 85 4.1 2.1 1 150 750 6,200 41 8
1985 105 4.8 2.2 2 270 1,290 11,810 44 9
1990 154 5.3 2.9 10 350 2,220 19,590 56 9
1995 164 5.7 2.9 2 430 2,390 24,930 58 10
2000 175 6.1 2.9 2 420 1,970 27,510 66 14
2005 191 6.4 3.0 3 580 2,640 35,131 61 13
NOTE: The 1990 migrant stock was raised from 120 million to 154 million, largely to reflect the break-up of the USSR; 1975 income data 
are 1976. 2005 data are gross national income.
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division and World Bank Development Indicators.
56Table 4.4  World, Developed Country, and Less Developed Country Economically Active Populations 
(EAP), 1980–2020
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
World EAP 1,929,556 2,160,150 2,405,619 2,604,941 2,818,456 3,050,420 3,279,373 3,481,270 3,651,283
More dev. EAP 522,683 544,271 568,832 573,626 589,151 604,521 613,388 611,392 602,977
Less dev. EAP 1,406,873 1,615,879 1,836,787 2,031,315 2,229,305 2,445,899 2,665,986 2,869,878 3,048,307
Change 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2010 2010–2020
World EAP 25% 21% 17% 17%
More dev. EAP 9% 5% 4% 5%
Less dev. EAP 31% 26% 21% 20%
SOURCE: International Labour Office (2009).
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is usually easier to obtain visas and documents for legal migration—and 
to make arrangements for illegal migration—in the cities.
Differences encourage migration, but it takes networks or links 
between areas to encourage people to move. Migration networks are 
a broad concept, and they include communication factors that enable 
people to learn about opportunities abroad as well as the migration in-
frastructure that actually transports migrants over national borders and 
even the rights regime that allows them to remain abroad. Migration 
networks have been shaped and strengthened by revolutionary changes 
in each of these areas (communications, transportation, and rights) dur-
ing the past half-century.
Communications and Transportation
The communications revolution helps potential migrants to learn 
about opportunities abroad. The best information comes from migrants 
that are already established abroad because they can provide family 
and friends with information in an understandable context. Cheaper 
communications enable migrants to quickly transmit job information 
as well as advice on how to cross national borders to friends and rela-
tives at home. For example, information about vacant California farm 
jobs may be received in rural Mexico, thousands of miles away, be-
fore it spreads to nearby cities that have unemployment rates of over 
20 percent.10 Meanwhile, films and television programs depicting life 
in high-income countries may encourage people (especially younger 
people) to assume that the grass is greener abroad and that migration 
will lead to economic betterment.11
The transportation revolution highlights the declining cost of 
travel. British migrants unable to pay one-way passage to North Amer-
ican colonies in the eighteenth century often indentured themselves, 
signing contracts that obliged them to work for three to six years for 
whoever met the ship and paid the captain. Transportation costs today 
are far less, typically less than $2,500 to travel anywhere in the world 
legally, and $1,000 to $20,000 for unauthorized migration. Most studies 
suggest faster payback times for migrants today, so that even migrants 
who pay high smuggling fees can usually repay them within two or 
three years.
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Managing Migration via Rights
The communications and transportation revolutions help migrants 
to learn about opportunities and to cross national borders, while the 
rights revolution affects their ability to stay abroad. After World War II, 
most industrial countries strengthened the constitutional and political 
rights of people within their borders to prevent a recurrence of fascism, 
and most granted social or economic rights to residents in their evolving 
welfare states without distinguishing citizens from migrants.
As migration increased in the 1990s, policymakers began to roll 
back certain rights, especially socioeconomic rights, for migrants in an 
effort to manage migration. For example, many European governments 
(Germany, for example) put liberal asylum provisions into their post-
war constitutions to avoid another situation similar to when refugees 
perished because other countries returned them to Nazi Germany. In 
the early 1990s, over 1,000 foreigners a day were applying for asylum 
in Germany. The government distributed them throughout the country 
and required local communities to provide them with housing and food. 
Because more than 90 percent of these were eventually found not to 
be in need of protection, there was a backlash that included attacks on 
foreigners.
The German government responded in three ways: 1) it required 
nationals of the countries of origin of asylum seekers (such as Turkey) 
to obtain visas, allowing pre-screening; 2) it imposed fines on airlines 
bringing foreigners to Germany without visas and other documents; 
and 3) it and other European Union countries agreed to make it diffi-
cult for foreigners from “safe” countries (or who transited through safe 
countries en route to Germany) to apply for asylum.12 In this way, the 
constitutional protection of asylum was maintained, but by making it 
harder to apply, they reduced the number of applicants.
In the 1990s, the United States debated the cost of providing wel-
fare or social assistance to legal and unauthorized migrants. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement was expected to speed up econom-
ic and job growth in Mexico, reducing migration between the United 
States and Mexico. Instead, Mexico–U.S. migration surged during the 
U.S. recession of 1991–1992, prompting California voters to approve 
Proposition 187 in 1994 over the objections of almost all statewide 
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political and opinion leaders (Migration News 1994). The proposition 
called for establishment of a state-funded screening mechanism to en-
sure that unauthorized foreigners did not obtain state-funded services, 
including public-school education.13
Proposition 187 led to a national debate over immigrant numbers 
and rights, especially about the access of newcomers to social assis-
tance. President Bill Clinton and those who wanted to “end welfare 
as we know it” argued that the number of needy migrants should be 
reduced to ensure continued access to welfare benefits among legal 
immigrants. However, employers argued that the better solution was 
to allow immigration to remain at high levels and reduce their access 
to social assistance. Employers won—immigration remained high and 
welfare benefits were curbed, but benefits to poor children and el-
derly immigrants were restored during the economic boom of the late 
1990s.14
Balancing migrant numbers and migrant rights is a major challenge. 
Countries with the highest shares of migrants in their labor forces, such 
as the Gulf oil exporters, tend to extend few rights to migrants—it is 
very hard for a guest worker to win immigrant status and naturalize in 
Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. Countries with fewer guest 
workers, such as Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, tend to 
grant more rights to foreigners. The numbers–rights trade-off is appar-
ent in World Trade Organization negotiations, where some developing 
countries argue that their migrant “service providers” should not have 
to earn the minimum wage in the destination country. Requiring pay-
ment of the minimum wage, they reason, will reduce the number of 
migrant workers employed (Ruhs and Martin 2008).
U.S. MIGRATION
The United States is a nation of immigrants. Under the motto “e 
pluribus unum” (from many one), U.S. presidents frequently remind 
Americans that, with a few exceptions, they or their forebears share the 
experience of beginning anew in the land of opportunity.15 Immigration 
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is widely considered to be in the national interest since it permits im-
migrants to better themselves and strengthen the United States.
For its first 100 years, the United States facilitated immigration, 
welcoming foreigners to settle a vast country. Beginning in the 1880s, 
certain types of foreigners were barred, including prostitutes, workers 
who arrived with contracts that tied them to a particular employer for 
several years, and Chinese, beginning an era of qualitative restrictions. 
In the 1920s, quantitative restrictions or quotas set a ceiling on the num-
ber of immigrants accepted each year.
Amendments in 1965 switched preferences from those wishing 
to migrate from countries in northwestern Europe to those who had 
relatives in the United States and those desired by U.S. employers. The 
origins of immigrants were not expected to change, but they did. In 
the 1960s, half of U.S. immigrants were from Latin America and Asia; 
between 2000 and 2005, 73 percent were from these regions (Martin 
and Midgley 2006, p. 3). Illegal immigration began rising in the 1970s, 
rose faster after immigration reforms in 1986, and was the first major 
immigration issue debated in Congress in the twenty-first century, as 
exemplified by debates in the Senate in 2006 and 2007 (Migration News 
2006, 2007a).
Immigration occurs in waves, and the United States is in the midst 
of its fourth wave of immigrants. The first wave arrived before records 
were kept beginning in 1820, and most newcomers were from the British 
Isles. The second wave, dominated by Irish and German immigrants in 
the 1840s and 1850s, challenged the dominance of the Protestant church 
and led to a nativist backlash against Catholics and immigrants.
The third wave, between 1880 and 1914, brought more than 20 mil-
lion immigrants to the United States, an average of 650,000 a year. 
Most of these southern and eastern European immigrants found jobs in 
factories in the cities of the Northeast and Midwest, where Americans 
leaving the farm sometimes joined them. Third-wave immigration was 
slowed first by World War I and then by quotas in the 1920s.
The fourth and current wave began with immigration reforms put 
in place in 1965. Since then, immigration has increased at an accelerat-
ing rate. The average annual inflow of legal immigrants was 250,000 in 
the 1950s, 330,000 in the 1960s, 450,000 in the 1970s, 735,000 in the 
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1980s, and more than a million since the 1990s (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 2009).
Types of Migrants
Foreigners enter the United States through a front door for legal 
permanent immigrants, a side door for legal temporary migrants, and 
a back door for unauthorized entrants. About two-thirds of legal im-
migrants are family sponsored, which means that family members in 
the United States asked the government to admit their relatives. There 
are no limits on the number of immigrant visas available for immedi-
ate relatives of U.S. citizens, and 580,000 were admitted in Fiscal Year 
2006, but there is a cap on the number of immigrant visas available to 
relatives of permanent residents and more distant relatives of U.S. citi-
zens (only 222,000 were admitted in 2006), resulting in long waits for 
visas. For example, Mexican spouses of U.S. immigrants had to wait 
six years for immigrant visas in 2008, and the wait for Mexican adult 
brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens was 13 years.16
Legal temporary migrants are foreigners who come to the United 
States to visit, work, or study. There are no limits on most types; the 
United States willingly accepted more than 30 million tourists and busi-
ness visitors in 2006. Temporary foreign students and workers are more 
controversial. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the U.S. government required foreign students to be interviewed 
personally before receiving visas to study in the United States and to 
pay a fee to support a database that tracks them while they are studying 
in the states.
Guest workers receive visas that tie them to a U.S. employer and 
specify how long they can stay. Holders of H-1B visas have at least a 
college degree and fill a job that normally requires a college degree. 
Most H-1B guest workers are Indians employed in computer-related 
jobs. Each can stay up to six years and “adjust” to regular immigrant 
status if their U.S. employer deems them uniquely qualified to fill the 
job.
It is easy for U.S. employers to have H-1B guest workers admitted; 
they simply attest that they are paying the prevailing wage and satisfy-
ing other conditions, and their request is almost automatically approved. 
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In 2001, Congress set an annual cap of 65,000 on the number of H-1B 
visas available to most employers, but there is no limit on the number 
for workers employed by nonprofit organizations such as universities.
The number admitted on H-1B visas doubled from about 100,000 to 
200,000 in the 1990s and almost doubled again to just under 400,000 
in 2004, as Congress raised the cap temporarily at the request of high-
tech firms.17 Employers want far more than 65,000 H-1B visas to be 
available, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates has joined the chorus of 
those who say the cap should be eliminated entirely (McCullagh 2005). 
Critics of the H-1B program say that the easy availability of H-1B visas 
has discouraged Americans from studying and working in science and 
engineering fields (Teitelbaum 2003).
Unauthorized foreigners are persons in the country in violation of 
U.S. immigration laws. Demographer Jeff Passel estimated there were 
11 million unauthorized foreigners in 2005, with the number increasing 
by 525,000 a year (Passel 2006a). There were 37 million foreign-born 
U.S. residents in 2005, of which 31 percent were naturalized U.S. citi-
zens, 39 percent were legal immigrants and temporary visitors, and 30 
percent were unauthorized. Somewhat over half of the unauthorized 
foreigners entered the country by evading border controls, and the rest 
entered legally but did not leave as required (Passel 2006b).
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for 
preventing unauthorized foreigners from entering the nation and for 
finding and removing those here illegally. The department’s Customs 
and Border Protection agency includes the Border Patrol, which has 
more than 12,000 agents to apprehend foreigners attempting to enter 
the United States between designated ports of entry. In recent years, 
Border Patrol agents have been apprehending about 1.3 million for-
eigners a year, and 85 percent of these are Mexicans caught just inside 
the Mexico–U.S. border. In addition, some 208,500 foreigners were re-
moved or deported from the United States in 2005, 70 percent of which 
were Mexican.18
Economic Impacts
Most immigrants come to the United States for economic oppor-
tunity. As they go to work, immigrants affect the U.S. economy and 
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labor market. Most working-age immigrants find jobs, earn and spend 
most of their wages, pay taxes, and consume public services. In do-
ing so, immigrants expand employment and the economy while slightly 
depressing wages or the growth in wages, especially for workers simi-
lar to the immigrants. With more workers, profits rise, and the entire 
economy is larger as a result of immigration.
In 1997, the National Research Council emphasized that the main 
beneficiaries of immigration are the immigrants themselves, who earn 
higher wages than they could in their home countries, followed by 
their U.S. employers. Skilled U.S. workers and affluent consumers also 
benefit from the presence of unskilled immigrants, for example, when 
professionals hire migrants to do household work or pay slightly less 
in restaurants because migrants hold down wages. The net economic 
benefits of legal and illegal immigration were estimated to be $1 billion 
to $10 billion in the mid 1990s, meaning that U.S. gross domestic prod-
uct was increased by this amount because of immigration (Smith and 
Edmonston 1997). Proponents of immigration stress that the immigrant 
effect was positive; opponents stress that the overall impact was negli-
gible because the then $8 trillion economy was expanding by 3 percent, 
growing by $240 billion a year or by $10 billion every two weeks.19
Immigration has a small, yet positive overall economic effect, mak-
ing the major economic questions about immigration distributional, 
such as who benefits and who suffers from immigration? In general, im-
migrants are different from those born in the United States in their level 
of education, so they will have uneven effects on U.S.-born workers.
The best single predictor of U.S. income is years of education. 
Some 30 percent of immigrants who arrived since 1990 and were 25 or 
older in 2002 had at least a college degree, compared with 24 percent of 
U.S.-born Americans in the same age category. At the other end of the 
education distribution, 34 percent of the immigrants did not finish high 
school as compared with 16 percent of U.S.-born adults (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2005).
The differences between immigrants and those born in the United 
States are clear: the educational profile of U.S.-born adults features a 
bulge in the middle, reflecting the 62 percent of Americans with a high-
school diploma but no college degree. Immigrants, on the other hand, 
divide into three distinct groups of about equal size: college graduates, 
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high-school graduates, and those with less than a high-school diploma. 
The large share of immigrants with less than a high-school diploma 
has raised concerns about the impact of immigrants on low-skilled 
U.S. workers and about the balance of their taxes paid relative to tax- 
supported benefits received.
LABOR-MARKET EFFECTS
Immigration adds workers who change U.S. wages, prices, and 
profits. The President’s Council of Economic Advisers summarized 
the labor-market effects of immigrants as follows: “Although immi-
grant workers increase output, their addition to the supply of labor . . . 
[causes] wage rates in the immediately affected market [to be] bid 
down . . . Thus, native-born workers who compete with immigrants for 
jobs may experience reduced earnings or reduced employment” (Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers 1986, p. 221).
Most research interest and policy concerns focus on how immigrants 
affect those near the bottom of the labor market. Governments have 
long protected vulnerable low-wage workers by establishing minimum 
wages, regulating hours of work, and allowing workers to join unions 
and bargain for higher wages with their employers. The 1960s War on 
Poverty and civil rights movement reinforced the U.S. commitment to 
improving conditions at the bottom of the labor market, which resulted 
in the creation of employment and training programs that enable work-
ers to improve their skills and earnings as well as affirmative-action 
programs for groups that suffered discrimination in the past.
Economic Studies
Economists and other social scientists have used three kinds of stud-
ies to examine the labor-market effects of immigrants in detail: 1) case 
studies, 2) econometric studies, and 3) economic-mobility or integra-
tion studies.
Case studies examine the impacts of immigrants in a particular in-
dustry or occupation, not the overall economy. When unionized farm 
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workers in southern California went on strike for a wage increase in 
1982, many were replaced by unauthorized newcomers recruited to 
break the strike by labor contractors. The displacement of union work-
ers in this case was a result of a competition between employers. The 
unionized harvesting association lost business and laid off workers 
as growers turned to labor contractors who hired non-union and of-
ten unauthorized workers to get their lemons picked. Eventually, the 
unionized harvesting association went out of business, and the wages 
of lemon pickers declined (Mines and Martin 1984).
Case studies show that immigrants can displace workers and depress 
wages by adding vulnerable workers to the labor force. This scenario 
conforms to accepted labor-market theory, but as the lemon example 
shows, immigration’s effects on wages and employment can be indirect 
and thus hard to measure. One reason is that many workers are hired via 
networks, meaning that current workers bring friends and family to fill 
vacant jobs. Once a cross-border network takes over the recruitment of 
new workers to fill job vacancies in a particular workplace, local work-
ers may not learn about them as immigrants recruit new workers from 
abroad. An example of network hiring via contractors was when the 
owners of office buildings in Los Angeles replaced unionized black jan-
itors with immigrants hired through cleaning contractors in the 1980s 
and 1990s (General Accounting Office 1988, pp. 39–41).
Other case studies show how an industry can introduce immigrants 
to an area via recruitment networks. The U.S. meat industry employs 
about 500,000 workers to turn cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry into meat 
and other products, and it has shifted from cities such as Chicago to 
more rural areas in the Midwest and Southeast over the past quarter 
century. Plants became fewer and larger, and they often sought to oper-
ate 16 hours a day with two “disassembly” shifts in areas with relatively 
few workers, and wages were much lower than those paid in cities, 
where workers had other job options. Many of these plants recruited 
immigrants, and today about half of the workers in meatpacking are 
Hispanic (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2008).
Case studies emphasize how contractor recruitment, networks, and 
industry shifts interact to transform particular workplaces or industries, 
whereas econometric studies consider how immigration, wages, and 
employment interact in a city’s labor market, usually by comparing cit-
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ies with higher and lower shares of immigrant workers. Econometric 
studies begin with the assumption that, if the presence of immigrants 
depresses wages or displaces workers, cities with a higher share of 
immigrants in their labor forces should have lower wages or higher 
unemployment rates, especially for similar U.S. workers. Thus, econo-
metric studies typically compare wages and unemployment rates for 
blacks, Hispanics, and women in cities with relatively more and fewer 
immigrants, such as Los Angeles and Minneapolis, expecting to find 
lower wages or higher unemployment in the area with more immigrants 
(Los Angeles in this example).
During the 1980s, to the surprise of economists, econometric stud-
ies found few of these expected negative labor-market effects. For 
example, a comparison of the wages and unemployment rates of black 
workers in Miami and other cities such as Atlanta and Tampa found no 
significant differences, even though the 1980 Mariel boatlift increased 
the Miami labor force by 7 percent in just four months (Card 1990). 
Several reasons for finding no adverse effects were offered, includ-
ing the fact that jobs were created to build housing for the newcomers 
and that Cuban newcomers and local blacks did not compete for the 
same jobs; for example, few Cuban newcomers got government jobs. 
Economist George Borjas summarized the 1980s research literature by 
concluding, “Modern econometrics cannot detect a single shred of evi-
dence that immigrants have a sizable adverse impact on the earnings 
and employment opportunities of natives in the United States” (Borjas 
1990, p. 81).
As more data became available in the 1990s, researchers began to 
realize that, instead of staying in “immigrant cities,” U.S. workers who 
competed most directly with immigrants moved away from immigrant 
cities or did not move to them. As a result, the effects of immigration on 
wages or unemployment were quickly diffused throughout the country 
rather than being measurable in an immigrant city such as Los Ange-
les or Houston. Furthermore, the “similar U.S. workers” who remained 
in “immigrant cities” often did not compete directly with immigrant 
workers, such as when blacks and women worked for government 
agencies at wages negotiated by collective bargaining or set by federal, 
state, or local governments that did not respond immediately to an in-
flux of immigrant workers. If some of the U.S. workers who compete 
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with newcomer immigrants move away, and the workers who remain 
are sheltered from immigrant wage effects, it is very hard to detect the 
expected effects of immigrants in comparisons of city labor markets 
(Borjas 1994a, 1999).
Measuring the impacts of 22 million foreign-born workers on 127 
million U.S.-born workers is no easier when foreign-born workers dif-
fer significantly in education and location. The expected labor-market 
effects of adding immigrants to the labor force—slower wage growth 
and higher unemployment among similar workers—tend to be small 
and very hard to measure, especially because U.S. residents are mobile 
and labor markets are flexible. Indeed, if immigrants move to fast-
growing cities, city comparison studies may suggest that immigration 
benefits similar U.S. workers (Borjas and Katz 2005). The difficulty in 
measuring immigrant impacts, and the different conclusions reached by 
economists such as George Borjas, who believes that immigrants re-
duce the wages of similar U.S. workers, and David Card, who does not, 
ensures a continuing debate on their effects (Lowenstein 2006).
Economic-mobility or integration studies examine how immigrants 
and their children are faring in the United States. Immigrants earn just 
over 75 percent as much as U.S.-born workers. In 2007, their median 
weekly earnings were $554 versus $722 for U.S.-born workers (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2008). Lower earnings for newcomers who may 
not know English or have U.S. work experience are not surprising; the 
question is whether the earnings of immigrants catch up to those of 
U.S.-born workers over time, suggesting economic integration.
Economist Barry Chiswick studied the earnings trajectories of im-
migrant men who were in the United States in 1970. Chiswick found 
that the earnings of immigrant men were initially 10 percent lower than 
those of U.S.-born men of similar age and level of education. However, 
the earnings of immigrant men rose faster, and after an average 13 years 
in the United States, they had earnings equal to those of similar U.S.-
born men, and after 23 years, the immigrants earned 6 percent more 
(Chiswick 1978). Chiswick’s study provided evidence for the fresh-
blood argument that immigration benefits the United States because the 
extra drive and ambition that leads people to cross national borders and 
begin anew expands the U.S. economy and raises average earnings.
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A decade later, economist George Borjas concluded that Chiswick’s 
findings applied to a unique set of circumstances. Most of the immi-
grants in the United States in 1970 were Europeans or well-educated 
Asians who initially earned less than comparably educated U.S. men, 
but they caught up as they learned English and gained U.S. work expe-
rience. However, later cohorts of immigrants who arrived with far less 
education, such as legal and unauthorized Mexican immigrants, started 
their American journeys with much lower earnings than earlier immi-
grants. The earnings of Mexicans did not rise as fast, leading Borjas 
to conclude that continued Latin American immigration would lead to 
widening gaps between immigrants and native-born Americans (Borjas 
1994b).20
Entrepreneurship
Economists tend to look at earnings to measure economic inte-
gration, but some social scientists emphasize other indicators, such as 
entrepreneurship and the creation of new businesses. Immigrant-owned 
businesses are highly visible in many cities, from ethnic restaurants and 
shops to gardening and cleaning services. With immigrants often will-
ing to work long hours, sometimes creating jobs for family members 
and other immigrants from their countries of origin, some commenta-
tors say that immigrant energy can revitalize cities (Aronson 1997, pp. 
11–12; Portes 1995, p. 29). Many Cubans in Miami, for example, began 
businesses to serve other Cubans in an “ethnic enclave” that is now seen 
as an economic incubator (Portes and Bach 1985).
Entrepreneurship is hard to measure, and self-employment is often 
used as a proxy measure for those who begin their own businesses. 
About 13 percent of U.S.-born workers were self-employed in 2005 (a 
broad category including, for example, farmers, doctors, and lawyers), 
as were 11 percent of foreign-born workers. Rates of self-employment 
were especially high among some groups: 28 percent of those born in 
Korea were self-employed in the United States, as were 20 percent or 
more of those born in Russia and Iran (Camarota 2005). Self-employment 
normally declines with economic development, especially as farmers 
leave the land for urban jobs in factories and offices. However, in the 
new service economy, it has become easier to be self-employed, and 
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immigrants may be in a unique position to spot opportunities (Camarota 
2005).
In the end, though, it is not clear that self-employment is a sign of 
immigrant economic success. In fact, self-employment tends to increase 
during recessions, as some ex-farmers return to the land in developing 
countries and some laid-off executives become self-employed consul-
tants in more developed countries (Borjas 1990; Filer, Hamermesh, and 
Rees 1996).
IMMIGRATION TRADE-OFFS
Immigration is often characterized as either good or bad for the 
country, but public policy choices are rarely contests between good and 
bad. They are instead arguments about which “good” deserves higher 
priority. For example, raising interest rates can lead to lower inflation, a 
desirable result, but away from fuller employment, a competing good. 
Similarly, reducing trade barriers can stimulate exports, helping some 
employers and workers, but it also increases imports, which can lead to 
the failure of other businesses and a loss of jobs.
There is no easy way to balance the trade-offs between competing 
outcomes, and the United States has found it especially hard to deal 
with trade-offs inherent in the three basic immigration questions:
1) How many immigrants should be allowed to enter?
2) From which countries and in what status should they come?
3) How should the government enforce immigration rules?
Immigrant farm workers provide an example. Americans want to 
pay low prices for food. They also want farm workers, like other U.S. 
workers, to have decent wages and working conditions. Congress per-
mitted Mexican farm workers to enter as immigrants and guest workers 
and tolerated unauthorized migrants, which helped to keep farm wages 
low but also increased poverty among farm workers. To alleviate this 
poverty, the federal government spends about $1 billion a year on spe-
cial education, health, and housing programs for farm workers and their 
children.21
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What is the trade-off between cheap food and decent farm wages? 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expen-
diture Survey, there were 120 million “consumer units” in 2007, and 
they had an average of 2.5 persons, 1.3 earners, and 1.9 vehicles. These 
consumer units or households had average annual incomes of $63,100 
before taxes, and their expenditures averaged $49,600 (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2008). These household expenditures included $6,100 
for food (12 percent). Food spending was split 57–43 percent, including 
$3,500 for food eaten at home ($67 a week) and $2,700 for food bought 
away from home. To put food spending in perspective, other significant 
expenditures were $17,000 for housing and utilities, $8,800 for trans-
portation, $2,900 for health care, $1,900 for apparel, and $2,700 for 
entertainment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008).
The largest at-home food expenditures were for meat and poultry, 
totaling $777. Expenditures on cereal and bakery products, $460, ex-
ceeded the $387 spent on dairy products. Expenditures on fresh fruits 
($202) and fresh vegetables ($190) totaled $392, or $7.50 a week (con-
sumer units spent an additional $112 on processed fruits and $96 on 
processed vegetables). The average consumer unit spent more on al-
coholic beverages, $457 (or $8.75 a week), than on fresh fruits and 
vegetables (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008).
Farmers get a small share of the retail food dollar, an average of 19 
percent. In 2006, farmers received an average 30 percent of the retail 
price of fresh fruits and 25 percent of the retail price of fresh vegetables, 
so consumer expenditures of $392 meant $109 to the farmer ([0.3 × 
$202 = $61] + [0.25 × $190 = $48] = $109). Farm labor costs are typi-
cally less than a third of farm revenue for fresh fruits and vegetables, 
meaning that farm worker wages and benefits for fresh fruits and veg-
etables cost the average consumer unit $36 a year (U.S Department of 
Agriculture 2008a).
Although strawberries are picked directly into the containers in 
which they are sold, and iceberg lettuce gets its film wrapper in the 
field, farmers and farm workers get a very small share of the retail dol-
lar. Consumers who pay $1 for a pound of apples are giving 30 cents to 
the farmer of which 10 cents goes to the farm worker; those spending 
$2 for a head of lettuce are giving 42 cents to the farmer and 10 cents to 
the farm worker (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008a).
Immigration and the U.S. Labor Market   71
If the influx of immigrant workers was slowed or stopped and farm 
wages rose, what would happen to expenditures on fresh fruits and 
vegetables? In 1966, the fledgling United Farm Workers union won a 
40 percent wage increase for table grape harvesters, largely because 
Bracero workers (temporary contract laborers from Mexico) were not 
available. The average earnings of field workers were $9.40 an hour in 
2007, according to a U.S. Department of Agriculture survey of farm 
employers, and a 40 percent increase would raise the average to $13.15 
an hour. If this wage increase were passed on to consumers, the 10-cent 
farm labor cost of a pound of apples would rise to 14 cents, and the re-
tail price would rise to $1.04 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008b).
For a typical household, a 40 percent increase in farm labor costs 
translates into about a 4 percent (3.6 percent) increase in retail prices 
for fresh fruits and vegetables.22 If farm wages rose 40 percent and were 
passed fully to consumers, average spending on fruits and vegetables 
would rise by $14 a year (3.6 percent × $392). However, for a typical 
seasonal farm worker, a 40 percent wage increase could raise earnings 
from $9,400 for 1,000 hours of work to $13,150, lifting him or her 
above the federal poverty line for an individual.
Are the savings on fresh produce due to immigration worthwhile? 
Under the present arrangement, the migrants are better off, earning 
more in the United States than they would at home. U.S. farmers and 
their bankers are also better off, enjoying higher profits and higher land 
prices. Consumers of U.S. commodities pay less for fresh produce. The 
critical question is whether these benefits are more valuable than having 
farm work performed and rewarded like other work in America. The 
way this question is answered affects U.S. immigration policy, espe-
cially with respect to Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS: IMMIGRATION AND VERNON BRIGGS
Immigration means change—in the number and type of people and 
workers in a country, in the structure and functioning of labor markets, 
and in the welfare of residents and workers. Migration has interrelated 
cultural and political as well as economic dimensions, as demonstrated 
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by this chapter’s discussion of recruiting networks and migration man-
agement. At the same time, the economic and labor-market effects of 
migrants are often difficult to measure, which prompts some to con-
clude that there are few such effects.
Vernon Briggs has long been concerned about low-wage and mi-
nority workers. His scholarship demonstrates that periods of low 
immigration and rapid economic growth, such as the 1960s, reinforce 
governmental poverty-reduction efforts and enable a rising tide to lift 
most U.S. workers up the U.S. job ladder (Briggs 2003). His work also 
documents that unauthorized migration surged in the 1990s, in part 
a consequence of flawed policy initiatives, as the real wages of U.S. 
workers with little education and few skills declined, even as their share 
of the labor force diminished (Briggs 2005).
Briggs deserves our gratitude for pioneering efforts to analyze these 
trends and to educate and inform policymakers and the public about 
the links between increased immigration and low-wage workers. The 
unauthorized foreigners who arrived in the 1990s are having U.S.-born 
(and thus U.S.-citizen) children, and a future Vernon Briggs will likely 
develop policy options to help them climb the U.S. job ladder.
Notes
1. Charles C. Lemert says there were fewer than 50 nation-states in 1900 (Lemert 
2005, p. 176).
2. Data were obtained from the Web sites of government immigration agencies that 
were accessed in August 2007.
3. A Wall Street Journal editorial on July 3, 1986, first made the open borders pro-
posal, which was repeated in an editorial on July 3, 1990.
4. The National Front candidate, Jean Marie Le Pen, received 15 percent of the vote 
in the first round of presidential voting in 1995 (Fekete 1995).
5. The average woman in developing countries has 3.5 children (excluding China), 
versus 1.5 children per woman in developed countries. According to the Population 
Reference Bureau (http://www.prb.org), the world’s fastest growing population is 
in Gaza, where the population growth rate is 4.5 percent a year, and the fastest 
shrinking population is in Russia, where the population is declining by 0.5 percent 
a year.
6. Young people are most likely to move over borders because they have the least 
invested in jobs and careers at home and the most time to recoup their “investment 
in migration” abroad.
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7. Average global per-capita income was $7,000 per person. At purchasing power 
parity, which takes into account national differences in the cost of living, the 
world’s gross national income was $56 trillion or $9,400 per capita—$32,500 per 
capita in the high-income countries and $5,200 in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (World Bank 2009).
8. Taxes are extracted from agriculture by monopoly input suppliers who sell seeds 
or fertilizers at high prices or by monopoly purchasers of farm commodities who 
buy from farmers at less-than-world prices and pocket the difference when the 
coffee, cocoa, or other commodity is exported. In high-income countries, farmers’ 
incomes are generally higher than those of nonfarmers, in part because high- 
income countries transfer funds to producers of food and fiber.
9. For example, this is evident in Chinese coastal cities, where internal rural–urban 
migrants fill 3-D jobs, and abroad, where Chinese migrants are employed in indus-
tries that range from services to sweatshops (Migration News 2008).
10. These farm worker recruitment networks are examined in Rural Migration News. 
See http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/index.php.
11. Even if migrants know that movies and TV shows portray exaggerated lifestyles, 
migrants who find themselves in slave-like conditions abroad sometimes say they 
did not believe things in rich countries could be “that bad.”
12. The goal is to prevent so-called asylum shopping, such as when an asylum seeker 
from Turkey passes through Bulgaria and Romania en route to Germany and ap-
plies for asylum because conditions for asylum applicants and rates of recognition 
are better in Germany (Da Lomba 2004).
13. A federal judge stopped implementation of Proposition 187 (which was approved 
by a 59 to 41 percent margin in November 1994), but some of its provisions were 
included in 1996 federal immigration reforms (see Migration News 1994).
14. Details of the three U.S. laws enacted in 1996 can be found at Migration News 
(http://migration.ucdavis.edu). One provision that was eventually dropped would 
have made legal immigrants deportable if they received more than 12 months of 
welfare benefits.
15. The exceptions are Native Americans, slaves, and those who became U.S. citizens 
by purchase or conquest, such as French nationals who became Americans with 
the Louisiana Purchase, Mexicans who became Americans with the settlement 
ending the Mexican War, and Puerto Ricans who became U.S. citizens as a result 
of the American victory over Spain in 1898.
16. Waiting lists are published in the Department of State Visa Bulletin, available at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html.
17. In addition to the H-1B cap exemption for certain nonprofits, up to 20,000 foreign 
students a year who earn master’s degrees and doctorates from U.S. universi-
ties can receive H-1B visas. As a result, the number admitted each year exceeds 
100,000. An H-1B visa holder can later become an immigrant if he or she qualifies 
on the basis of family unification or employment.
18. Annual DHS reports entitled “Immigration Enforcement Actions” can be found at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/index.shtm. Almost all appre-
hended Mexicans “volunteer” to return to Mexico. Those caught so many times 
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they appear to be smugglers may be prosecuted by U.S. authorities. In the inves-
tigation of the firings of eight U.S. attorneys in December 2006, it was reported 
that, in most border districts, the same individual had to be apprehended at least 
six times before being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s office (see Migration 
News 2007b).
19. By 2005, the U.S. economy was growing by about $15 billion in two weeks.
20. Between 1970 and 1990, the share of U.S. men without a high-school diploma by 
age 25 fell from 40 percent to 15 percent; the share of immigrant men without a 
high-school diploma fell from 48 percent to 37 percent (Borjas 1994b).
21. The evolution and effectiveness of these programs is examined in Martin and 
Martin (1993).
22. The calculation is as follows. If farmers receive an average 27.8 percent of the 
retail price of fresh fruits and vegetables ($109/$392), and give a third of what they 
get to farm workers, then the farm worker share of the retail dollar is 9 percent 
(0.278 × 0.33 = 9 percent). If farm labor costs rise 40 percent, then 0.4 × 9 percent 
yields a 3.6 percent rise in retail prices.
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Assessing the Briggs Approach 
to Political Refugee Policy
Larry Nackerud
University of Georgia
Vernon Briggs’s legacy in the landscape of U.S. immigration policy 
is secure. His research and writings are extensive, stretching from 1965 
to today, and he is recognized as a leading national and international 
expert in his field. The accolades for his work, the stature of his coau-
thors, and the never-ending list of scholars who cite his publications, all 
speak to Briggs’s footprint on U.S. immigration policy. This chapter, 
however, is not about Briggs’s wide-ranging work in immigration pol-
icy; rather, it is focused on a more narrowly defined policy arena about 
which he was passionate—political refugee and asylee policy. In this 
chapter I posit that, while Briggs writes and speaks often of political 
refugee and asylee policy, his work in this area is ripe for extension, and 
yes, even debate. I am confident that Briggs will encourage and support 
such work, as nothing signifies Briggs’s work more than discourse, de-
bate, and lively discussion.
This confidence is bolstered by my personal experience with Briggs. 
In the mid 1980s, I studied at Cornell University to pursue an interest in 
social policy analysis. I sought knowledge about federal social policy 
formulation, local-level impact, and community-driven efforts to shape 
or modify those policies. Given this interest, Alan Hahn (my graduate 
committee chair) recommended I take a seminar in immigration and po-
litical refugee policy from “this fellow” over in the School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations.
As the seminar’s first session was about to begin, Briggs shuffled 
into the classroom with a pile of books and well-worn notes under his 
arm. He placed the books and notes in front of him on the table and 
began to speak. I remember initially thinking, “This will be a long se-
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mester.” Quickly, though, Briggs won me over. I was soon captivated 
by the breadth and depth of his historical and technical knowledge of 
immigration as well as of political refugee and asylee policy.
Briggs promoted academic dialogue and civil discourse. He encour-
aged students to express differing opinions and challenging questions 
in respectful and informed ways. He provoked an appreciation for 
the “unending conversation” that is central to the academic dialogue 
(Bruffee 1997). Critical to Briggs’s view of such dialogue was that stu-
dents should understand that academic work, be it teaching, research, 
or writing, is merely a conduit to a conversation of persons who are, 
in important ways, “fundamentally disagreeing” (Bean 2001, p. 18). 
Anyone who has followed Briggs’s career is aware of his extraordinary 
ability to disagree, to state an opinion contrary to the popular view, and 
to do so with respect for others. For evidence of this unique ability, 
one need look no further than his recent public testimony, “Real Im-
migration Reform: The Path to Credibility,” before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives (Briggs 2007).
I experienced firsthand Briggs’s ability to encourage and support 
dialogue, even when there was political incongruence. In the classroom 
and during the years he was on my doctoral committee, it was clear 
that, although Briggs and I shared an interest in political refugee and 
asylee policy, our politics were not in complete congruence (on matters 
including the role of government, the position of humanitarian concerns 
in policymaking, and our concerns about the economy). I cringed when 
I heard Briggs say something to the effect that every person admitted to 
the United Stated should be first judged for her or his capacity to posi-
tively contribute to the economy. I would sometimes counter, “Even in 
the world of political refugee policy?” Not always, but often, Briggs, 
after a pensive pause, would answer in the affirmative.
His talk of neutrality with respect to political ideology and eco-
nomic accountability for each U.S. entry decision sometimes struck me 
as cold. I came to realize, though, that our common interest in societal 
equity and the well-being of people seeking refuge in another country 
was merely constructed and expressed differently. Moreover, it was his 
tolerance of difference that contributed mightily to my oft-confirmed 
belief in Briggs as the “consummate academic.” At the core of such an 
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academic, in my opinion, is a willingness to nurture the expression of a 
varying belief held by another.
When asked to write this chapter, I first read and reacquainted my-
self with many of Briggs’s works, including books and journal articles. 
I was struck by the extensive use of three considerations in his writing: 
economic accountability for each entry decision into the United States, 
neutrality with respect to political ideology, and societal equity. That 
threefold emphasis is the point of departure for this chapter: Can these 
considerations ever become the foundation for decision making in the 
complex arena of political refugee and asylee policy? This chapter con-
siders that question through a review of the scholarship of Briggs and 
others.
HISTORY AS THE CONTEXT
 Regardless of whether one is attempting to emulate Briggs or 
seeking to thoughtfully examine his three considerations (economic ac-
countability, political neutrality, and societal equity), there can be only 
one starting point—history. Briggs, the consummate historian, started 
nearly each class and written piece with a historical review, particu-
larly past policy developments. In this section, as a means of setting the 
foundation for a discussion of his three considerations, I present a brief 
history of U.S. political refugee policy, followed by a synopsis of the 
current state of affairs in U.S. political refugee policy.
In the historical section of his classic work, Immigration and Amer-
ican Unionism, Briggs states that issues surrounding accommodation 
of political refugees or asylees did not concern U.S. policymakers until 
the 1930s (Briggs 2001). In fact, prior to the passage of the Immigration 
Act of 1924, there was little need to be concerned about how the United 
States might respond to the needs of persons who sought to escape per-
secution in their homeland. In short, if they could get to the United 
States, they were generally admitted. The era of entrance upon arrival 
ended with the Immigration Act of 1924. It was not until after World 
War II that political refugee accommodation moved to a prominent po-
sition within the international community and the United States. In fact, 
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the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which President Harry Truman first 
promoted in 1945, was the first-ever piece of U.S. legislation focused 
solely on political refugee accommodation (Briggs 2003a).
Internationally, the world of political refugee accommodation 
witnessed a watershed event in 1951: the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Political Refugees. The Status provided the 
now classic definition of a person seeking refugee or asylee status:1
[O]wing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling 
to return to it. (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 1951)
Providing a backdrop for the 1951 Convention was passage of the 
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948. Of the 30 
articles expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights, none was more 
applicable to a discussion of political refugee and asylee policy than 
Article 14, which indicated that everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 1948).
As the international community embraced a more rights-based and 
nondiscriminatory conscience for the consideration of the movement 
of people about the world, the United States countered with the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, which continued to employ a 
discriminatory, national-origins admission system (Briggs 2003a). Per-
sons described as refugees continued to come to the United States in the 
1930s, 1940s, and even 1950s; however, they did so at a time when the 
overall immigration levels were low.
After passage of the Political Refugee Relief Act of 1953, it was 
the parole authority of the Eisenhower administration that had the most 
profound impact on political refugee policy. The use of parole authority 
to bring refugees into the country was first used in 1956 and culminated 
with the admission of several hundred thousand Indochinese as part 
of the Indochinese Refugee Act of 1977 (Jeffreys 2007). Interestingly, 
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the use of the parole authority admission process for political refugees 
continued even after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, which 
specified 17,400 visas for political refugees worldwide (Briggs 2001).
Another document, equal internationally to the impact of the 1951 
Convention, was the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees. This prohibited any nation from returning a person 
claiming to be a refugee to a country where her or his life or freedom 
would be threatened. The United States signed onto the Protocol in 
1968 (Jeffreys 2007), and this concept of “non-refoulement” took its 
place in U.S. political refugee and asylee policy deliberations.
In 1978, the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Politi-
cal Refugee Policy (SCRIP) was formed. The commission was charged 
with bringing some sense to the country’s admission policies. While the 
work of SCRIP was extensive and historically well regarded, it was the 
refugee-producing conditions in Southeast Asia that hurried the U.S. 
Congress to passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Briggs 2001). This 
Act established, at least in theory, a geographically and politically neu-
tral adjudication standard for refugee or asylee status (Jeffreys 2007). 
It did so by removing the previous standard—which involved fleeing 
Communism or being from the Middle East—and replacing it with the 
persecution standard expressed in the 1951 U.N. Convention (Nackerud 
1993).
The Refugee Act of 1980 essentially removed political refugees 
and asylees from immigration law by eliminating the refugee category 
declared earlier in the Immigration Act of 1965. A new system for the 
admission of political refugees and consideration of asylee status was 
thus created. Central to the new system was a consultation process be-
tween the President and Congress to determine numerical allocations 
and targeted geographic preferences (Nackerud 1993). The Refugee 
Act of 1980 was also designed to stop the use of the parole authority to 
admit large numbers of political refugees without numerical restriction 
(Briggs 2001). It also brought the United States into greater congruence 
with the international community, primarily through adoption of the 
U.N.-sponsored definition of who might be judged a political refugee 
or asylee (Nackerud 1993).
Briggs highlighted the fact that asylee policy was the least thought-
through provision of the Refugee Act of 1980. Asylee status was 
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intended to apply to individual cases and no one foresaw that the United 
States would become a nation of first instance for massive numbers of 
persons who, once ashore, would seek political asylum. Within weeks 
of its passage, that is precisely what happened (Briggs 2001, p. 148). 
Over the years, particularly large numbers of asylum seekers from Cuba 
and Haiti would challenge the effectiveness of the 1980 Refugee Act as 
a policy instrument.
That Act specified the creation of the Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment within the Department of Health and Human Services, which 
was charged with ensuring that persons admitted as political refugees 
become self-sufficient and free from long-term dependence on public 
assistance (Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007). The consultative pat-
tern established in the 1980 Refugee Act continues to this day. Before 
each fiscal year, the President consults with Congress and a worldwide 
refugee admissions ceiling is established. Allocations for each of the six 
geographic regions of the world are set (Jeffreys 2007). From 1980 to 
2006, 2.3 million political refugees were admitted to the United States. 
An additional 344,507 individuals were granted asylum from 1990 to 
2005. Thirty U.S. metropolitan areas and six states, California, Texas, 
Florida, New York, Washington, and Illinois, received over 60 percent 
of all resettled political refugees from 1983 to 2004 (Newland, Tanaka, 
and Barker 2007).
In 2007, political refugees constituted a mere 10 percent of an-
nual overall immigration flow to the United States, but they were more 
noticeable as a subpopulation because of their tendency to congregate 
geographically. Refugees have historically congregated in certain major 
metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, but 
they are also now doing so in mid-sized cities such as Sioux Falls and 
Fargo, South Dakota, and Binghamton, New York. For the last seven 
years, the United States has set its annual political refugee admissions 
ceiling at 70,000, a 70 percent decline from where it was set when the 
notion of a numerical limit was first introduced some 28 years ago. 
Despite this downward trend, the United States continues to resettle 
more political refugees overall than any other country, although other 
countries, particularly the Scandinavian social welfare states, resettle 
higher proportions of political refugees relative to the size of their na-
tive populations (Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007).
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Table 5.1 depicts the numerical history of refugee admissions. Of 
particular note are the two years following most closely in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and their historically low 
levels of refugee admissions (26,773 and 28,304 in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively).
Low levels of refugee admissions (relative to those seen before 
2002) continued even after 2002 and 2003. Indeed, the total number 
of political refugees admitted to the United States decreased 23 per-
cent from 2005 (53,738) to 2006 (41,150).  Overall, the annual average 
number of refugee arrivals declined from approximately 100,000 dur-
ing the 1990s to 50,000 during the 2000–2006 period. This decline is 
often attributed to changes in security procedures after September 11, 
2001, as well as admission requirements resulting from the Patriot Act 
of 2001 and the Real ID Act of 2005 (Jeffreys 2007). The composi-
tion of refugees has also shifted over the years, paralleling evolving 
humanitarian crises around the world and often more directly reflecting 
U.S. foreign policy priorities (Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007). The 
political asylee applicant must meet the same definition of persecution 
set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980. Asylee claims have risen through 
the years and claims averaged just over 26,000 a year from 2004 to 
2006 (Jeffreys 2007).
This history and synopsis dovetails with one of Briggs’s main 
historical points; the initial assignment for policy interpretation and 
implementation regarding entry of persons into the United States was 
with the Department of Labor upon its creation in 1913, but the assign-
ment has shifted over time. In 1933, responsibility was transferred to 
the Department of Justice, and in 2003, it was moved to the Department 
of Homeland Security (Briggs 2003a). In 2007, responsibility was di-
vided among three bureaus of the Department of Homeland Security: 
Customs and Border Protection, Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (General Accounting Of-
fice 2004).
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Table 5.1  Refugee Arrivals, Fiscal Years 1980 to 2006
Year Number
1980 207,116 
1981 159,252 
1982 98,096 
1983 61,218 
1984 70,393 
1985 67,704 
1986 62,146 
1987 64,528 
1988 76,483 
1989 107,070 
1990 122,066 
1991 113,389 
1992 115,548 
1993 114,181 
1994 111,680 
1995 98,973 
1996 74,791 
1997 69,276 
1998 76,181 
1999 85,076 
2000 72,143 
2001 68,925 
2002 26,773 
2003 28,304 
2004 52,837 
2005 53,738 
2006 41,150 
NOTE: Data series began following the Refugee Act of 1980. Excludes Amerasian im-
migrants, except in fiscal years 1989 to 1991.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State (2007).
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THE THREE CONSIDERATIONS
Economic Accountability for Each Entry Decision 
into the United States
Can economic accountability for each entry decision ever become 
the foundation for decision making in the complex arena of political 
refugee and asylee policy? Even though Briggs’s work in the use of 
economic accountability for overall immigrant entry decisions is exten-
sive and strong, I do not believe it is in the best interest of the United 
States to fully overlay that consideration onto the arena of political refu-
gee and asylee policy. In fact, I believe even some of Briggs’s work on 
economic accountability and political refugee and asylee policy may 
benefit from a bit of an extension of his ideas.
If a single mantra had to be selected from the legacy of Briggs’s 
work, then the one that most fully embodies his career and impact is the 
notion of linking immigration decisions and economic accountability. 
In almost all writings and speaking opportunities, Briggs proffers this 
idea. In public testimonies as recent as May of 2007, he emphasized 
the impact on the labor force of any change in entry policy. In Briggs’s 
view, each entrant should be judged for: 1) their ability to bring human 
capital with them when they enter the country, 2) the probability that 
an individual entering the country will be an asset to the U.S. economy, 
and 3) particularly with regard to subpopulations, such as political refu-
gees and asylees, the probability that the individual will not become or 
remain welfare dependent. Briggs’s belief in viable economic account-
ability is captured in the following quote:
The United States needs to adopt an immigration policy that is con-
sistent with its rapidly changing labor-market trends. If congruent, 
immigration policy can provide a valuable tool to national efforts 
to enhance economic efficiency and to achieve societal equity. If 
contradictory, immigration policy can present a major barrier to 
the accomplishment of either or both goals. The luxury of allowing 
immigration policy to continue to be determined on political crite-
ria (i.e., to placate special interest groups) and to achieve idealistic 
social dreams (i.e., to pursue diversity simply for its own sake) 
can ill be afforded. Making immigration policy primarily a human 
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resource development policy would give immigration policy what 
it now lacks: economic accountability for most of what it does. 
(Briggs 2003a, p. 282)
With regard to political refugee and asylee policy, however, Briggs’s 
economic accountability idea is open to debate. In a paper presented in 
2003 before the Association for Evolutionary Economics, Briggs con-
tended that “unexpected consequences” of immigration policy have 
played a significant part in the creation of poverty in the United States 
since 1965. Listing six of these consequences, Briggs described number 
five as the “extensive admission of refugees, mostly from third-world 
nations.” Number six on Briggs’s list is as follows: “The arrival of many 
poor persons, also from mostly the third world, who often falsely make 
claims for political asylum to justify their presence and then abscond 
before their hearing dates are held or, if they receive a negative ruling, 
after being ordered to depart” (Briggs 2003b, p. 328).
I believe Briggs overstates the rather complex relationship between 
the entry of political refugees and asylees and U.S. poverty. For exam-
ple, the U.S. poverty rate fell from 12.6 percent in 2005 to 12.3 percent 
in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). Considering that the U.S. popula-
tion had recently surpassed 300 million people, a 12.3 percent poverty 
rate equates to approximately 36.9 million persons living in poverty. 
Even if the full allocation of 70,000 political refugees had been filled in 
2006, political refugees would still only amount to 0.002 percent of the 
nation’s impoverished persons. In fact, the actual number of political 
refugees admitted for 2006 was 41,150, and if one assumes that all of 
these people were living in poverty, then the percentage of the nation’s 
poor attributable to political refugee admissions would represent only 
0.0013 percent of the total number of poor persons for that year.
Further, the cumulative total of political refugees admitted from 
1980 to 2006 is less than 2.3 million. If every political refugee admitted 
to the United States during this period lives in poverty (which is clearly 
not true), they represent only 0.076 percent of the overall U.S. popula-
tion and less than 1 percent of the nation’s poor. Even with the most 
draconian effort to estimate the impact of the nation’s political refugee 
population, these numbers remain incredibly small. And they remain so 
even when the relatively small number of asylees is added to the mix.
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In 1994, in Still an Open Door? Briggs hypothesized that the ac-
commodation of political refugees and asylees would be a challenge 
to address in an overall immigration system based on economic needs. 
Then he and coauthor Stephen Moore made a number of recommenda-
tions for accomplishing this objective, including the following (Briggs 
and Moore 1994):
• A method should be instituted to expedite asylee applications 
and separate the legitimate claims for political asylum from 
claims by people who simply seek a pretext to enter the country 
for personal economic gain (the current process, which offers 
both an affirmative and defensive route to asylum, probably 
does some of this, see TRAC Immigration [2006]).
• Even though political refugees should represent an exception to 
the rules of general immigration, restrictions on political refu-
gee levels should still be in place.
• U.S. support is critical for resettlement, repatriation, and main-
tenance of quality of life standards in the world’s refugee 
camps.
• The U.S. should link its foreign aid and foreign trade policies 
to adherence to human rights principles in those countries that 
generate mass numbers of political refugees.
• Once a political refugee is admitted, one less immigrant should 
be admitted.
Even with these recommendations, Briggs concluded by expressing 
doubts about the ability to fully accommodate refugees and asylees in 
an immigration system based on economic accountability, and I agree. 
Although economic concerns will always play a major role in interna-
tional affairs, there are certainly instances when foreign policy concerns 
or the execution of reciprocal humanitarian agreements may rise to 
greater prominence.  In those instances, refugee and asylee accommo-
dation, and the inclusion of a non-economic basis for entrant decision 
making, may assist in furthering the interests of the United States.
Indeed, one argument against strictly applying the consideration 
of economic accountability is that political refugees and asylees may 
have human capital characteristics that are much higher than gener-
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ally perceived. In Mass Immigration and the National Interest, Briggs 
indicates there have been times when the human capital characteristics 
of political refugees (including levels of education, years of experience 
in the formal labor market, and language[s] spoken) have measurably 
enhanced the characteristics of the entire immigrant population (Briggs 
2003a), but that is only part of the story.
I contend that refugees who make it to the United States for resettle-
ment are tremendously different from their less-resilient peers. Those 
who get here must have the ability to flee their country with virtually 
nothing, migrate to a host country (most often to a U.N.-sponsored 
camp), convince a consortium of nongovernmental organization repre-
sentatives that they qualify as a political refugee, and get accepted for 
resettlement into the United States. To even undertake such a journey, 
many refugees have already demonstrated they possess personal quali-
ties that will promote their success in this country, including (but not 
limited to) risk taking, quick and effective decision making, the ability 
to convince others and to negotiate difficult bureaucracies, and resil-
ience in the face of overwhelming odds. This is obviously not true of 
all political refugees, but it is a safe bet to say that many, if not most, 
political refugees who resettle in this country are likely to do well, par-
ticularly when given a chance to do so over time (see Singer and Wilson 
2006).
Can—indeed, should—the consideration of “economic account-
ability for every entrant” serve as a foundation for U.S. political refugee 
and asylee policy? I do not think so.
Neutrality with Respect to Political Ideology
Briggs has often touted the need for neutrality with respect to politi-
cal ideology in the development, interpretation, and implementation of 
immigration and political refugee and asylee policy. Can neutrality with 
respect to political ideology ever become a strong consideration in po-
litical refugee and asylee policy? I believe this is an unachievable goal. 
And if ever achieved, it would be very difficult to maintain.
Any student of U.S. political and refugee policy would do well to 
read Briggs’s view of how political refugee and asylee policy became 
politicized in the United States (Briggs 2003a, pp. 136–173). That 
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discussion, in a chapter titled “Unexpected Consequences,” leads the 
reader through the years 1965 to 1994, from President Lyndon Johnson 
to President Bill Clinton. Briggs carefully outlines the government’s 
increasingly politicized response to crises facing a diverse group of 
refugee populations, including Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, Guate-
malans, and Salvadorans. He concludes this section of the book with a 
heading, “The Continuing Weakness of Asylee Policy” (Briggs 2003a, 
p. 170).
For the nation to move beyond a highly politicized policy, Briggs 
stresses that social goals must override political goals (Briggs 2003a). 
Thus, he argues that social goals, such as compassion, humanitarian-
ism, and a desire to reduce discrimination, should take precedence over 
political goals, such as enhanced use of family reunification in political 
refugee and asylee policy. The notion appears to be in congruence with 
philosopher John Rawls’s view of society, which maintains, “In a just 
society the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargain-
ing or the calculus of social interests” (Keat and Miller 1974, p. 4). 
Without politics, however, what would give meaning to “social goals”? 
It is difficult to accept the suggestion that political aims would or could 
ever be absent in any policy arena, especially in one that involves the 
relationship between the United States and the rest of the world.
Is the world really a better place when a superpower like the United 
States fails to take an ideological stand on the many important policy 
questions associated with political refugee or asylee policy? The down-
side risk of not taking a stand is, to quote a popular country song, “If 
you don’t stand for something, you stand for nothing.” Since the U.S. 
Constitution does not spell out an entry policy, immigration and refugee 
policies are, as Briggs recognizes, “a purely discretionary duty of the 
U.S. government” (Briggs 2001, p. 5). Within this rather arbitrary dis-
cretionary duty, I believe, is the opportunity for the nation to stand for 
something, which includes adopting a never-wavering position on hu-
man rights (as expressed in the U.N.’s Declaration of Human Rights) and 
opposing totalitarian regimes. My fear is that unless a proactive (rather 
than a neutral) political ideology is firmly embraced in political refugee 
and asylee policy, it will always be chaotic and implemented with no 
enduring purpose except to fuel the bureaucracy of government.
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We need to remember that in the case of political refugees and asyl-
ees, U.S.-based policymakers are, by default, publicly declaring that 
another national government cannot, or will not, protect its own citi-
zens. In political asylee cases, policymakers are saying that it is more 
than reasonable to support the claim of an individual who maintains 
his or her life or freedom will be threatened if they are returned to their 
homeland (Jeffreys 2007). Few (if any) national governments wish to 
be deemed unable or unwilling to protect their citizens.
Perhaps an alternative approach is to slightly change the question 
to “How might neutrality with respect to political ideology become a 
meaningful contributor in political refugee and asylee policy?” With 
that in mind, I offer the following recommendations.
First, eligibility criteria for the status of either a political refugee or 
a political asylee need to be broadened. As noted earlier in this chap-
ter, the persecution standard in the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 is linked 
to an individual’s experience and a well-founded fear of persecution. 
However, much of the international community (as particularly noted in 
the definition of a refugee by the former Organization of African Unity 
and now the African Union, and in the Americas, as expressed in the 
Cartegena Declaration of 1984) sees political refugee and asylee status 
as more closely associated with group flight. If U.S. refugee and asylee 
policy is ever to become more neutral with respect to political ideology, 
then the U.S. standard of persecution should probably be expanded to 
include considerations such as conditions that caused one to flee home 
(not just their country), general chaos or violence in the applicant’s 
homeland, and flight as a member of a family or community (not just 
flight related to race, religion, political opinion, or nationality).
Second, the United States may need to more fully embrace the idea 
of participating in the development of a regional alliance with the coun-
tries of the Americas and the Caribbean. Such an alliance could help 
achieve a more neutral ideology with respect to hemispheric political 
refugee and asylee policies. At present, the countries of Latin America 
have varied definitions and standards in these two policy areas. The 
U.S. definition, while congruent with the U.N. standard, may need to be 
tweaked and brought into greater congruence with an overall policy in 
the Americas (Fischel de Andrade 1998).
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Third, the use of U.S. political refugee and asylee policy to achieve 
“national security” in a post–September 11 world is problematic if the 
goal is to achieve a more neutral political ideology (Kerwin 2005). A 
number of policy actions supposedly aimed at helping to achieve na-
tional security, including reductions in refugee admissions, the criminal 
prosecution of asylum seekers, and the blanket detention of Haitians, do 
little to advance public safety. Indeed, they violate the rights of politi-
cal refugee and asylee seekers, and they fuel, rather than neutralize, the 
spread of political ideology (both at home and abroad) (Kerwin 2005, p. 
755). Replacing the “fear of persecution” consideration with a more eas-
ily applied standard involving “human security” could help reduce the 
urge to manipulate political ideology from case to case (Afzal 2006).
In short, political refugee and asylee policy cannot and should not 
be made neutral with respect to political ideology. Like the notion of 
economic accountability for every entrant, political neutrality cannot 
serve as the foundation for this policy, though the problems of politici-
zation that Briggs identifies are real, and there may indeed be room for 
some movement in the general direction of greater neutrality.
Societal Equity
Can the consideration of social equity ever become the foundation 
for decision making in the complex arena of political refugee and asylee 
policy? I believe so. And Briggs helps us in that effort. His work is 
a good starting point, and extension of his ideas on this matter could 
come easily.
Briggs’s scholarship consistently mentions societal equity as an im-
migration consideration. In the foreword to Mass Immigration and the 
National Interest, for example, he makes the point with a statement 
from the 1994 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform: “It is both a 
right and a responsibility of a democratic society to manage immigra-
tion so that it serves the national interest” (Briggs 2003a, p. v). For 
Briggs, linking public policy to the national interest means serving the 
greater good and is a powerful expression of societal equity concerns. 
Thus, he consistently criticizes advocates for any particular group of 
potential political refugees or asylees for tending to overlook the na-
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tional interest and focusing too narrowly on the needs of persons in a 
particular group.
Briggs also highlights societal equity when he emphasizes the 
plight of members of less-advantaged groups in the United States. In 
Chicanos and Rural Poverty, for example, he stated that if the goal is 
to create a more “equitable and humane society,” then it is necessary 
in all policy work to keep attention on the impact of policy on disad-
vantaged subpopulations (Briggs 1973, p. 1). Even a cursory review 
of Briggs’s scholarship reveals a great deal of attention devoted to the 
link between policy (development, interpretation, and implementation) 
and its impact on low-wage workers, particularly those who are African 
Americans, rural residents, or agricultural workers, whom he has often 
referred to (lamentingly, of course) as “second-class citizens.”
Briggs is especially mindful of the often-unintended consequences 
of public policies and the unequally distributed negative impact of social 
legislation on unskilled workers. He reminds us that not all low-wage 
workers experience equally the benefits of the U.S. labor movement’s 
policy achievements, which include minimum-wage protection, unem-
ployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and the right to engage in 
collective bargaining (Briggs 2001).
Briggs often cites the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights as an 
argument for including societal equity as a fundamental immigration 
consideration. He emphasizes Article 14, which (as mentioned earlier) 
includes the right to seek asylum in any country while fleeing persecu-
tion, and Article 28, which states that “everyone is entitled to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized” (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 1948).
Even though Briggs speaks of social equity as a consideration in 
political refugee and asylee policy, his work could be more valuable 
if clarified and extended. What should be the philosophical and con-
ceptual foundation for a consideration of social equity? What guiding 
principles or criteria should be used when applying the consideration of 
social equity? Although Briggs does not say so directly, John Rawls’s 
(1971) A Theory of Justice appears to have influenced his thinking. If 
so, he would not be alone; Rawls influenced many academics and ad-
vocates whose careers were hitting their stride in the 1970s and whose 
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interests involved matters of social equity. Yet Rawls was a theoreti-
cian, and most of what Briggs reached for in his career was application 
into the world of actual policy and policy decisions. Thus, Briggs and 
others who extend his work may want to consider the following.
First, the United States needs to return to its position of prominence 
in the international community of nations that accept political refugees. 
If societal equity is to be considered more prominently in the U.S. po-
litical and refugee policy landscape, then the country’s failure to even 
meet the annual allocation for political refugees must be reversed. A 
numerical allocation of 70,000 potential political refugees is not an un-
tenable number, especially considering the existence of over 40 million 
refugees and persons displaced by violence and persecution around the 
world (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2007). 
Second, in discussions and negotiations with the international com-
munity, the United States has often spoken with a sanctimonious voice 
and criticized other countries for their political refugee and asylee poli-
cies, especially in the event of uneven implementation of those policies 
(China is just one example). The United States can take a lofty position 
partly because our borders are far from most refugee-producing coun-
tries, but even we have had our problems, especially when dealing with 
refugees and asylum seekers from Cuba, Haiti, and Central America. 
If societal equity is to be a more viable consideration in U.S. political 
refugee and asylee policy, then that policy must reflect our geographic 
proximity to countries in the Caribbean and Latin America.
At the top of my reform list would be a policy that ensures com-
plete congruence of the treatment of Haitians and Cubans. Haiti has 
become more peaceful since holding national elections in 2007, and 
Cuba continues to move closer to an economic system characterized 
by market exchange. Thus, we can no longer assume that all Haitian 
nationals are fleeing poverty and thus not generally eligible for political 
refugee or asylee status and that all claims by Cubans are legitimate. 
Under three U.S. presidents, this country has suffered incalculable em-
barrassment in the international community by stressing poverty too 
strongly as a disqualifying characteristic in the adjudication of Haitian 
asylee claims. Granted, fleeing poverty need not be the only standard, 
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but when combined with fleeing oppression or violence, it need not 
summarily disqualify an individual.
Briggs’s work can serve as a foundation for enhancing the use of 
social equity as a consideration in political refugee and asylee policy, 
but realizing that goal requires an extension of his work in the areas and 
along the lines described above.
MY TRUE PURPOSE
In responding to the invitation to write this chapter, my officially 
stated purpose was to write an academic piece on some element of im-
migration policy using Briggs’s work. Thus, I have focused on political 
refugee and asylee policy and attempted to assess Briggs’s use of three 
major considerations—economic accountability for each entry deci-
sion, neutrality with respect to political ideology, and social equity. I 
hope I have done so in a manner respectful of Briggs’s legacy of im-
pressive work.
But my unofficial purpose for writing the chapter is to thank Dr. 
Briggs. He opened my eyes to the world of immigration in general and 
to political refugee and asylee policy in particular. He showed me how 
an interest in federal social-policy formulation, local-level impact, and 
community-driven efforts to shape those policies all fit perfectly within 
the dynamic policy arena of political refugee and asylee policy. It was 
Briggs who suggested I travel to Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoras, 
Mexico, to collect dissertation data as Central Americans fled country-
based violence and streamed through south Texas in the late 1980s. It 
was Briggs who said go there and witness firsthand the hardscrabble 
reality of what had previously been only an abstract academic interest. 
He set me on a lifetime path as an academic. I will be forever grateful.
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Note
1. Although individuals seeking political refugee or political asylee status are both 
seeking sanctuary, have crossed over the international border of their homeland, 
and must meet the definitional criteria for fleeing a “well-founded fear of perse-
cution,” differences do exist. The major differences between the two are in the 
journey the person undertakes and the site from which the application for either 
refugee or asylee status is made. Persons seeking refugee status do so most often 
from within the confines of a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
sponsored camp and outside the borders of the country of desired resettlement. 
Persons seeking political asylee status do so after first leaving their home country 
and then initially or eventually entering the country within which they wish to 
remain. Both require a recognition by the United States federal government of a 
country whose federal government cannot protect its own citizens and represent 
one of only three areas of designation by which people can enter the United States, 
the other two being family reunification and labor economics.
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Training and Immigration 
in the Real World
Ernesto Cortés Jr.
Interfaith Education Fund
Although it has been more than 40 years since I sat in Vernon 
Briggs’s classroom at the University of Texas, his insights into the val-
ue of training in the labor market and the role of the public sector are 
echoed in my work every day. Briggs’s economics has always been 
about moving beyond theory and into the realm of action and practical 
problem solving.
In this chapter, I describe how I have continued to act and examine 
issues in the spirit of what I learned in Briggs’s classroom, even when 
our policy conclusions have diverged. I first highlight an initiative to 
establish labor-market intermediary institutions and then address the 
subject of immigration.
STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING
Not long after I left the University of Texas, I began organizing with 
the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), the nation’s largest community 
organizing network, founded by Saul Alinsky in Chicago in the 1940s. 
For more than three decades, my colleagues and I have been working, 
primarily in the Southwestern United States, to build broad-based com-
munity organizations with the power to address the responsibilities of 
both the public and private sectors in a dynamic economy and demo-
cratic society.1 These organizations have won countless victories for 
their families and communities throughout the years.2
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IAF leaders in the Southwest consulted with Briggs when we were 
developing the concept of labor-market intermediaries about two de-
cades ago. His reflections on the nature of structural unemployment, 
a form of joblessness not responsive to mere changes in aggregate de-
mand, supported our leaders’ instincts that a mediating institution could 
serve as a bridge between workers and employers and be beneficial to 
both. It is not that fiscal and monetary policies are unimportant, Briggs 
explained, but changes in the U.S. economy were fundamentally alter-
ing the nature of the American labor market.
Today, of course, what Briggs was teaching is accepted as common 
knowledge as America’s economy has moved from the production of 
goods to the production of services as its driving force. However, his 
analyses of national and global trends were both insightful and tremen-
dously useful as IAF leaders began to puzzle through the changes they 
were experiencing in local labor markets in the late 1980s.
One of Briggs’s most powerful lessons is reflected in IAF efforts 
to improve education and training: the success of a democracy and the 
wealth of a society are based largely on their human capital. In San 
Antonio, Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) and the 
Metro Alliance created Project QUEST, the first high-skill, high-wage 
job-training program developed by the IAF organizations in the South-
western United States. Learning from the lessons of Project QUEST, 
Valley Interfaith leaders organized VIDA (Valley Initiative for Devel-
opment and Advancement), the Pima County Interfaith Council formed 
JobPaths, Austin Interfaith leaders created Capital IDEA, and the El 
Paso Interreligious Sponsoring Organization founded Project ARRIBA. 
Since 1992, these five independent job-training institutions have trained 
and placed more than 10,000 participants in jobs that pay an average of 
nearly $32,000 annually. This is particularly significant considering the 
average annual wage of program participants before participation was 
less than $10,000.
The IAF emphasis on human capital will translate into roughly 30 
years of increased wages and productivity for each job-training gradu-
ate. This benefits not only the individual worker but also his or her 
family and employer. As the number of graduates increases, local labor 
markets will reap the still larger community benefits of a well-educated, 
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well-paid workforce with the skills necessary to succeed in the face of 
structural economic changes.
IMMIGRANT HUMAN CAPITAL
Although I agree with Briggs’s views on structural unemployment 
and the usefulness of labor-market intermediaries, I disagree with his 
views on the role of immigrant human capital in a dynamic economy. 
He views a more generous immigration policy as an impediment to rais-
ing wages, improving working conditions, and securing employment 
opportunities for U.S. workers (see, for example, Briggs 1996). In re-
sponse, I would stress the contributions that immigrant workers make 
in terms of increasing demand for domestic goods and services, which 
in turn creates new jobs (Legrain 2006, p. 136).
Immigrants also add to the diversity of communities, which urban-
studies expert Richard Florida and demographer Gary Gates identify 
as an important driver of regional economic growth. In fact, Florida 
and Gates report that eight of the top 10 U.S. metropolitan areas with 
the highest percentage of foreign-born residents are among the nation’s 
top 15 high-technology regions (Florida and Gates 2001). According 
to British economist Philippe Legrain, “Big global cities capture the 
whole world in one place” (Legrain 2006, p. 119). Surely this is a ben-
efit, given the increasing globalization of our economy.
Briggs criticizes labor unions for supporting more generous immi-
gration policies, stating that it is not in the interest of their members to 
do so given recent declines in U.S. real wages (Briggs 2001). There is 
no question that employers have been successful in reducing the real 
wages of workers, but those declines appear to be due overwhelmingly 
to changes in technology and the rise of global production, not to im-
migrants (Head 2007). “Since 1995, when the ‘new economy’ based 
on information technology began to take off, workers’ incomes have 
not kept up with productivity, and during the past five years the two 
have spectacularly diverged,” observes Simon Head, author of The New 
Ruthless Economy (Head 2007).3
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Labor unions should work aggressively to organize all workers, 
including immigrants. A number of labor organizations, including the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the United Food 
and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), have been 
very successful in organizing immigrant workers and their success has 
somewhat mitigated the effects of decades of declining union member-
ship. If the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the labor 
force today were legalized, they would also become potential union 
members.
Conversely, if those 12 million undocumented workers were some-
how miraculously located, detained, and deported, the shock to the 
economy and its day-to-day functioning would be tremendous. Even as-
suming that every unemployed person in the United States would be in 
the right location and have the right skill set and the right frame of mind 
to replace the deported workers, there would not ordinarily be enough 
job seekers to fill the gap. In August 2007, for example, the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics recognized only 7.1 million unemployed workers as 
actively seeking employment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007).4
Although it is generally agreed that immigrants contribute to the 
downward pressure on wages of high-school dropouts, at most only 20 
percent of the incidence is attributable to the availability of immigrant 
labor. The remaining 80 percent is directly related to the substitution of 
capital for labor, advances in technology, and other issues unrelated to 
immigrants (Goldin and Katz 2008).
Studies also indicate that, although immigrants lower the wages of 
high-school dropouts by 1 percent, they increase the wages of work-
ers who graduated from high school by as much as 4 percent (Legrain 
2006, pp. 142–143). This occurs because immigrants rarely substitute 
for U.S.-born workers, even when their education and experience levels 
are similar. Instead, immigrant skills are often complementary to those 
of native workers. Indeed, this is true both for immigrants with high 
levels of education and experience (in science and technology occupa-
tions, for instance) and for those with low levels of formal education 
(in occupations such as cooking, caregiving, and gardening) (Legrain 
2006, pp. 68–75; Ottaviano and Peri 2006a,b).
Since competition for jobs held by undocumented immigrants 
largely affects the most poorly educated segment of the native labor 
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market, a closer examination of education policies is in order. One way 
to address the concern about poorly educated U.S.-born workers would 
be to ensure that fewer U.S. students drop out of high school, thereby 
making them eligible for higher skilled jobs that pay better wages. The 
question of education policy is also central to the immigration debate 
from another perspective. As baby boomers continue to age, the United 
States economy is going to lose hundreds of thousands, if not millions, 
of its most highly skilled workers to retirement over the next two de-
cades. To meet the coming demand for a skilled workforce and continue 
our pace of economic growth as a nation, it is in the national interest to 
invest in educating all children, regardless of whether their parents have 
legal residency papers.
IMMIGRATION, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
The debate over immigration and immigration reform in the United 
States must also be linked to a broader discussion about trade and 
economic-development policies. To consider immigration in isolation 
from these policies is not merely impractical, it also denies the role that 
U.S. policymaking has played in driving up the numbers of people that 
have come here outside the legal process.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example 
of a trade policy that has contributed to the growth of worker migration 
to the United States. As a consequence of NAFTA, Mexico was forced 
to eliminate its agriculture subsidies to subsistence farmers, destroying 
what had been in effect an employment and anti-hunger strategy. By 
purchasing agricultural products at above-market prices, the Mexican 
government kept farmers working, and its policy of reselling the prod-
ucts at a loss (through government-owned stores) made them affordable 
to the poorest of the nation’s families. NAFTA forced these subsistence 
farmers into the cities to look for work, which depressed wages in the 
urban areas at the same time that food prices rose (Stiglitz 2007, pp. 
64–66).
It should come as no surprise that these pressures left many poor 
Mexican nationals with few options beyond seeking work across the 
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border. In the mid 2000s, while Mexico’s agricultural subsidies were 
being removed, the California and Arizona economies were booming. 
This boom produced a tremendous demand for labor, especially in ag-
riculture, which now had new opportunities to sell products in Mexico, 
and construction. The United States needed labor; Mexicans needed 
jobs.5
The World Bank’s structural adjustment policies created similar 
pressures in other developing countries (see, for example, Komisar 
2000). An insistence on the elimination of subsidies and market protec-
tions forced countries to skip the middle steps in developing a strong 
market economy. The success of the U.S. economy followed some 200 
years of infrastructure development, as well as subsidies and protection-
ism. The World Bank’s conditions for aid ignore the role such policies 
played in the development of strong economies, and they create eco-
nomic circumstances that lead millions of people to emigrate and even 
to risk their lives by immigrating illegally to developed nations in an 
attempt to support their families.
When the European nations decided to link their economies more 
closely to one another, they deliberately chose a common-market strat-
egy rather than a trade agreement in an attempt to avoid these types 
of unintended consequences. They recognized the disparities between 
their various countries and created a huge social-investment fund to 
build up the infrastructure in poorer countries. They also established 
common labor standards. While the European Union’s policy decisions 
have by no means completely eliminated economic tensions and immi-
gration challenges, they appear to represent a more practical approach 
to international trade and development than that pursued by the United 
States to date.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to believing that U.S. immigration policy is hampered 
by not being sufficiently considered in its wider context, I am concerned 
that its implementation has at times infringed on the civil liberties of 
U.S. citizens as well as noncitizens.
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For example, I have heard testimony from Hispanic women with 
strong West Texas accents who were handcuffed in workplace raids, 
marched to their lockers, and then upon presenting evidence that they 
were citizens, told that such evidence was meaningless because it 
could be faked. A request for a female agent was denied, and the male 
agents proceeded to frisk the women—women who had proof of their 
citizenship status. The presumption in such cases is clearly one of guilt 
rather than innocence, in direct violation of the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the civil rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution.6
To be sure, the intention to enforce our current laws may have 
merit. Yet the possibility of unintended consequences and disastrous 
implementation only underscores the need to craft our policies in a way 
that ensures they are executed with good judgment, care, consideration, 
and thoughtfulness. Otherwise, our incapacity to do so trumps the logic 
of our policies.7
THE BRIGGS TRADITION
Briggs has consistently shown he cares about people, particularly 
about people of color. With that concern as a guide, he made major 
practical contributions to problem solving through his work on struc-
tural unemployment and training (see, for example, Briggs 1979, 1973; 
Marshall and Briggs 1967). I have drawn directly on his insights and 
guidance in my own work relating to labor-market intermediaries and 
economic issues more generally. It is a testament to his scholarship and 
integrity that my colleagues and I are still benefiting from what I first 
began to learn from him more than 40 years ago.
On immigration policy, our views are obviously different. Yet, the 
pragmatic approach to public policy I learned from Briggs makes me 
confident that it is fully within our capacity as a nation to address the 
formidable education, trade, development, and civil rights issues— 
especially those relating to unintended consequences and practical policy 
implementation—confronting the nation with respect to immigration.
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Notes
1. These organizations include A Mid-Iowa Organizing Strategy (AMOS) in Des 
Moines; Albuquerque Interfaith; Allied Communities of Tarrant in Fort Worth; 
Austin Interfaith; Bay Area Organizing Committee in San Francisco; Border In-
terfaith in El Paso; The Border Organization in Del Rio and Eagle Pass, Texas; 
Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) in San Antonio; Communities 
Organized for Relational Power in Action (COPA) in Watsonville, Salinas, and 
surrounding California communities; Dallas Area Interfaith; El Paso Interreligious 
Sponsoring Organization (EPISO); The Jeremiah Group in New Orleans; Marin 
Organizing Committee (Northern California); The Metro Alliance in San Anto-
nio; North Bay Sponsoring Committee in Sonoma/Napa (Northern California); 
Northern Arizona Interfaith Council; Northern and Central Louisiana Interfaith; 
Oklahoma City Sponsoring Committee; Omaha Together One Community 
(OTOC); One LA—IAF in Los Angeles; Pima County Interfaith Council in Tuc-
son; Sacramento Valley Organizing Community; The Metropolitan Organization 
(TMO) in Houston; Valley Interfaith in the Lower Rio Grande Valley; Valley Inter-
faith Project (VIP) in metropolitan Phoenix; the West Texas Organizing Strategy 
in Lubbock, San Angelo, and surrounding communities; and the Yuma County 
Interfaith Sponsoring Committee in Yuma, Arizona.
2. For discussions of the work of these organizations, see, for example, Greider 
(1992), Osterman (2002), Putnam and Feldstein (2003), Rogers (1990), Warren 
(2001), and Wilson (2001). A list of additional references is available from the 
author.
3. Head adds that between 1995 and 2006, U.S. worker productivity grew 340 per-
cent more than real wages—and 779 percent more than wages in the last six years 
(Head 2007).
4. In December 2008, a year after the latest recession began, the U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics reports there were 11.1 million unemployed workers (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2009).
5. As this chapter is being prepared for publication, the U.S. economy is in recession. 
However, when recession gives way to recovery, states on the border will again be 
a magnet for Mexico’s displaced farmers and struggling urban workers.
6. The author heard this testimony at a public hearing sponsored by the UFCW in 
Omaha, Nebraska, on August 16, 2007 (UFCW 2007). In contrast, according to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, “The principle that there is a presumption of innocence 
in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its 
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law” (U.S. 
Supreme Court 1895).
7. A failure of the capacity to implement policy effectively is, of course, not unique to 
immigration policy. For example, this failure is one of the fundamental flaws in the 
No Child Left Behind legislation. The internal logic of an educational accountabil-
ity system has, in implementation, created monstrous requirements and strained 
the capacities of our nation’s teachers and schools (see, for example, Young 2009). 
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Another example is the U.S. policy in Iraq (see Ignatieff 2007). Attention must be 
given to ensure that policies work in practice, not just in theory.
References
Briggs, Vernon M. Jr. 1996. “Immigration Policy and the U.S. Economy: An 
Institutional Perspective.” Journal of Economic Issues 30(2): 371–389.
———. 1973. Chicanos and Rural Poverty. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
———. 1979. “Special Labor Market Segments.” In Manpower Research 
and Labor Economics, Gordon Swanson and Jon Michaelson, eds. Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 243–276.
———. 2001. Immigration and American Unionism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Florida, Richard, and Gary Gates. 2001. Technology and Tolerance: The Im-
portance of Diversity to High-Technology Growth. Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence Katz. 2008. The Race between Education and 
Technology. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Greider, William. 1992. Who Will Tell the People? New York: Simon and 
Schuster.
Head, Simon. 2007. “They’re Micromanaging Your Every Move.” New 
York Review of Books 54(13): 42–44. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
article-preview?article_id=20499 (accessed June 3, 2009).
Ignatieff, Michael. 2007. “Getting Iraq Wrong.” New York Times Magazine, 
August 5: 29.
Komisar, Lucy. 2000. “Interview with Joseph Stiglitz.” Progressive 64(6): 
34–38. http://www.progressive.org/0901/intv0600.html (accessed June 3, 
2009).
Legrain, Philippe. 2006. Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Marshall, Ray, and Vernon M. Briggs Jr. 1967. The Negro and Apprenticeship. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
Osterman, Paul. 2002. Gathering Power: The Future of Progressive Politics in 
America. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., and Giovanni Peri. 2006a. “The Economic Value 
of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from U.S. Cities.” Journal of Economic 
Geography 6(1): 9–44.
———. 2006b. “Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evi-
dence from the United States.” Revision of NBER Working Paper no. 
11672. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
110   Cortés
Putnam, Robert, and Louis Feldstein. 2003. Better Together: Restoring the 
American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Rogers, Mary Beth. 1990. Cold Anger: A Story of Faith and Power Politics. 
Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2007. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company.
UFCW. 2007. “Workers Decry Abusive ICE Misconduct: Hold First National 
Meeting on ICE Misconduct and Violations of 4th Amendment Rights.” 
News release, August 16. Washington, DC: UFCW. http://www.ufcw.org/
press_room/index.cfm?pressReleaseID=343 (accessed June 29, 2009).
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2007. “The Employment Situation: August 
2007.” News release, September 7. Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_09072007.pdf (accessed June 26, 2009).
———. 2009. “The Employment Situation: December 2008.” News release, 
January 9. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_01092009.pdf 
(accessed June 26, 2009).
U.S. Supreme Court. 1895. Coffin v. United States. 156 U.S. 432.
Warren, Mark. 2001. Dry Bones Rattling: Community Building to Revitalize 
American Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wilson, William Julius. 2001. The Bridge over the Racial Divide. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Young, John. 2009. “Standardized Testing Leaves Collateral Damage.” Austin-
American Statesman, February 14, A:15.
111
7
Immigration Policy and 
Economic Development
James T. Peach
New Mexico State University
For more than three decades, Vernon M. Briggs Jr. argued that U.S. 
immigration policy should be determined largely on the basis of the 
nation’s rapidly changing labor-market trends. In Briggs’s view, U.S. 
immigration policy and the needs of the labor market have been mis-
matched. He has been particularly concerned about a new (fourth) wave 
of migration with detrimental effects disproportionately felt by un-
skilled workers and minorities, especially blacks and Hispanics. What 
is needed, Briggs argues, is an immigration policy that reduces the mas-
sive flow of international migration to the United States and matches 
the characteristics of immigrants with genuine labor force needs.
Briggs’s policy conclusions are based on a careful, detailed analysis 
of immigration law and the often-unintended consequences of changes 
in immigration law. His analysis is logical, subtle, and compelling. Yet 
Congress has failed to pass immigration legislation consistent with 
changing labor-market conditions and needs.
The latest attempt to pass a major immigration reform law in 2007 
contained some elements consistent with Briggs’s proposals, but it had 
almost no chance of being passed by a deeply divided Congress. Not 
surprisingly, there were no major immigration law changes in the 2008 
presidential election year, nor did immigration policy play a major role 
during the presidential campaign. Immigration was simply too con-
troversial for either major party to bring into play. Given the global 
economic and financial crisis that became more serious in late 2008 and 
continued into 2009, immigration is not likely to be a high priority on 
the policy agenda of Congress or the Obama administration. In brief, 
major U.S. immigration reform may not occur for many years.
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The immigration problem is not intractable. The main theme of this 
chapter is that policies designed to accelerate the process of economic 
development in migrant-sending nations should be the key element of 
an overall immigration policy. Certainly, the convoluted, illogical, con-
tradictory, and generally unenforced mess that is now immigration law 
in the United States is badly in need of reform, and Briggs’s suggested 
labor-market-oriented changes to immigration policy could form a solid 
foundation for such reform. Changes in the law, however, cannot di-
rectly affect the root causes of migration. In contrast, rapid economic 
development in the sending nations can affect the flow of migration.
The development of this thesis is not a critique of Briggs’s analy-
sis and does not contradict his major research and policy conclusions. 
Most of the key ingredients of the argument presented here can be 
found in Briggs’s own works. While his work has focused mainly on 
the inconsistency between U.S. labor-market needs and immigration 
policy, he has consistently mentioned the need for economic develop-
ment and economic-development assistance, particularly to Mexico, as 
one element in a comprehensive strategy. The proposal developed here 
represents only a change in emphasis. In brief, U.S. immigration reform 
will not reduce the flow of international migration to the United States 
unless major sending regions are more successful in their economic-
development efforts.
Two related labor-market issues also need to be addressed briefly. 
First, whether or not immigration flows are increasing, the United States 
must address the educational and workforce training needs of its resi-
dents in a fashion consistent with rapidly changing economic trends and 
labor-market conditions. Although the previous sentence is not a direct 
quote from Briggs’s published works, it will surely sound familiar to 
those who have read them.
Almost every release of data on U.S. educational attainment paints 
a deteriorating picture, and the No Child Left Behind Act has failed to 
reverse these trends. Institutions of higher education are struggling with 
tight budgets and increasing costs, and state and local governments are 
unlikely to provide the needed resources.
The educational and workforce training problem is national in 
scope and needs to be addressed at the federal level. The need to do 
so is obvious. In February 2009, the unemployment rate among those 
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with less than a high-school education was 15.1 percent, whereas the 
comparable rate for those with a bachelor’s degree or higher was 4.2 
percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Income levels by edu-
cation show similar disparities. What the nation does with immigration 
policy will matter little over the next several decades unless there is 
a huge effort to provide education and training for all U.S. residents 
consistent with success in an increasingly high-technology and interna-
tionalized economy.
Second, there is no excuse for failing to address the U.S. unem-
ployment problem. The opportunity cost of employing the unemployed 
is zero.1 The unemployed are, from an economic perspective, wasted 
resources who do not add to the nation’s output. Little imagination is re-
quired to devise policies to eliminate unemployment, and there is more 
than enough useful work that needs to be done.
It is obvious that macroeconomic stability and relatively strong 
long-term economic growth during the quarter century from 1982 to 
2007 have not been sufficient to ensure employment for all of those 
who want to work. The current economic crisis brings added urgency to 
the unemployment problem. In February 2009, the U.S. unemployment 
rate reached 8.1 percent, and many analysts expect continued labor-
market deterioration (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009).
In early 2009, 12.5 million people in the United States were unem-
ployed, an additional 5.6 million wanted a job but quit looking for work, 
and 4.0 million others worked part time but would have preferred to 
work full time (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). In 2008, the av-
erage U.S. worker added about $100,000 to the nation’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) (author calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2009). The lost output from 12.5 million unemployed persons 
is more than a trillion dollars.
Although there are indications that immigration to the United 
States, particularly from Mexico, has declined during the current eco-
nomic downturn, it remains a rather odd policy to allow in-migration 
when there are millions of current U.S. residents without a job. Even 
stranger is that the nation tolerates domestic unemployment on a large 
scale even though there are policy options available to eliminate all or 
nearly all of it.
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There are several powerful arguments for placing economic de-
velopment, education, workforce training, and unemployment higher 
on the policy priority list than immigration reform. First, as indicated 
above, the U.S. political process is not likely to soon produce immigra-
tion reform or allocate immigration enforcement resources along the 
lines suggested by Briggs. Second, the politics of immigration reform 
will be easier to address once U.S. unemployment is reduced to zero (or 
almost zero), the educational and training needs of the current and fu-
ture labor force are adequately addressed, and migrant-sending nations 
are progressing rapidly. Third, economic development issues, unem-
ployment, and education issues need to be addressed whether or not 
the nation grapples with the immigration issue. Fourth, the immigration 
issue is far more complex and contentious than the other three issues. 
Unfortunately, there is little reason for optimism that the nation will 
seriously address any of these issues, including immigration reform.
AUTHOR BIASES 
Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel Laureate in economics, argued forcefully 
that there is no such thing as a value-free social science (Myrdal 1968). 
Myrdal argued the best we can do is be as aware of our value judgments 
and biases as possible and state them explicitly. Not doing so leads to a 
false sense of scientific objectivity.
With that in mind, I first confess that I took three classes in la-
bor economics from Briggs when I was an undergraduate majoring in 
mathematics at the University of Texas at Austin in the 1960s. I have 
respected him and his work very highly for more than four decades. I 
am honored to have the opportunity to contribute a chapter to this vol-
ume. I am equally honored that after more than four decades he remains 
a valued friend and colleague.
Second, I have always shared Briggs’s concern over the plight of 
the poor. His concern for the underprivileged is genuine, and whether 
he is addressing immigration or other structural imbalances in the econ-
omy, that value judgment or bias is apparent.
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Third, in 1974 (or possibly early 1975), I was extraordinarily privi-
leged to listen to a great debate on immigration policy between Briggs 
and his University of Texas colleague Wendell C. Gordon at the supper 
seminar series sponsored by the university’s Department of Economics. 
The supper seminar series was always a well-attended and intellectually 
stimulating event. The Briggs–Gordon debate on immigration was the 
best of them all. Briggs presented the case for a more restrictive border 
policy, while Gordon presented the case for a more open border. Both 
participants’ remarks were later published in the Social Science Journal 
(Briggs 1975; Gordon 1975). Better short statements of the two oppos-
ing sides of the immigration debate are hard to find, and I still have my 
students read those articles. Today, I have the same mixed feelings about 
the immigration issue that I had more than 30 years ago during this great 
debate. As Briggs has maintained, the labor-market consequences of 
relatively unconstrained immigration are felt disproportionately by the 
unskilled and poor. At the same time, borders and nationalism broadly 
defined are impediments to the process of economic development. Sort-
ing out the issues about the costs and benefits of migration empirically 
is an almost impossible task.
Finally, both Briggs and I are long-standing members and past-
presidents of the Association for Evolutionary Economics. We share 
a common intellectual heritage dating back to the works of Thorstein 
Veblen, John R. Commons, and Clarence E. Ayres. The institutional or 
evolutionary tradition places great emphasis on technological and in-
stitutional change as major determinants of the way economies evolve. 
Among institutional economists, there is no automatic assumption that 
markets will cure all economic problems. Yet institutionalists, like 
mainstream economists, have expressed very different and sometimes 
conflicting views on immigration. Veblen regarded borders and restric-
tions on immigration as significant obstacles to the efficient functioning 
of the industrial system. Commons thought that restrictions on immi-
gration were needed. A brief attempt to examine and reconcile these 
views is presented in Peach (2007).
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CONTRASTING BRIGGS’S PERSPECTIVE WITH SOME 
FALSE ISSUES
Briggs’s view toward immigration is that the size of the migration 
flow to the United States and the characteristics of those who migrate 
here should complement, rather than disrupt, the functioning of the U.S. 
labor market. Briggs argues that U.S. immigration issues could, for the 
most part, be ignored during the 1950s and early 1960s when migration 
flows were relatively small. Conversely, he argues that the increased 
migration flows that occurred during the last quarter century can no 
longer be ignored (Briggs 1984, 1992, 2003).
Briggs’s perspective does not imply some numerically precise opti-
mal level of immigration in a dynamic, modern economy. There simply 
can be no such optimal or desirable migration rate. As a practical mat-
ter, Briggs argues that the appropriate number of migrants in any given 
year should be determined administratively on the basis of labor-market 
conditions (fewer migrants should be admitted when unemployment 
rates are high, for example).
A zero migration or zero net-migration policy, promoted by some 
politicians and commentators, is not the position advocated by Briggs. 
Zero migration and zero net-migration are very different concepts, but 
both are absurd notions in an increasingly internationalized or global 
economic system. Zero migration presumably means no migration— 
either into or out of a nation. Zero net-migration means that the number 
of immigrants would exactly equal the number of emigrants, a highly 
unlikely occurrence. Neither policy could be demographically neutral 
in the sense of not affecting population size (Bouvier et al. 1995). Zero 
net-migration is not likely to be demographically neutral because the 
age and fertility patterns of immigrants and emigrants are likely to be 
different. Zero migration cannot be demographically neutral because 
prohibiting all migration would also change a society’s fertility and 
mortality rates.
There are other reasons to reject any notion of zero U.S. migration. 
For example, such a policy would be virtually impossible to enforce 
in a democratic society. Further, the aging of the U.S. population and 
fertility rates near or perhaps even below replacement levels are hard to 
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ignore. Without some level of net in-migration, the prospect of a shrink-
ing U.S. labor force is very real. The United Nations reports that more 
than 40 percent of the world’s population already lives in nations with a 
fertility rate that is below replacement level and that this figure is likely 
to increase in coming decades (United Nations 2006).
Economists and policymakers have not yet determined how to deal 
with issues of economic growth or the provision of goods and services 
in an economy with a declining labor force. In a very meaningful sense, 
some migration will be essential to keep the U.S. economy growing 
and to maintain or increase per-capita income over the next decades. 
Moreover, the Social Security issue complicates the immigration is-
sue considerably. With an aging population and population growth due 
to natural increase slowing down, migration is particularly needed to 
fund future Social Security obligations. In short, zero migration simply 
won’t work.
The U.S. immigration debate often focuses on numeric estimates 
of the stock or flow of (legal and illegal) immigrants. Are the num-
bers increasing or decreasing? Where are the migrants from? What are 
their characteristics? These are important and meaningful questions in 
a policy context. Yet there are no precise numeric answers to many of 
these questions, and this is particularly the case with regard to estimates 
of illegal migrants. Despite the best efforts of demographers and econo-
mists, estimates of the stock and flow of illegal migration to the United 
States are undoubtedly wrong and contribute little to a resolution of 
the immigration debate. Over the last decade or two, the U.S. Census 
Bureau has amply documented an increase in the number and propor-
tion of the foreign-born U.S. population. The trends in the foreign-born 
population of the United States could not have occurred without sig-
nificant in-migration. In a policy context, the Census estimates of the 
foreign-born population provide enough information to formulate im-
migration policy (for example, see Briggs 2003).
Congress and the President, however, address most policy issues 
without “adequate” data on the nature of the problem or the poten-
tial impact of proposed solutions. As Briggs (1984, p. 10) points out, 
“Obviously, reliable data are needed, but policy formulation and the se-
lection of topics for social science inquiry cannot depend on the quality 
of available data.” Fiscal and monetary policies designed to stimulate 
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the economy are adopted without adequate data indicating the magni-
tude of the problem. For example, no one really knows, or can possibly 
know, whether the current stimulus package (The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009) is too large or too small. Energy policy, 
Social Security policy, environmental policy, and countless other poli-
cies are also changed without adequate data.
Another false issue that clouds the immigration debate is ideol-
ogy. Immigration is not a liberal–conservative or left–right issue. The 
immigration views of conservatives and liberals, Democrats and Re-
publicans, and corporate executives and labor union leaders do not fall 
into neat and consistent categories. After all, immigration legislation is 
often the work of both liberals and conservatives and Republicans and 
Democrats. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) 
was commonly referred to as the Simpson–Rodino bill. Alan Simpson 
was a conservative Republican senator from Wyoming, whereas Peter 
Rodino was a more liberal Democratic U.S. representative from New 
Jersey.
The logic of market-oriented mainstream economics is that any bar-
rier to the mobility of resources or trade in goods and services inhibits 
the efficient functioning of the economy. But not everyone who thinks 
that “markets work best” will also favor reducing restrictions on migra-
tion. Briggs has often discussed both the neoclassical economists’ lack 
of appropriate theoretical models of immigration and the false issue of 
ideology (see, for example, Briggs 1984, 1996, 2003). Immigration is-
sues do indeed make for strange bedfellows.
THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS 
IMMIGRATION POLICY
An effective, perhaps the most effective, form of immigration pol-
icy is to promote economic development in migrant-sending nations. 
An important corollary to this thesis is that immigration-law reform—
no matter how well intentioned or well designed and regardless of the 
seriousness of efforts aimed at greater enforcement—will not substan-
tially reduce the flow of in-migration to the United States. International 
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migration is, after all, an international issue and not one that can be 
adequately addressed by domestic policy alone.
Enforcement of U.S. immigration laws has been about as effective 
as the enforcement of prohibition in the 1920s and early 1930s and 
perhaps less effective than the so-called war on drugs. Enforcement 
is inherently difficult and there have been a number of major changes 
to U.S. immigration law in the last 20 or more years.2 The IRCA leg-
islation of 1986 is probably the most widely known of these changes 
because it 1) made hiring immigrants without proper documentation 
illegal and 2) provided for amnesty, under certain conditions, for those 
who were already in the country illegally. IRCA, for the first time, made 
employers potential targets of enforcement operations. Enforcement of 
the employment provisions of IRCA has been lax and has apparently 
had little effect on the flow of undocumented immigrants to the United 
States (for example, Abraham and Hamilton 2006).
After the events of September 11, 2001, immigration and customs 
enforcement were consolidated in a single agency, Immigration, Cus-
toms and Enforcement (ICE), within the Department of Homeland 
Security, and enforcement budgets were substantially increased. Be-
tween fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2009, the ICE budget increased 
from $3.6 billion to $5.9 billion, an increase of 63 percent in a four-year 
period (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009). “Operation 
Jump Start” even brought National Guard troops to the U.S.–Mexico 
border in 2006 to assist in the enforcement effort, although those troops 
were reassigned in 2008.3 
In addition to revisions in immigration law and increased resources 
for enforcement, there has been considerable controversy over the con-
struction of a fence along the U.S.–Mexico border. Cost estimates of 
a border fence along the entire border vary considerably—from $47 
billion to $59 billion, not including maintenance, surveillance, or en-
forcement costs. Environmentalists, border residents, and border 
governors have been less than enthusiastic about the construction of 
the border fence. Governor Rick Perry (a Republican) of Texas and 
Governor Janet Napolitano (a Democrat, appointed as Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security in early 2009) of Arizona both op-
pose the fence for a number of reasons, each using a similar phrase to 
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describe its likely effectiveness: “Show me a 20 foot fence and I will 
show you a 21 foot ladder.”4
By most accounts (for example, Camarota 2007), migration flows 
to the United States were at record levels in the early 2000s despite 
changes in immigration law, greater expenditures on enforcement, and 
the construction of fences. If reducing the flow of in-migration to the 
United States is a desirable goal, it is reasonable to ask whether there is 
a more cost-effective mechanism for getting the job done.
Investing in the economic development of migrant-sending nations, 
particularly Mexico, could be a more effective use of scarce resources 
and provide other benefits as well. This economic-development 
suggestion is not an argument against meaningful revision of the con-
voluted and largely unenforced U.S. immigration laws. Indeed, if 
implemented, the economic-development policy as immigration policy 
idea could pave the way for successful implementation of immigration 
law based on U.S. labor-market needs as suggested by Briggs. 
The argument presented here is in the context of migration from 
Mexico to the United States—the issue that initially engaged Briggs’s 
interest and subsequent work on immigration policy (Briggs 1975).5 
Briggs, himself, did not ignore economic development as part of an 
overall strategy to reduce migration flows. In the 1970s, Briggs (1975, 
p. 483) stated: “With respect to the special problems associated with 
illegal entry from neighboring Mexico, the United States should make 
overtures to Mexico concerning how efforts could be made to devel-
op the economy of Mexico’s northern states.” He also argued that the 
United States “should carefully reassess its trade and tariff policies as 
they pertain to Mexico” (Briggs 1975, p. 483).
Briggs continues to maintain that economic-development assistance 
to sending nations should be part of the overall policy mix: “More at-
tention should also be given by national policies to addressing the push 
factors in the major source countries. More economic assistance should 
be made available and tailored to the particular factors in any coun-
try that cause so many of its citizens to leave their homeland” (Briggs 
2003, p. 280).
If there is a difference between Briggs’s views on the role of eco-
nomic development as migration policy and my own, it is a matter of 
emphasis. Briggs places reform of immigration law and increased en-
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forcement as the highest priorities, while the suggestion here is that 
mutually agreed upon development assistance would be more effective 
in reducing migration flows than immigration reform or enforcement.
What do we know about Mexican immigrants to the United States? 
Most of those born in Mexico and residing in the United States are not 
U.S. citizens (78.5 percent). More than a quarter (27.0 percent or roughly 
3.1 million) of these foreign-born noncitizens entered the United States 
between 2000 and 2006, even though migration from Mexico to the 
United States may have slowed down for a year or two after the terrorist 
attacks of September 2001 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).6
Why do these immigrants come to the United States? Migration 
(domestic and international) occurs for many reasons. Migrants are mo-
tivated to relocate for personal reasons such as family reunification, to 
seek political asylum (to flee real or imagined political persecution), 
and to satisfy inherent restlessness. Despite this wide range of reasons, 
economic motives for migration are amply supported by economic 
theory (Massey et al. 1994; Todaro 1969) and numerous empirical stud-
ies (see, for example, Greenwood and McDowell 1991; Passel 1990; 
Stark and Taylor 1989). In the case of Mexico and the United States, 
there is strong evidence that large U.S.–Mexico income disparities con-
tribute significantly to U.S. migration from Mexico (see, for example, 
Díez-Cañedo Ruiz 1984; Passel 2006). That is why policies designed to 
reduce those income differentials could go a long way toward reducing 
migration flows between the two nations.
Economic growth theory generally suggests that income differenc-
es among nations and regions should disappear over the long run. To 
the extent that migration is motivated by economic concerns, income 
convergence should reduce migration to the United States in the long 
run. But, given the historical record and current policies, it will be a 
very long time before U.S.–Mexico income convergence occurs. Ac-
cording to World Bank data, U.S. GDP per person ($43,984) was 5.5 
times that of Mexico ($8,051; World Bank 2008).7 If Mexico’s GDP per 
person were to grow at 2 percent per year and U.S. GDP per person did 
not grow at all, income convergence between the two nations (as mea-
sured by GDP per person) would not occur until about 2091. We can 
be reasonably confident that this is too long to have an effect on early 
twenty-first-century immigration flows or policy.
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The 2 percent per year growth rate used in this example is not en-
tirely arbitrary. GDP per person in the United States has grown at about 
2 percent per year for more than a century. If U.S. GDP per person 
continues to grow, then either a much higher growth rate in Mexico 
or a much longer time (perhaps centuries) will be required to achieve 
income convergence between the two nations.
The preferred solution, of course, is faster growth in Mexico and 
not slower U.S. growth. Rapid economic growth in Mexico is possible. 
The historical record suggests that the Mexican economy grew at very 
high rates from the 1940s to the early 1980s, a period commonly re-
ferred to as el milagro (the miracle). The rapid growth of the Mexican 
economy during the miracle years was associated with rapid urbaniza-
tion and even more rapid industrial growth.
Neither market forces nor current policies will reduce U.S.–Mexico 
income differentials enough to affect the contemporary debate over U.S. 
immigration policy. The most optimistic projections of the effects of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on economic growth 
in Mexico and the United States do not suggest that bi-national income 
convergence is just around the corner. A 2003 Congressional Budget 
Office Study (2003, p. xiv) concluded that “NAFTA has increased U.S. 
GDP but by a very small amount—probably no more than a few billion 
dollars” and that the effects on Mexico were likely to be roughly the 
same size.
If economic growth in Mexico is important to the United States, 
it is difficult to tell. Other than trade policy and mild praise from U.S. 
officials for Mexico’s attempts to restrain the growth of its money sup-
ply and balance its federal budget, the United States has done little to 
promote economic growth in Mexico. Worse, it is difficult to claim that 
praise, restraining money supply growth, or balancing budgets contrib-
utes much to growth at all. An argument can be made that the United 
States has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbor to 
the south, despite a long record of doing so, but interference is not what 
I am suggesting.
A rapidly growing U.S. economy, operating at or near full capacity, 
is critical to Mexico’s economic growth. Thus, investment in education 
and worker training and an attack on the U.S. unemployment problem 
are essential to the long-term growth of the Mexican economy. The two 
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economies are interdependent and have been for some time (Musgrave 
1985). Interaction between the two countries is obvious in trade rela-
tions, investment patterns, labor-market activities, business cycles, and 
in the environmental arena. U.S.–Mexico interaction is asymmetric: 
policies and activities in the United States have much more of an effect 
in Mexico than the reverse.
Trade is a particularly important part of any economic growth sce-
nario in Mexico. Mexican exports constitute nearly a third of its GDP 
and now, as a century ago, nearly 90 percent of Mexico’s exports are 
destined for U.S. markets. Trade relations between the U.S. and Mex-
ico reinforce the notion that a growing U.S. economy is important for 
Mexico’s economic development. In the current (2008–2009) U.S. 
economic downturn, Mexico’s exports have plummeted. Between Janu-
ary 2008 and January 2009, Mexico’s exports declined by 30 percent 
(INEGI 2009). In previous U.S. downturns, particularly in 1981–1982, 
Mexico’s exports also decreased.
During the debate over NAFTA in the early 1990s, it was frequently 
argued that NAFTA would promote prosperity in Mexico and reduce 
Mexican migration to the United States. This was a false assertion, 
and there is little evidence that NAFTA has reduced U.S. immigration 
flows (Passel 2006; Scott, Sala, and Campbell 2006). In fact, in the 
year NAFTA took effect (1994), Mexico experienced its worst eco-
nomic crisis since the Great Depression. The United States had little 
choice except to put together a $50 billion financial rescue package for 
Mexico, the third U.S. attempt to bolster the Mexican economy since 
the early 1980s (Peach 1995). Mexico willingly accepted the severe 
restrictions on its own domestic fiscal and monetary policy that came 
along with the various rescue plans. It is not impossible to influence 
Mexico’s policy stance and development strategies from north of the 
border, and the current economic crisis (2008–2009) may provide yet 
another opportunity to do so. The key question is whether this will be 
done in a constructive manner.
More meaningful economic-development policies toward Mexico 
are possible. A modern version of the Marshall Plan, involving large-
scale investments by the three NAFTA partners, is another possibility. 
Such a plan could be easily designed with an emphasis on education, 
transportation, and energy infrastructure needed to make NAFTA work 
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more effectively. The need for coordinated education, energy, and trans-
portation policies in the three nations has become apparent since NAFTA 
has been implemented, and such investments could stimulate economic 
growth in all three nations without threatening national sovereignty.
Another possibility is for the United States to provide several 
billion dollars in scholarships for Mexican students to study at U.S. 
universities, perhaps with the condition that they must return home af-
ter completion of their studies. This could benefit both U.S. institutions 
of higher education and the Mexican economy. In fact, both nations 
already profit from a sizeable Mexican program to subsidize the educa-
tion of its residents in the United States.
Many other economic-development programs could be devised 
with just a little imagination and could be paid for with some or all of 
the billions of dollars the United States already spends on various im-
migration enforcement activities along its southern border. The need 
to devise such programs is reinforced by the current global economic 
crisis. There are many signs that the Mexican economy is again in 
serious trouble. For example, Mexico’s real GDP decreased 8.2 per-
cent between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, 
and Mexico’s exports decreased 35.6 percent between April 2008 and 
April 2009 (INEGI 2009). Another Mexican economic crisis would al-
most certainly increase the flow of migrants from Mexico to the United 
States, even if the U.S. economy is performing poorly. I suggest we 
adopt policies that will address both the immediate economic crisis, 
the long-term development needs of the United States and Mexico, and 
alter migration flows between the two nations. It is possible to do it 
all—reform immigration along the lines suggested by Briggs, improve 
enforcement, and promote economic development in Mexico. But, if 
we must choose between them, my choice is to emphasize economic 
development as the highest priority. 
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Notes
1. I believe that I learned “the opportunity cost of employing the unemployed is zero” 
from a course taught by Briggs, but memory is a frequently unreliable source.
2. No one does a better job of summarizing and explaining the evolution and subtle-
ties of U.S. immigration law than Briggs (1984, 2003).
3. As this chapter is being written, the Obama administration is also considering 
deploying troops and law enforcement agents to the border to prevent Mexican 
drug-cartel violence from spreading into the United States.
4. Border fences produce other forms of controversy and even amusement. In 2007, 
the Golden State Fence Company, hired to build portions of the border fence near 
San Diego, entered a guilty plea to charges that it hired illegal immigrants (as 
many as 250 of its 750 workers) to work on the fence (Horsley 2007). 
5. Partly because the United States and Mexico share a common border, migration 
from Mexico to the United States generally receives the most attention in the me-
dia, and this particular migration flow is often discussed in emotional terms. Of 
course, Mexico is not the sole source of U.S. immigration. The American Com-
munity Survey for 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007) indicates that there were 37.5 
million foreign-born persons in the United States and that just 11.5 million (30.7 
percent) of those were born in Mexico. 
6. The American Community Survey estimates of the foreign-born population and 
the number and percentage of the foreign born who were born in Mexico are very 
similar to estimates from the Current Population Survey (CPS). See Camarota 
(2007) for an extended discussion of the CPS data.
7. Using GDP per person may not be the best comparison. The differences in per-
sonal income per person in the two nations may be much larger because exports 
account for a much larger share of GDP in Mexico than in the United States.
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It was fall 1972 in Austin, Texas. Vernon Briggs was assigned to 
teach principles of economics—the introductory course for freshmen—
and the lead author of this chapter was a first-year graduate student in 
transition from humanities to social science. However, without a sin-
gle economics course under her belt, auditing the introductory course 
seemed prudent. What she never expected was positive lifetime returns 
from that decision.
In one lecture, Briggs dared to assert that immigrants aggravated 
rural poverty by depressing wages and displacing Chicanos, but he did 
so on the basis of detailed knowledge of rural labor markets. He had 
just finished Chicanos and Rural Poverty (Briggs 1973) and understood 
all too well the dynamics of labor-market competition. He also recog-
nized that employment policy requires not only tight coordination with 
immigration policy but also appropriate human capital investments in 
domestic workers, preferably via well-functioning educational institu-
tions. This chapter is a testament to Briggs’s concerns and influence.
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THE ISSUES
Black, Hispanic, and white women differ in the amount of school 
they complete, in the timing and character of their family formation, and 
in their labor-force behavior. White women average the highest level of 
education while Hispanics complete the fewest years of schooling, with 
blacks somewhere in between. Decisions about educational investments 
and work experience during the early life course have profound impacts 
on later career paths and wage prospects. Although returns on education 
and work experience have been examined in previous research, most 
studies have focused on men, whose post-school labor-force activity 
is virtually universal (Ahituv, Tienda, and Hotz 2000; Hotz et al. 2002; 
Keane and Wolpin 1997). Because their family formation decisions are 
highly influential in determining their employment behavior, the situa-
tion for women is more complex (Ahituv and Tienda 2004).
Understanding how fertility influences employment decisions dur-
ing the early life course is complicated because the timing of births 
influences both school continuation and labor-force decisions at a given 
age. Younger women’s labor-force participation has been increasing 
over the past century, especially since 1950 (Spain and Bianchi 1996). 
Compared with men, women continue to experience greater and more 
frequent interruptions in their career trajectories (Alon, Donahoe, and 
Tienda 2001). In turn, their family formation choices affect both edu-
cational attainment and the acquisition of valuable work experience 
during the early life course. Finally, fertility decisions are thought to 
be influenced by women’s educational and work career opportunities, 
giving rise to a potentially important source of endogeneity between the 
fertility, schooling, and employment decisions of women.
Additionally, women are not a homogeneous group. African- 
American and Hispanic women earn, on average, lower wages than 
white women and are less likely to find a job when searching for paid 
work (Browne 1999). Furthermore, not only decisions surrounding 
investments in education and work experience, but also choices of fam-
ily formation differ among racial and ethnic groups. Black women are 
more likely than either white or Hispanic women to bear a child out 
of wedlock, yet they complete more years of education than Hispanic 
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women (Ahituv and Tienda 2004; Stier and Tienda 2001). Therefore, it 
is necessary to consider jointly the interrelationship between fertility, 
schooling, and employment decisions to appreciate whether minor-
ity and nonminority women respond similarly to changing economic 
opportunities.
From the late 1970s to the present, labor-market conditions became 
more geographically heterogeneous across the United States, implying 
changing regional incentives to either enter the workforce or remain 
in school. Tight, dynamic markets may propel young women into the 
labor force, thereby allowing them to accumulate work experience. 
However, if this work experience comes at the expense of pursuing ad-
ditional schooling, participating in the labor force early in one’s career 
may be deleterious in the long run. Due to the geographic and resi-
dential separation of racial and ethnic groups in the United States, as 
well as the geographic differences in amount of industrial restructuring 
across the country, local labor-market conditions could lead to differing 
outcomes for black, white, and Hispanic women (Bound and Dresser 
1999; Browne 1999).
This chapter addresses several questions about young women’s 
employment and wage prospects in the context of the school-to-work 
transition. First, how do young women’s human capital investment and 
family formation decisions vary along racial and ethnic lines? Second, 
what implications do these differences have for labor-force behavior? 
Third, how does the acquisition of early work experience differ among 
black, white, and Hispanic women, and are the returns on early ex-
perience significant predictors of adult wage inequality? Finally, how 
sensitive are young women’s labor-force decisions to local market 
conditions?
The next section describes the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) and defines key variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Following a statistical portrait of the work and schooling experiences 
for a cohort of young women from ages 17 through 28, we elaborate an 
econometric specification to estimate the effects of local labor-market 
conditions, human capital, and fertility on young women’s employment 
behavior and wages and present empirical results. The conclusion high-
lights key findings and suggests directions for further research.
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DATA
The data for our analysis is drawn from the NLSY, a nationally 
representative sample of U.S. youth between the ages of 13 and 20 as 
of January 1, 1978. The original sample consisted of a national prob-
ability sample of 6,111 men and women in this age range, plus 5,296 
individuals from randomly selected oversamples of black, Hispanic, 
and economically disadvantaged white youth. Beginning in 1979, in-
person interviews were conducted annually, and by 1993, the last year 
we analyze, just over 10 percent of the original sample had been lost to 
attrition. The detailed life histories specify dates and type of employ-
ment, hours of work, wage rates, dates of school enrollment, and dates 
of childbirth by age, which permit us to record simultaneous activities 
at specific ages.
Empirical analyses use data for women drawn from the national 
probability sample and the black and Hispanic oversamples for the 
1979–1993 period. We also restrict our analysis to respondents aged 
13–16 in 1978 (28–31 in 1993). Except for youth who participate in 
informal, remunerated jobs prior to the legal age for work (i.e., 14), this 
sample selection criterion yields the most complete information pos-
sible on the entire process of early employment experiences, school 
departure, and labor-market entry. With these data restrictions, our anal-
ysis sample consists of 2,477 young women, including 1,204 whites, 
762 blacks, and 511 Hispanics.
Labor-Market Status
Using the detailed work and school histories, we construct a year-
by-year classification of women’s primary activity.1 Starting from age 
13, each respondent was coded as participating in one of the following 
four mutually exclusive activities: 1) enrolled in school, 2) part-time 
work only, 3) full-time work, and 4) homemaker.
For women who had not worked full time, we examined school 
attendance and employment during the calendar year to see if their 
dominant activity was school (state 1) or part-time work (state 2). The 
homemaker activity state (4) also includes a tiny share of childless 
women who were not working or attending school. This coding exer-
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cise produced a person-year file with 15 observations per respondent. 
Wage rates are available for jobs associated with the first three states. 
Because we consider whether school is the dominant state, we do not 
estimate a wage equation for state 1.
Human Capital Measures
We derive indicators of human capital as measured by educational 
attainment and work experience, measured from a life cycle perspec-
tive. Because youth accumulate educational experience over their 
early life course (Hotz and Tienda 2002; Tienda and Ahituv 1996), we 
constructed a measure of the years of school attended at each age. We 
also chart age-specific educational attainment using the school history 
module to ascertain whether the highest level is less than high school, 
high-school graduation (or GED), or a bachelor’s degree as of each age. 
With respect to work experience, we use the detailed work history data 
to construct measures of the number of weeks worked full time and 
part time at each age. Finally, we include scores on the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) in our analyses to control for individual dif-
ferences in labor-market aptitude.
Family Background, Personal Characteristics, and Fertility
Using 1979 baseline NLSY interviews, we follow Caspi et al. (1998) 
in constructing several family and personal background variables re- 
lated to young women’s labor-market outcomes. These include the in-
come of respondents’ parents in 1978, maternal educational attainment, 
total number of siblings in 1979, and whether or not the respondent 
lived in a female-headed household at the age of 14.2 Personal charac-
teristics include race/ethnicity, age, husband’s income, urban residence, 
age of menarche, and whether the respondent was born in a foreign 
country. From the birth histories available in the NLSY, we construct 
a measure of cumulative fertility by age, which essentially denotes the 
number of children ever born at each age. 
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Labor-Market Conditions
To assess the effects of labor-market conditions on the employment 
prospects and wages of young female workers, we used county-level 
data on employment and average earnings distributed by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
to construct two time-varying measures of local labor-market condi-
tions: the county average income per worker (expressed in constant 
1982 dollars) and the county annual percentage rate of growth in total 
employment. These time-varying indicators of labor-market conditions 
were appended to respondents’ geo-coded records.
EARLY WORK AND FAMILY EXPERIENCES OF 
YOUNG WOMEN
Attaining full-time employment represents a successful culmination 
of the transition from school to work. Ahituv, Tienda, and Hotz (2000) 
show that there are multiple pathways from school to work that roughly 
correspond to race and ethnic groups. Table 8.1, which depicts the age-
specific allocation of women into the four mutually exclusive activity 
states, reveals clear racial and ethnic differences in the transition from 
school to work. At age 17, enrollment in school is the modal activity 
for all demographic groups, although by that age, almost 30 percent of 
Hispanic women have left school compared to 21 percent of whites and 
16 percent of blacks. Overall, black and white women are more similar 
to each other in their school-leaving patterns. However, black women 
are more similar to Hispanic than white women in their full-time age-
employment profiles at later ages because, like their male counterparts, 
they experience delays in the initial entry into the labor market. Thus, 
by age 24, when most women have finished school, nearly half of His-
panic and black women have become full-time workers, compared with 
60 percent of white women. By age 28, 61 percent of white women held 
a full-time job compared to 53 percent of Hispanic and black women. 
Although, between the ages of 17 and 28, the share of Hispanic women 
who were homemakers doubled, while that of black women more than 
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Table 8.1   Pathways from School to Work: Age-Specific Distribution of Hispanic, Black, and White Women by 
Four Activity States (%)
Hispanic (N=5,724)a Black (N=8,679) White (N=13,723)
Age
School 
enrollment
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Home- 
makers
School 
enrollment
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Home- 
makers
School 
enrollment
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Home- 
makers
17 70.1 13.2 6.0 10.6 84.2 4.7 2.8 8.3 78.8 10.1 7.1 4.0
18 44.0 28.7 14.5 12.8 56.2 18.0 7.4 18.5 46.3 27.5 19.0 7.2
19 24.3 32.9 23.9 18.9 34.3 27.5 13.6 24.6 32.7 27.7 30.9 8.8
20 17.0 31.4 34.4 17.2 24.4 30.5 19.2 25.9 27.4 27.3 37.6 7.7
21 14.2 30.1 34.2 21.4 16.9 27.7 28.0 27.3 24.4 24.1 41.0 10.5
22 10.0 27.4 41.0 21.6 11.4 32.1 33.7 22.9 12.3 27.0 49.3 11.5
23 6.4 28.8 42.3 22.5 6.8 30.3 39.8 23.1 7.1 25.3 57.3 10.3
24 3.9 24.7 47.6 23.8 4.2 25.9 48.3 21.7 4.8 23.2 61.6 10.5
25 3.9 26.9 50.5 18.7 3.5 25.8 50.2 20.5 3.9 22.3 63.2 10.6
26 4.4 21.7 53.4 20.6 3.2 24.4 53.8 18.7 3.6 24.3 60.4 11.8
27 4.3 23.6 51.3 20.9 2.7 24.9 54.2 18.1 3.2 24.7 61.0 11.2
28 4.7 21.7 53.2 20.4 3.5 23.7 53.2 19.7 2.9 22.7 60.9 13.5
NOTE: Some segments may not total 100 due to rounding.
a  N’s reported are in units of person years. The person year file was created from a sample including 1,204 white, 762 black, and 511 Hispanic women.
SOURCE: NLSY.
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doubled, and that of white women almost quadrupled, only 13 percent 
of white women were full-time homemakers at age 28 compared to 
about 20 percent of black and Hispanic women.
As has been observed for young men (Ahituv, Tienda, and Hotz 
2000), Hispanic women enter the labor force on a part-time basis at 
younger ages than either white or black women. White and Hispanic 
women are about equally likely to work full time at age 17. That only 
about half as many black women work full time at this age reveals their 
greater difficulty securing employment during adolescence. By age 19, 
when the majority of young women have left school, about one-third 
of white women and one-quarter of Hispanic women work full time 
as compared to only 14 percent of black women. The Hispanic–black 
gap in full-time employment arises partly because larger shares of 
black women remain enrolled in school up to age 20, whereas Hispanic 
women withdraw from school at a significantly faster rate. However, 
this does not explain the large race gap in the timing of the entry into 
full-time employment because even larger shares of white women pro-
long schooling as compared to blacks. The white advantage in full-time 
employment that emerges at age 17 persists throughout the early life 
course: it widens through late adolescence and early adulthood, im-
plying acquisition of more labor-market experience. After age 25, the 
white–minority gap narrows, hovering around 7 percentage points. 
At least four reasons can be proffered to account for racial and eth-
nic differences in the timing of entry to full-time employment. The first 
is that, similar to young men (Ahituv, Tienda, and Hotz 2000), black, 
white, and Hispanic women pursue distinct investment profiles in the 
transition from school to work. In other words, young women’s human 
capital investment decisions in education and early work experience 
have direct and lasting consequences for their full-time employment 
prospects and the wages they can command as young adults. Second, 
racial and ethnic differences in the timing of births and marriage may 
contribute to the observed differences in full-time employment. A third 
reason is Hispanics enjoyed more favorable labor-market conditions 
than either blacks or whites because they disproportionately live in the 
sunbelt and were relatively shielded from the industrial decline that di-
minished job opportunities in the rustbelt states during the late 1970s 
and throughout the 1980s. A fourth explanation for these differences is 
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that black women experience more intense labor-market discrimination 
than Hispanics.
Human Capital Investment
Figure 8.1 addresses the first reason by plotting the age-specific 
educational attainment of young women. These trends are based on all 
young women in the sample, regardless of when or if they attained full-
time employment prior to age 27. The well-documented differences are 
clearly evident: namely, whites attain the highest level of education at 
all ages, Hispanics the lowest level, and blacks an intermediate level. 
This finding is consistent with the activity state distributions reported 
in Table 8.1, which show that Hispanics have the fastest rates of school 
departure while whites exit school at much slower rates.
Educational differentials widen appreciably after age 18 owing 
to differences in the likelihood of college attendance by minority and 
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nonminority groups, coupled with low rates of high-school completion 
among Hispanic women. By the ages of 24–25, white women averaged 
almost one more year of school than Hispanics and approximately a half 
year more than blacks. Owing to the greater propensity of white women 
to pursue post-graduate training, the race gap in education increased 
slightly by age 27. Group differences in the acquisition of labor- 
market experience throughout the early life course could also contrib-
ute to rising educational inequities by age if this form of human capital 
acquisition comes at the expense of additional schooling.
As suggested by the data in Table 8.1, black, white, and Hispanic 
women accumulate unequal amounts of part-time and full-time work 
experience in their transition from school to work because of differ-
ences in the timing of labor-force entry (Hotz and Tienda 2002). Figure 
8.2 summarizes racial and ethnic differences in accumulated work 
experience for young women aged 17–28. In contrast to the trends in 
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educational attainment, which showed Hispanic women to be most dis-
advantaged, during the 1980s, Latinas acquired more work experience 
than their black counterparts but less than whites. In fact, despite their 
higher levels of education at each age, the work experience curve for 
blacks is below those of Hispanic and white women throughout the 
age range considered. Moreover, the ethno-racial experience gaps in-
creased over time. At age 18, white women averaged 0.7 years more 
work experience than their black age counterparts and 0.4 years more 
than Hispanics. By age 22, the comparable differentials were 1.6 and 
0.9 years for blacks and Hispanics, respectively. And, by the end of the 
observation period, white women averaged 2.3 years more work experi-
ence than blacks and 1.5 years more than Hispanics.
On balance, women’s transition from school to work roughly par-
allels that of young men inasmuch as there appear to be three general 
profiles (Ahituv, Tienda, and Hotz 2000). The experience of whites is 
characterized by prolonged schooling and early entry into the work-
force, which eventuates in higher stocks of human capital in the form 
of both work experience and schooling. Hispanic women’s age-specific 
full-time labor-force participation rates trail those of whites at every 
age, but they acquire more labor-force experience than black women. 
Black women’s modal pathway from school to work involves delayed 
labor-market entry, coupled with prolonged schooling. If the returns 
on education are greater than the returns on work experience, Hispanic 
women should be most economically disadvantaged as young adults 
because they achieve the lowest educational levels. This scenario is 
likely because returns on education rose appreciably during the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Danziger and Gottschalk 1993).
Young Women’s Family Formation
A second reason for the unequal labor-force experiences of black, 
white, and Hispanic women is their different patterns of family for-
mation. Group differences in the timing and number of births directly 
influence women’s labor-force behavior, but fertility also is influenced 
by employment activity and educational attainment (Ahituv and Tienda 
2004). Figure 8.3 portrays the cumulative proportions of women mar-
ried at specific ages for black, white, and Hispanic women, and Figure 
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8.4 depicts the cumulative proportions of women from each group with 
at least one child at specific ages. A striking difference in marriage be-
havior is that black women are appreciably less likely to marry at any 
age than either whites or Hispanics. Another noteworthy difference 
in family formation is that Hispanic women enter marriage at a faster 
pace than either blacks or whites until about age 22, when the white 
and Hispanic marriage rates converge. Marriage behavior influences 
women’s labor-force activity in two ways. First, it enables them to re-
main at home if their spouses’ income is sufficient to meet needs and 
preferences. Second, marriage generally makes childbearing more like-
ly, other things being equal.
Figure 8.4, which displays the cumulative proportion of women 
with at least one child by age, shows large differences in childbearing 
patterns. Although childbearing at age 16 is typically uncommon, black 
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girls are twice as likely as Hispanics and four times as likely as whites 
to have their first child at this age. During the teen years, childbearing 
among Hispanics rises steeply so that, by age 20, 36 percent of Hispanic 
women have borne at least one child compared to 40 percent of black 
women and only 19 percent of white women. The black and Hispanic 
cumulative fertility curves remain above that of white women through-
out the life course, despite the fact that the proportion of black married 
women remains lower throughout. Thus, white women’s high rates of 
labor-force participation as young adults also reflect their lesser family 
constraints relative to minority women coupled with higher stocks of 
work experience they accumulate as a result. By age 27, only 56 percent 
of white women had given birth to at least one child as compared to 70 
percent of black and Hispanic women.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Age
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
w
ith
 c
hi
ld
White
Black
Hispanic
SOURCE: NLYS.
Figure 8.4  Age-Specific Cumulative Proportion with Child, by Race and 
Ethnicity
142   Tienda et al.
Local Labor Markets and Young Women’s Employment
Young women’s decisions about whether to prolong or leave 
school, enter the labor force, or start a family also depend on labor- 
market opportunities, which evolved rapidly during the 1980s and 
1990s. Between 1979 and 1993, there were two recessions, including 
a rather severe one during the early 1980s and another during the early 
1990s. Unemployment reached 21 percent for young women between 
1982 and 1983 and nearly 10 percent for young men (Donahoe and 
Tienda 2000). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, when our cohort 
had largely completed the transition from school to work, female unem-
ployment rates remained in the double digits.
However, the national trends obscure regional variation in local la-
bor markets, which is germane to our hypothesis that local conditions 
may be partly responsible for the high employment rates of Hispanics, 
despite their low educational attainment. During the recession of the 
early 1980s and until around 1985, when our cohorts were between 
the ages of 20 and 23, on average, Hispanic youth resided in more 
dynamic labor markets as compared to black and white youth. This re-
flects the fact that Hispanics disproportionately resided in California, 
where labor-market conditions between 1975 and 1987 were consis-
tently more favorable as compared with other regions. Young blacks 
resided in counties with average labor incomes and employment growth 
rates significantly below those of counties where white and Hispanic 
youth resided. After 1985, however, white women enjoyed more favor-
able labor-market conditions, on average, than either black or Hispanic 
women.
If local labor-market conditions influence young women’s timing 
of full-time employment and their schooling decisions, they also could 
contribute to unequal levels of experience for whites, blacks, and His-
panics. In the following section, we address whether and by how much 
the employment and wage returns on education and experience differ, 
whether young women’s labor-force decisions are sensitive to local labor- 
market conditions, and whether returns on education and work experi-
ence are uniform for minority and nonminority women. 
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ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
To examine the effects of the factors influencing the employment, 
education, and fertility choices of young adult women over their life 
cycle and the effects of these decisions on young women’s wages, we 
employ the same econometric framework used in Hotz et al. (2002) and 
in Ahituv and Tienda (2004).3 In essence, we employ an econometric 
specification that models the school, work, and homemaking activity 
choices using a discrete-choice multinomial probit model in which 
the activity-specific and age-specific utility functions depend upon the 
years of schooling and work experiences accumulated by a given age, a 
woman’s accumulated fertility, the local labor-market conditions pre-
vailing at that age, and family background characteristics, as well as 
indicators of race and ethnicity. We also specify a fertility equation as of 
each age, which also depends on these same factors. Finally, we specify 
a Mincerian wage equation, in which the (log of) wages of women who 
work depend on our human capital and labor-market condition variables, 
as well as race, to estimate the returns on wages of these factors and to 
determine the remaining differences in wages by race and ethnicity.
A key feature of our econometric analysis is to account for the en-
dogeneity of these various choices when estimating their influences 
on life cycle employment, schooling, fertility, and wage outcomes of 
women. To account for this endogeneity, we augment the basic estimat-
ing equations with a factor-analytic error structure, in which a common 
factor, with choice-specific factor loadings, econometrically “links” 
these various choices together, where the distribution of this common 
factor is approximated by a discrete distribution function, with finite 
numbers of points of support.4 In what follows, we present estimates for 
a specification of the model that does not include this factor structure 
(the “without heterogeneity” specification) and one that includes this 
factor structure to account for endogeneity (the “with heterogeneity” 
specification).
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 8.2 presents descriptive statistics for several measures of 
family background, including family income and mother’s years of 
schooling. Minority women are more likely than whites to come from 
economically disadvantaged homes. The average family income of 
Hispanics was about $13,000 below that of whites and roughly $3,000 
higher than that of blacks. If black women represent the most economi-
cally disadvantaged family backgrounds, Hispanic women come from 
the most educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. Mothers of His-
panic women averaged 7.5 years of graded schooling, compared to 10 
and 11.5 for blacks and whites, respectively. Also, black women were 
three times as likely as whites and about twice as likely as Hispanics 
to have been reared in a mother-only family. Several studies show that 
differences in financial resources, parental education, and family sta-
bility affect various outcomes of young women, including educational 
attainment (Kane 1994), the likelihood of working during adolescence 
(Ahituv, Tienda, and Hotz 2000), and the odds of becoming an adoles-
cent mother (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994).
Table 8.2 also reports young women’s educational attainment, mean 
AFQT scores, and work experience. We include the AFQT score as a 
control in all statistical models and interpret it as pre-market aptitude 
for market-relevant skills (Neal and Johnson 1996). As presaged by 
Figure 8.2, white women acquire considerably more work experience 
than minority women by age 28 (28 percent more than black women 
and 19 percent more than Hispanics). Not only are white women more 
likely than their minority counterparts to be married after age 22 (Fig-
ure 8.3), but they also enjoy the benefit of higher spousal earnings. The 
latter could depress their labor supply, particularly during the prime 
reproductive years because they can afford to become homemakers.
Finally, there is evidence that Hispanic women lived in more dy-
namic labor markets than blacks, but not necessarily white women, as 
indicated by the average annual employment growth rate of their county 
of residence. However, mean per-worker incomes of labor markets 
where Hispanic women resided were actually lower, on average, than 
mean incomes where blacks and whites resided. Therefore, the effect of 
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Table 8.2   Proportions and Means (Standard Deviations) of Endogenous and 
Independent Variables at Age 28 by Race and Hispanic Origin 
Hispanic Black White
Endogenous variables
Number of births 1.56
(1.40)
1.63
(1.41)
1.10
(1.10)
Hourly pay ($) 6.85
(4.72)
5.73
(3.98)
7.17
(4.91)
Independent variables
Human capital and scholastic 
achievement
Education (years) 12.29
(2.32)
12.75
(2.02)
13.34
(2.35)
Work experience (weeks) 347.10
(186.95)
305.71
(174.42)
426.27
(158.53)
AFQT Score 57.96
(18.89)
51.34
(17.10)
75.59
(17.57)
Family background (1979)
Number of siblings 4.26
(2.79)
4.53
(3.01)
2.97
(1.92)
Family income ($) 18,532
(13,007)
15,571
(13,725)
31,007
(17,734)
Mother’s education (years) 7.52
(4.21)
9.94
(3.69)
11.40
(3.34)
% Mother-only family 20.0 37.4 11.0
Personal characteristics
Age of menarche 12.29
(2.40)
12.70
(2.16)
12.75
(2.06)
Husband’s income 28,671
(38,419)
23,413
(18,567)
31,611
(38,623)
% Ever birth 72.34 73.84 60.92
% Foreign born 20.21 2.60 2.70
Labor-market conditions
Employment growth 0.704
(2.849)
0.444
(2.557)
1.062
(2.433)
Per-worker income ($) 13,736
(3,891)
14,064
(3,323)
14,264
(3,484)
SOURCE: NLSY.
146   Tienda et al.
labor-market conditions on young women’s employment and wages is 
not obvious and requires empirical evidence, to which we now turn.
Tables 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 report two sets of estimates for the coeffi-
cients—and factor loadings for the models that control for heterogeneity 
using the factor-analytic error specification—for the utility functions 
associated with three of the four activity states (the “school only” state 
serves as a reference category), for the state valuation equation, and for 
the (log) wage functions. Also presented are estimates for the locations 
and points of support associated with the person-specific, common ran-
dom factor. In assessing the appropriateness of the two sets of estimates, 
one can consider the relative explanatory power of the model with and 
without controls for unobserved heterogeneity using a likelihood ratio 
test. Based on this test, the improvement in the fit of the model is highly 
significant when the common factor structure is added to the model 
without heterogeneity.
With the exception of full-time work in the wage functions and 
part-time work in both the state valuation and wage functions, the factor 
loadings are all significantly different from zero for the model with het-
erogeneity.5 Although we discuss the results from both models below, 
the data strongly suggest that controlling for person-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity is necessary to obtain consistent parameter estimates in 
the fertility and wage equations and the state-specific valuation func-
tions that characterize the employment and family formation behaviors 
of young women during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Minority Group Status
Coefficients for minority group status are negative for all activ-
ity state choices, implying that black and Hispanic women are more 
likely than whites to remain enrolled in school as compared with work-
ing full or part time or becoming full-time homemakers (Table 8.3). 
This is consistent with results of Ahituv and Tienda (2004), who find 
that minority women prolong schooling relative to white women with 
similar background characteristics. These results are unaltered by the 
inclusion of controls for unobserved heterogeneity, except that the point 
estimates change slightly. Note that all values of the factor loadings 
for the various activities are positive and significant for full-time work 
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activity, negative and significant for homemaking, and not significant 
for part-time employment.6 Although the point estimates on the family 
background and AFQT scores are similar whether or not unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into account, this is not so for endogenous vari-
ables (e.g., wages and number of children).
Table 8.3 shows that only one endogenous variable—number of 
children—behaves as expected once unobserved heterogeneity is taken 
into account. Specifically, a higher number of children increases the 
likelihood of homemaking and lowers the likelihood of full-time em-
ployment relative to school enrollment. Higher fertility also increases 
the odds of part-time work relative to exclusive educational activity.
Racial and ethnic effects on family formation reveal a more com-
plex pattern in that black women with children are more likely to remain 
in school, to work full or part time, or to become full-time homemakers 
relative to white women with similar characteristics (Table 8.4). These 
results are consistent with those of other studies (Browne 1999). How-
ever, the point estimates for employment activity are greatly attenuated 
once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, suggesting that 
black mothers who work differ from their nonworking counterparts in 
unmeasured ways that are systematically correlated with the decision to 
work. Hispanic women with children are less likely than white moth-
ers to remain enrolled in school, but they are as likely either to join 
the labor force or become full-time homemakers. Hispanic mothers are 
slightly more likely than white mothers to work full time, but this result 
is on the margin of statistical significance, and therefore tentative.
Finally, results show trivial race effects on both full- and part-time 
wages irrespective of whether unobserved heterogeneity is taken into 
account (Table 8.5). Hispanic women, however, earn 7 to l2 percent 
more than their statistically comparable white counterparts. Note that 
this effect holds with and without controlling for unobserved hetero-
geneity. We note that this result differs from those of cross-section 
analyses (Duncan, Hotz, and Trejo 2006), where one finds that His-
panic women either have lower or the same wages after controlling 
for observable factors. Such studies seldom adequately represent the 
accumulation of human capital and selection into various work activity 
states over the life course as is possible with the longitudinal data avail-
able in the NLSY.
148Table 8.3  Estimates of Activity States 
Without heterogeneity With heterogeneity
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work Homemaker
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work Homemaker
Activity-specific factor loading 0.0152
(0.0668)
0.4566***
(0.0584)
−0.2928***
(0.0718)
Intercept 0.0000
(0.4958)
−7.7339***
(0.5026)
−4.7478***
(0.5917)
0.0000
(0.5110)
−8.3800***
(0.5073)
−4.3343***
(0.6388)
Endogenous variables
Number children 0.1881***
(0.0331)
0.0559*
(0.0311)
0.3422***
(0.0355)
0.1840***
(0.0435)
−0.1821***
(0.0392)
0.4215***
(0.0448)
Minority status
Black −0.2522***
(0.0295)
−0.1303***
(0.0277)
−0.2727***
(0.0286)
−0.2545***
(0.0290)
−0.1514***
(0.0274)
−0.2681***
(0.0280)
Hispanic −0.1905***
(0.0299)
0.0844**
(0.0270)
−0.2282***
(0.0294)
−0.1911***
(0.0295)
−0.0975***
(0.0266)
−0.2213***
(0.0289)
Human capital and scholastic achievement
Years of schooling attended 0.0561***
(0.0097)
0.0933***
(0.0089)
−0.0500***
(0.0096)
0.0560***
(0.0094)
0.0870***
(0.0087)
−0.0443***
(0.0091)
Years PT work
Exp previous year
0.5727***
(0.0179)
0.4740***
(0.0169)
0.3176***
(0.0168)
0.5732***
(0.0180)
0.4713***
(0.0171)
0.3189***
(0.0170)
PT years last year squared −0.0589***
(0.0023)
−0.0490***
(0.0025)
−0.0452***
(0.0027)
−0.0590***
(0.0023)
−0.0486***
(0.0025)
−0.0453***
(0.0027)
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Years FT work
Exp previous year
0.1841***
(0.0162)
0.5488***
(0.0155)
−0.0419**
(0.0027)
0.1836***
(0.0162)
0.5472***
(0.0156)
−0.0420**
(0.0166)
FT years last year squared
−0.0127***
(0.0023)
−0.0351***
(0.0022)
−0.0003
(0.0026)
−0.0130***
(0.0023)
−0.0353***
(0.0022)
−0.0006
(0.0027)
AFQT score
−0.0121***
(0.0007)
−0.0072***
(0.0007)
−0.0179***
(0.0007)
−0.0120***
(0.0007)
−0.0069***
(0.0007)
−0.0181***
(0.0007)
Family background (1979)
Family income
−0.0028***
(0.0008)
−0.0007
(0.0007)
−0.0050***
(0.0007)
−0.0028***
(0.0008)
−0.0007
(0.0007)
−0.0052***
(0.0007)
Mother education
−0.0231***
(0.0039)
−0.0207***
(0.0037)
−0.0297***
(0.0036)
−0.0229***
(0.0038)
−0.0215***
(0.0037)
−0.0294***
(0.0036)
Mother-only family
0.0000
(0.0265)
−0.0623**
(0.0294)
0.0362*
(0.0236)
0.0000
(0.0262)
−0.0195
(0.0245)
0.0412*
(0.0233)
Personal characteristics
Husband’s income
−0.0037***
(0.0007)
−0.0087***
(0.0007)
0.0012
(0.0010)
−0.0037***
(0.0007)
−0.0084***
(0.0007)
0.0012
(0.0010)
Foreign born
0.0000
(0.0380)
0.0000
(0.0359)
0.0000
(0.0371)
0.0000
(0.0380)
0.0000
(0.0358)
0.0000
(0.0369)
Age
0.0632
(0.0465)
0.6479***
(0.0463)
0.5480***
(0.0543)
0.0616
(0.0472)
0.6883***
(0.0462)
0.5234***
(0.0569)
AgeSq
−0.0017*
(0.0010)
−0.0140***
(0.0010)
−0.0100***
(0.0012)
−0.0016*
(0.0010)
−0.0145***
(0.0010)
0.0097***
(0.0012)
Age78_13
0.0000
(0.0293)
0.0116
(0.0273)
−0.0147
(0.0281)
0.0000
(0.0292)
0.0153
(0.0274)
0.0207
(0.0286)
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Without heterogeneity With heterogeneity
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work Homemaker
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work Homemaker
Age78_14
−0.0149
(0.0263)
−0.0170
(0.0255)
0.0239
(0.0244)
−0.0143
(0.0262)
−0.0174
(0.0254)
0.0200
(0.0244)
Age78_15
0.0000
(0.0257)
−0.0397*
(0.0235)
0.0144
(0.0239)
0.0000
(0.0256)
−0.0343
(0.0233)
0.0018
(0.0242)
Labor-market conditions
Emp. growth
0.0000
(0.3317)
0.0000
(0.3258)
0.0000
(0.3440)
0.0000
(0.3315)
0.0000
(0.3258)
0.0000
(0.3433)
Per-worker income
0.0062*
(0.0034)
0.0151***
(0.0030)
−0.0095**
(0.0032)
0.0064*
(0.0034)
0.0156***
(0.0029)
−0.0098**
(0.0032)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Included in the estimates (but not reported) are flags indicating missing values for mother’s ed-
ucation, family income, and AFQT score. The variable “number of children” is unique to the activity states equation. Age78_13 refers to 
being age 13 in 1978; Age78_14 to being age 14 in 1978; and Age78_15 to being age 15 in 1978. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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We find that the number of children depresses women’s full-time 
employment activity (Table 8.3), which is consistent with one’s expec-
tation that childbearing reduces women’s labor supply, at least when 
the children are young. Having more children increases the odds that 
women work part time relative to exclusive scholastic activity, but it 
raises even more the likelihood that they become full-time homemak-
ers. Interestingly, the expected negative effect of fertility on the odds of 
full-time employment only emerges after accounting for unobserved, 
person-specific factors that influence both family formation and em-
ployment decisions.
Human Capital Effects
The distinct pathways from school to work pursued by young women 
have direct implications for their age-specific and ultimate educational 
attainment and acquired work experience. Human capital results are 
consistent with prior studies (Hotz et al. 2002) showing that higher lev-
els of education raise the odds of working full time, and to a lesser 
extent part time, relative to remaining enrolled in school (Table 8.3). 
Conversely, higher levels of education lower the likelihood that women 
will become full-time homemakers relative to prolonging their school-
ing further. These effects are robust to the inclusion of person-specific, 
unobserved factors. Also, higher levels of educational attainment are 
associated with lower fertility, but the magnitude of this effect is attenu-
ated substantially for women who work part or full time once controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity are introduced (Table 8.4). Substantively, 
this implies that educated mothers who work differ systematically from 
educated mothers who do not work in ways that are unmeasured by 
covariates included in the empirical model.
For (log) wages, each year of education completed is associated 
with a 2.8 to 3.1 percent return (Table 8.5), which is consistent with 
results of cross-section analyses of female wages (Browne 1999; Dun-
can, Hotz, and Trejo 2006). Moreover, the point estimates are robust to 
specifications that include and exclude controls for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Returns on part-time wages were slightly lower than returns 
on full-time wages, which is another widely replicated empirical result. 
Completion of high school or its GED equivalent produced no addi-
152Table 8.4  Estimates of Birth Outcomes
Without heterogeneity With heterogeneity
School
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work Homemaking School
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work Homemaking
Activity-specific 
factor loading
0.6807***
(0.0140)
1.971***
(0.0176)
2.099***
(0.0108)
2.309***
(0.0232)
Intercept −0.4730**
(0.2334)
−3.118***
(0.7042)
−0.3170
(0.5984)
−6.549***
(1.0349)
−1.076***
(0.2153)
−3.777***
(0.3764)
−1.751***
(0.2393)
−8.255***
(0.5319)
Minority status
Black 0.0829***
(0.0122)
0.2630***
(0.0224)
0.3067***
(0.0104)
0.2696***
(0.0288)
0.0324**
(0.0118)
0.0686***
(0.0183)
0.0428***
(0.0093)
0.2129***
(0.0249)
Hispanic −0.0180
(0.0139)
0.1000***
(0.0233)
0.1284***
(0.0115)
0.1438***
(0.0288)
−0.0343**
(0.0118)
−0.0054
(0.0202)
0.0194*
(0.0100)
0.0061
(0.0269)
Human capital and scholastic achievement
Years of schooling 
attended
−0.1439***
(0.0030)
−0.1820***
(0.0048)
−0.1324***
(0.0027)
−0.1891***
(0.0057)
−0.1287***
(0.0029)
−0.1106***
(0.0040)
−0.0629***
(0.0022)
−0.1172***
(0.0052)
 AFQT score 0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0019***
(0.0005)
−0.0010***
(0.0003)
0.0045***
(0.0007)
0.0014***
(0.0003)
0.0009**
(0.0004)
−0.0004*
(0.0002)
0.0025***
(0.0006)
Family background (1979)
Number siblings 0.0063***
(0.0016)
0.0084**
(0.0025)
0.0197***
(0.0016)
0.0070**
(0.0031)
0.0015
(0.0016)
0.0000
(0.0021)
0.0096***
(0.0014)
0.0012
(0.0030)
Family income −0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.0000
(0.0006)
−0.0016***
(0.0003)
−0.0038***
(0.0010)
−0.0006*
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0005)
−0.0013***
(0.0002)
0.0009
(0.0009)
Mother education −0.0050**
(0.0017)
−0.0093**
(0.0030)
−0.0004
(0.0015)
−0.0069**
(0.0031)
−0.0041**
(0.0016)
−0.0085**
(0.0026)
−0.0059***
(0.0014)
−0.0094***
(0.0028)
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Table 8.4 (continued)
Mother-only family −0.0093
(0.0104)
−0.0650***
(0.0176)
−0.0016***
(0.0003)
0.0169
(0.0214)
−0.0225**
(0.0102)
−0.0006
(0.0083)
−0.0366*
(0.0188)
Personal characteristics
Age of menarche −0.0031
(0.0025)
−0.0172***
(0.0044)
0.0115***
(0.0024)
−0.0753***
(0.0066)
−0.0067**
(0.0025)
−0.0194***
(0.0036)
−0.0055**
(0.0020)
−0.0376***
(0.0055)
Foreign born −0.1124***
(0.0186)
−0.2833***
(0.0428)
−0.1945***
(0.0188)
−0.0818**
(0.0378)
−0.1213***
(0.0175)
−0.1777***
(0.0302)
−0.1562***
(0.0169)
0.0268
(0.0333)
Age 0.0907***
(0.0212)
0.4004***
(0.0600)
0.1049**
(0.0492)
0.7449***
(0.0891)
0.1238***
(0.0195)
0.3357***
(0.0307)
0.1427***
(0.0199)
0.6833***
(0.0458)
AgeSq 0.0017***
(0.0005)
−0.0047***
(0.0013)
0.0003
(0.0010)
0.0119***
(0.0019)
0.0007*
(0.0004)
−0.0036***
(0.0007)
−0.0008*
(0.0004)
−0.0101***
(0.0010)
Age78_13 0.0453***
(0.0126)
−0.0021
(0.0222)
0.0056
(0.0117)
0.1859***
(0.0283)
0.0473***
(0.0129)
0.0301*
(0.0197)
−0.0122
(0.0101)
0.2249***
(0.0261)
Age78_14 0.0180*
(0.0110)
0.0241
(0.0198)
−0.0024
(0.0097)
0.1694***
(0.0232)
0.0157*
(0.0105)
0.0136
(0.0161)
−0.0238**
(0.0084)
0.1874***
(0.0212)
Age78_15 0.0113
(0.0106)
−0.0093
(0.0202)
−0.0010
(0.0097)
0.0779**
(0.0248)
0.0141
(0.0102)
0.0591***
(0.0158)
0.0046
(0.0082)
0.1998***
(0.0205)
Urban 0.0002
(0.0137)
−0.0334*
(0.0206)
−0.0303***
(0.0110)
−0.1153***
(0.0253)
0.0238**
(0.0118)
−0.0028
(0.0164)
−0.0190**
(0.0092)
0.0779***
(0.0214)
Labor-market conditions
Per-worker income 0.0043**
(0.0016)
−0.0215***
(0.0030)
−0.0214***
(0.0014)
0.0127***
(0.0032)
0.0040**
(0.0015)
−0.0077**
(0.0023)
−0.0058***
(0.0011)
0.0008
(0.0027)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Included in the estimates (but not reported) are flags indicating missing values for mother’s 
education, family income, and AFQT score. The variables “age of menarche,” “number of siblings,” and “urban” are unique to the birth 
equation. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Table 8.5  Estimates of Hourly Wage Rates
Without heterogeneity With heterogeneity
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Activity-specific factor loading −0.0148
(0.0141)
0.0094
(0.0079)
Intercept 0.6204**
(0.2729)
−0.8053***
(0.2104)
0.6317**
(0.2735)
−0.8147***
(0.2139)
Minority status
Black −0.0208*
(0.0135)
−0.0021
(0.0059)
−0.0192
(0.0135)
−0.0032
(0.0059)
Hispanic 0.0755***
(0.0134)
0.1155***
(0.0067)
0.0762***
(0.0134)
0.1149***
(0.0067)
Human capital and scholastic achievement
Years of schooling attended 0.0277***
(0.0040)
0.0304***
(0.0019)
0.0272***
(0.0040)
0.0306***
(0.0020)
High school or GED −0.0054
(0.0099)
0.0052
(0.0056)
−0.0054
(0.0099)
0.0050
(0.0056)
Bachelor’s degree or more 0.2182***
(0.0225)
0.1348***
(0.0081)
0.2173***
(0.0225)
0.1350***
(0.0081)
Years PT work exp previous 
year
−0.0165*
(0.0091)
0.0022
(0.0039)
−0.0161*
(0.0091)
0.0020
(0.0040)
PT years last year squared 0.0018*
(0.0011)
−0.0036***
(0.0007)
0.0017*
(0.0011)
−0.0036***
(0.0007)
Years FT work exp previous 
year
0.0474***
(0.0068)
0.0510***
(0.0043)
0.0471***
(0.0069)
0.0512***
(0.0043)
FT years last year squared −0.0017*
(0.0009)
−0.0023***
(0.0005)
−0.0017*
(0.0009)
−0.0023***
(0.0005)
AFQT score 0.0019***
(0.0003)
0.0034**
(0.0002)
0.0013***
(0.0003)
0.0034***
(0.0002)
Family background (1979)
Family income 0.0013**
(0.0004)
0.0012***
(0.0002)
0.0013**
(0.0004)
0.0012***
(0.0002)
Mother education 0.0002
(0.0019)
0.0003
(0.0009)
0.0002
(0.0020)
0.0002
(0.0009)
Mother-only family 0.0261**
(0.0114)
0.0088*
(0.0057)
0.0265**
(0.0114)
0.0088*
(0.0058)
Personal characteristics
Foreign born 0.0484**
(0.0190)
−0.0159*
(0.0083)
0.0477**
(0.0189)
−0.0156*
(0.0083)
Age −0.0036
(0.0244)
0.0930***
(0.0180)
−0.0038
(0.0244)
0.0934***
(0.0183)
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tional return on education above and beyond what women reaped from 
years of school completed, but having achieved a college degree yield-
ed an additional return of 21 percent for part-time employment and 13 
percent for full-time work. These “sheepskin” effects were unaltered by 
consideration of unobserved, person-specific factors.
The work experience effects on employment and wage outcomes 
are highly differentiated according to whether experience was acquired 
on a full-time or part-time basis. For example, higher levels of acquired 
part-time work experience raise the odds of working in a subsequent 
year, but especially the odds of part-time employment (Table 8.3). Be-
cause part-time employment also is associated with school enrollment 
(the school activity state includes part-time workers who are enrolled 
full-time), part-time work experience also increases the odds that 
women will continue in school. Full-time work experience has more 
pronounced effects on the likelihood of future full-time employment, 
but it also increases the odds of part-time work relative to remaining 
enrolled. In sharp contrast to the positive effect of part-time experience 
Table 8.5 (continued)
Without heterogeneity With heterogeneity
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Part-time 
work
Full-time 
work
Agesq
0.0002
(0.0005)
−0.0016***
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0005)
−0.0016***
(0.0004)
Age78_13
−0.0428**
(0.0137)
−0.0063
(0.0062)
−0.0431**
(0.0138)
−0.0063
(0.0063)
Age78_14
−0.0164
(0.0124)
−0.0392***
(0.0054)
−0.0164
(0.0124)
−0.0392***
(0.0054)
Age78_15
−0.0300**
(0.0124)
−0.0210***
(0.0053)
−0.0305**
(0.0125)
−0.0210***
(0.0054)
Labor-market conditions
Emp. growth
−0.2739*
(0.1764)
−0.4824***
(0.0988)
−0.2707*
(0.1770)
−0.4844***
(0.0996)
Per-worker income
0.0227***
(0.0017)
0.0322***
(0.0006)
0.0226***
(0.0017)
0.0322***
(0.0006)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Included in the estimates (but not reported) 
are flags indicating missing values for mother’s education, family income, and AFQT 
score. The variables “high school or GED” and “bachelor’s degree or more” are unique 
to the wage equation. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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on exclusive homemaking, full-time work experience significantly low-
ered the odds of remaining out of the labor force altogether.
Experience effects on wages present an altogether different pic-
ture (Table 8.5). Essentially work experience acquired from part-time 
employment yields trivial returns for either full- or part-time employ-
ment. However, full-time work experience yields a whopping 4.7 to 5.1 
percent return on wages received by part-time and full-time workers, 
respectively. Because the factor loadings were not statistically sig-
nificant in the wage equation, these effects remain unchanged across 
specifications. Finally, the AFQT score yields positive wage returns that 
are slightly higher for women employed full time as compared to those 
employed only part time.7
Labor-Market Conditions
The final question posed at the outset concerns the sensitivity of 
young women’s labor-force decisions to local labor-market conditions. 
Point estimates indicate zero effects of annual employment growth 
on women’s labor-force or homemaking activity relative to full-time 
school attendance, but residence in counties with higher incomes pulls 
women into the labor market relative to attending school and deters 
them from full-time homemaking (Table 8.3). These average worker 
income effects are especially pronounced for full-time work and robust 
across specifications with and without controls for heterogeneity. Simi-
larly, higher average worker incomes are associated with positive wage 
returns to employed women, on the order of 2.3 percent for part-time 
workers and 3.2 percent for full-time workers (Table 8.5).
Labor-market conditions also influence women’s employment 
behavior through their effects on fertility (Table 8.4). That is, more 
favorable market opportunities, as indexed by average per-worker in-
comes, lower the odds that women employed full or part time will bear 
another child, but they increase the odds that women enrolled in school 
will bear a child. The magnitude and statistical significance of mar-
ket effects on fertility are highly sensitive to the inclusion of statistical 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. That is, in addition to personal, 
human capital, and labor-market conditions, childbearing decisions are 
governed by unmeasured circumstances, such as family size prefer-
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ences, early socialization experiences, and the proximate determinants 
of fertility.
Thus, there is suggestive, but not powerful evidence that favorable 
labor-market conditions influence young women’s employment expe-
riences. More important for predicting young women’s labor-market 
status are the human capital investment choices that generate their 
stocks of education and experience. To the extent that favorable eco-
nomic conditions “pulled” these groups out of school and into the labor 
market, the total effects of labor-market conditions on employment out-
comes may be stronger than the direct effects shown here.
CONCLUSIONS
Group differences in family background and other characteristics 
that are associated with school and work choices produce lower stocks 
of human capital accumulated by minority women, especially less for-
mal schooling. Once these differences are taken into account, black and 
Hispanic women are more likely than comparable white women to pro-
long their investments in education relative to working or becoming 
homemakers. However, racial and ethnic differences in family forma-
tion, which decisively influence work behavior during the early life 
course, also determine how much and what forms of human capital are 
acquired during the early life course. Although black mothers are more 
likely than white mothers to remain enrolled in school, Hispanic moth-
ers are more likely to become full-time homemakers or enter the labor 
force. Race effects on wages were trivial, but Hispanic women earned 
7 to 12 percent more than their white counterparts who were similarly 
endowed. This result, which differs from most cross-section findings, 
requires further investigation.
We also find consistent positive effects of education on the likeli-
hood that women will work full time, negative effects on fertility, and 
approximately a 3 percent wage return for each year of education com-
pleted, with the caveat that returns are slightly lower for part-time as 
compared to full-time workers. Furthermore, as suggested by numer-
ous studies about the rising returns on skill during the 1980s, young 
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women enjoy a substantial wage return on college degrees, but none for 
completion of high school or its GED equivalent. Finally, we find trivial 
wage returns on experience acquired through part-time work on subse-
quent full- or part-time wages but a whopping 5 percent wage return on 
experience acquired through full-time work to both full- and part-time 
workers. These results cast doubt on the received wisdom of urging 
youth to acquire work experience while they are enrolled in school. As 
shown for young men (Hotz et al. 2002), perhaps the optimal life cycle 
earnings streams derive from maximizing formal schooling before ac-
quiring work experience either on a full- or part-time basis.
Average county-level per-worker incomes do influence the likeli-
hood that young women will be employed either full or part time relative 
to full-time school enrollment in any given year; moreover, wages re-
ceived by young workers also depend on the opportunities afforded by 
the markets in which they reside. However, employment outcomes are 
insensitive to changes in the annual employment growth rate, which 
is negatively associated with wage returns on full and part-time em-
ployment. This counterintuitive result warrants further investigation 
and may derive from two sources. One is that employment growth for 
young workers in recent years has occurred in low-wage industries, 
particularly services, as relatively well-paying manufacturing and other 
unionized jobs declined (Danziger and Gottschalk 1993). The other has 
to do with the level of aggregation at which local market conditions 
are specified. We have opted to represent local market conditions using 
counties rather than more conventional units for labor markets, such as 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas or Primary Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas, but doing so ignores the fact that women can commute 
across county lines for work.
Notes
1. Women who were in the military were classified as employed full time if they were 
not enrolled in school; this group comprises a tiny share of all respondents.
2. Family income and parental education contain large amounts of missing data. Our 
statistical models include flags for missing values and do not compromise sample 
sizes or introduce biases in the parameter estimates.
3. Ahituv and Tienda (2004) provide a detailed discussion of this framework and 
how it applies to modeling the life cycle choices of young women.
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4. Hotz et al. (2002) and Ahituv and Tienda (2004) provide details about this specifi-
cation and the maximum likelihood methods used in estimation.
5. As discussed in Hotz et al. (2002) and Ahituv and Tienda (2004), the products of 
factor loadings characterize the covariances between the activity-specific utility 
functions and those in the fertility and wage equations. Thus, the statistical sig-
nificance of the factor loadings indicates the existence of significant correlations 
among these disturbances and whether there is statistical evidence consistent with 
the importance of treating the schooling, work, and homemaking activity and fer-
tility choices and wages as being jointly endogenously determined.
6. The insignificant factor loading for part-time work partly reflects the fact that we 
did not separate part-time workers who were enrolled in school from those who 
were not. Hence the contrast with the school-only state may be less sharply defined 
because many women enrolled in school also work part time.
7. Many cross-section studies show that economic returns to education are lower 
for part-time workers than for those engaged full time. That the economic returns 
to skills (AFQT) and years of part-time work experience are lower for part-time 
than for full-time employment is not totally consistent with a human capital ex-
planation, however, and invokes the possibility that market segmentation may be 
partly responsible. Our data did not permit a direct exploration of this alternative 
interpretation.
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The Misdirected Debate 
over the Economics of 
Disabilities Accommodation
Seth D. Harris
U.S. Department of Labor
Vernon Briggs is an unabashed advocate for government regula-
tion of labor markets. Of course, his advocacy has focused primarily 
on immigration policy (Briggs 1996, 2003; Briggs and Moore 1994). 
Even if labor markets operate efficiently, he has said, efficiency is not 
the paramount value in American society. Fairness, equal employment 
opportunity, and the self-sufficiency of working families are important 
values that deserve equal respect in debates over labor-market policies 
(Briggs 1984).
Yet Briggs’s arguments do not depend exclusively on a normative 
appeal. Consistent with his training in institutional economics, and his 
gentle-but-firm contrariness, Briggs stresses that labor markets do not 
always operate efficiently. In such cases, he advocates conscientiously 
designed and properly implemented government intervention to im-
prove efficiency (Briggs 2003). According to Briggs, labor regulation 
“forces managers to manage,” rather than to reflexively slash labor costs 
in search of competitive advantage (Briggs 1987). A central insight of 
Briggs’s scholarship is that regulation can redirect competition toward 
more productive and socially desirable outcomes.
This chapter applies Briggs’s insight to the economics of workplace 
accommodations mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). The ADA’s Title I prohibits employment discrimination against 
any “qualified individual with a disability.”1 Along with discrimination’s 
more traditional forms,2 the ADA defines “discrimination” to include 
the failure to provide a “reasonable accommodation” to a worker with 
a known impairment as long as the employer will not suffer an “undue 
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hardship.” An accommodation can be any change to a physical environ-
ment, work schedule, or job responsibilities that allows a worker with 
a disability to perform the essential job functions or enjoy the same 
privileges and benefits as co-workers.
The ADA and its accommodation mandate have been criticized as 
government meddling in otherwise smoothly operating and efficient 
labor markets. The attack begins with the premise that accommoda-
tions raise employers’ costs of hiring workers with disabilities. Critics 
argue the ADA’s accommodations mandate contributes to joblessness 
by pricing workers with disabilities out of the labor market. The result 
is a tempting man-bites-dog narrative about labor-market regulation 
harming its intended beneficiaries. In fact, this is the reasoning behind 
at least two commentators’ calls for the ADA’s repeal (DeLeire 2000; 
Epstein 1992).
Briggs would skewer this type of argument if it were attempted in 
his scholarly arena. In this chapter, I follow his lead and respond in a 
similar manner. I will examine certain neoclassical economic assump-
tions and others that are too seriously flawed to justify the central role 
they have played in the debate over disabilities accommodations. In 
essence, this debate began with the wrong premise and, as a result, ru-
minated over wrong conclusions. These flawed premises have distracted 
attention from likelier causes of the low and declining employment rate 
among workers with disabilities—that is, the hypotheses that should 
have been the debate’s starting point. After reviewing how this de-
bate went wrong, I will suggest hypotheses that should have been, and 
should be, at the center of the debate over the economics of disabilities 
accommodations.3
THE ADA’S EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS 
WITH DISABILITIES
Virtually all statistical measures show that workers with disabilities 
are employed at a much lower rate than workers without disabilities,4 
and there is little debate over the decline in their employment rate since 
the ADA was enacted (Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba  forthcom-
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ing; Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003). Instead, the scholarly debate has 
focused on whether the ADA contributed to the employment rate’s de-
cline. From its earliest days, scholars and judges have predicted that the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate would make workers with disabilities 
more expensive to employ than workers without disabilities and, there-
fore, less appealing to employers (Barnard 1992; Borkowski v. Valley 
Central School District 1995; Calloway 1995; Donohue 1994; Epstein 
1992; Issacharoff and Nelson 2001; Kelman 1999, 2001; McGowan 
2000; Rosen 1991; Schwab and Willborn 2003; Vande Zande v. Wis-
consin Department of Administration 1995). This prediction has been 
central to the debate.
In particular, this prediction served as the basis for the hypotheses 
tested by two early and important studies finding a causal relation-
ship between the ADA’s passage and a decline in the employment rate. 
Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist (2001) and Thomas DeLeire 
(2000) studied data from the Current Population Survey and the Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation, respectively. Acemoglu and 
Angrist found a decline in the employment rate among both men and 
women with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 39 beginning in 
the two years immediately after the ADA took effect in 1992. DeLeire 
found a substantial decline in the employment rate of men with disabili-
ties beginning in 1990—immediately after the ADA was passed, but two 
years before it took effect. The proximity of the ADA’s passage and the 
employment-rate decline, and analyses which purported to exclude 
other potential causes for the decline, led Acemoglu and Angrist and 
DeLeire to infer a causal relationship between the law and the decline.
A simple syllogism supports these studies’ hypotheses. Workers 
with disabilities need accommodations while workers without disabili-
ties do not. Accommodations cost money; therefore, employing workers 
with disabilities costs more than employing workers without disabili-
ties. Rational employers seek to maximize profits, which, assuming 
capital is fixed, result from a worker’s net productivity (i.e., produc-
tivity minus labor costs). Since workers with disabilities bear higher 
labor costs because of their accommodations, and the accommodations 
can be assumed to make these workers only as productive as their co-
workers without disabilities, workers with disabilities return lower net 
productivity to their employers. As a result, employers will not hire 
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them. Only a short logical step is needed to conclude that the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate has caused the employment rate among work-
ers with disabilities to decline. I have called this the “rational-choice” 
view of the decline in the employment rate for workers with disabilities 
(Harris 2007a). It justifies employers’ choices to eschew workers with 
disabilities as economically rational.
As with most simply stated economic assertions, the devil is in the 
details. I challenge two assumptions that are necessary to the rational-
choice view. For the purpose of focusing on these assumptions, I will 
accept that accommodations impose costs that cause the net productiv-
ity of workers with disabilities to be lower than that of workers without 
disabilities. Even when this premise is accepted, the key assumptions 
supporting the rational-choice view are seriously flawed. Because of 
these flaws, the rational-choice view can explain, at most, only a small 
fraction of circumstances in which employers might be asked to provide 
accommodations to a worker with a disability. Thus, it offers a shaky 
foundation for any scholar’s hypothesis regarding the employment rate 
for all workers with disabilities.
Competitive Markets and Perfect Information
The first and most important assumption underlying the rational-
choice view is that workers’ accommodation requests and employers’ 
accommodation decisions occur in perfectly competitive labor mar-
kets (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Donohue 1994; Jolls 2000). In such 
markets, there are no transaction costs or other factors interfering with 
employers’ profit-maximization calculations, and net productivity will 
drive the decision to hire workers without disabilities, rather than work-
ers with disabilities. Yet, perfectly competitive labor markets are not 
ubiquitous, if they exist at all.
Many incumbent employees bargain with their employers in an 
“internal labor market” characterized by barriers to competition. Only 
“external labor markets,” in which job applicants and prospective em-
ployers search for each other, are presumed to be freely competitive 
(Harris 2007a). Since internal labor markets are not perfectly com-
petitive, the rational-choice view cannot describe the effects of many 
incumbent employees’ accommodations. To the contrary, as demon-
strated by several empirical studies and my own internal labor-market 
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analysis, incumbent employees with disabilities do not necessarily re-
turn lower net productivity for their employers than employees without 
disabilities—in some cases, they yield more (Blanck 1997, forthcom-
ing; Harris 2007a; Hendricks et al. 2005; Schartz et al. 2006). Therefore, 
the prediction that accommodations will ordinarily price workers with 
disabilities out of internal labor markets is inaccurate. Thus, the rational- 
choice view is not relevant to workers with disabilities in internal labor 
markets.
A presumed characteristic of competitive markets, including exter-
nal labor markets, is perfect information. Employers are assumed to 
know everything they need to know to make efficient hiring decisions, 
including which workers have disabilities and what accommodations 
they require. Yet information about disabilities and accommodations 
may not flow freely. Workers who roll their wheelchairs or bring a ser-
vice animal into a job interview necessarily disclose their impairments. 
But most employers are not similarly alerted that a prospective em-
ployee has epilepsy, diabetes, HIV, vision or hearing limitations, mental 
disabilities, intellectual and learning disabilities, or other impairments. 
The ADA does not require job applicants to disclose their impairments 
and prohibits employers from requesting such information except in 
limited circumstances.5
Further, even when they know a worker has an impairment, 
employers may not always know whether an impairment requires 
accommodation. In some cases, it may be obvious. Workers in wheel-
chairs will very likely need ramps or elevators to access upper-level 
floors. In other cases, it is less obvious. For example, a worker with 
cerebral palsy may or may not need an accommodation depending upon 
factors that the employer may not be able to assess during a job inter-
view, even if the employer knows what those factors are. Only those 
workers who request an accommodation during the hiring process are 
effectively forced to disclose that they have an impairment requiring an 
accommodation.
Thus, workers may have impairments that are unknown to their 
prospective employers or, even if known, may not require accommoda-
tion. Changes in these workers’ employment rate cannot be blamed on 
the costs of their accommodations because, by definition, employers 
cannot factor those costs into their hiring decisions. The rational-choice 
view is not relevant to workers with hidden disabilities or workers who 
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do not need accommodation or whose need for accommodation is not 
apparent.
Many workers acquire impairments after they have been hired. 
Some suffer industrial accidents or illnesses, and others suffer injury or 
illness not related to work. Still others experience impairments that are 
the natural effects of aging or disease. There is substantial evidence that 
workers in these categories represent a large percentage of all work-
ers with disabilities. For example, incumbent employees, not applicants 
for jobs, bring a large majority of the ADA charges filed with the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Schwab et al. forthcom-
ing). Also, in 2005, 1.2 million incumbent employees in the private 
sector suffered workplace illnesses or injuries requiring recuperation 
away from work beyond the day of the incident (Sengupta, Reno, and 
Burton 2007). Data drawn from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, 
a survey of Americans between the ages of 51 and 61, found that 36 
percent of people in that age range with work-limiting impairments 
acquired those impairments because of an accident, injury, or illness 
at work. Thirty-seven percent of Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) recipients in the same age group were disabled because of an 
accident, injury, or illness at work (Reville and Schoeni 2003–2004).
As in the case of job applicants with undisclosed impairments or 
impairments that do not clearly require accommodation, employers 
could not have made hiring decisions about workers with after-hiring 
impairments on the basis of accommodations costs. It would have been 
impossible for employers to know at the hiring stage which workers 
would need accommodations because of the onset of after-hiring im-
pairments. The rational-choice view is again irrelevant.
In sum, disabilities accommodations issues are not characterized 
by perfect information in a long list of circumstances. The rational-
choice view offers no insight into an employment-rate decline among 
workers whose disabilities are hidden at the time of hiring, whose pro-
spective employers do not know that their visible impairments require 
accommodation, or who develop their disabilities any time after hiring 
(Harris 2007a). For the rational-choice hypothesis to prove true, the 
employment-rate decline would have to be explained without consider-
ing these large groups of workers with disabilities.
It may well be possible to construct an efficiency argument about 
the ADA’s accommodation mandate and workers with disabilities. The 
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argument would likely resemble the debate over statistical race and sex 
discrimination (Aigner and Cain 1977). Briefly stated, employers may 
rationally prefer to hire workers without disabilities if assessing the net 
productivity of workers with disabilities is systematically more costly 
than assessing the net productivity of workers without disabilities. In 
the context of disabilities accommodations, the argument would likely 
depend on an assertion that the costs of determining whether and to 
what extent workers with disabilities need accommodations are great-
er than the costs of assessing the net productivity of workers without 
disabilities.
A full discussion of the statistical-discrimination argument is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but two preliminary insights are 
worth considering. First, as the debate over statistical race and sex 
discrimination has shown, these arguments do not invariably lead to 
the rational-choice view’s preferred conclusion; it is possible to en-
vision situations in which antidiscrimination policy yields greater 
economic efficiency than a market shaped by statistical discrimination 
(Lundberg and Startz 1983; Schwab 1986). Second, like the rational- 
choice view itself, a statistical-discrimination argument would be 
relevant only to those workers whose need for accommodation is 
known to their prospective employers at the hiring stage. In order 
for employers rationally to prefer low-transaction-cost workers over 
high-transaction-cost workers, employers must be able to categorize 
workers correctly. Workers with hidden disabilities would be mis-
classified into the low-transaction-cost group, as would workers who 
acquire disabilities after hiring. Thus, at best, a completely successful 
statistical-discrimination argument would relate to a limited number of 
cases. Like the rational-choice perspective, the statistical-discrimination 
argument has nothing to say about workers with hidden disabilities, 
workers with visible impairments but hidden accommodation needs, 
and workers who develop impairments after being hired.
In any event, the syllogism that has dominated the debate over the 
economics of disabilities accommodation was not built on statistical- 
discrimination arguments. It relied instead on an assumption of per-
fect information. Eliminating this assumption necessarily makes the 
rational-choice view irrelevant to the employment prospects of large 
numbers of workers with disabilities. The next section discusses ad-
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ditional workers with disabilities whose employment status cannot be 
described by the rational-choice view.
Assuming Workers with Disabilities Would Be Employed  
without Accommodations
A second assumption underlying the rational-choice view is that 
workers with disabilities would have found jobs if the ADA did not 
mandate reasonable accommodations. If there were a causal relation-
ship between the costs of accommodations and employers’ decisions 
not to hire workers with disabilities, then it would also have to be true 
that the employment rate among workers with disabilities would have 
remained flat or increased in the absence of the accommodation man-
date.6 In other words, some workers with disabilities must have been 
able to get jobs in the absence of the accommodation mandate but then 
unable to get them once the accommodation mandate took effect. This 
assumption is the essential stepping-stone from the premise that ac-
commodations bear positive costs and the hypothesis that the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate caused disemployment effects. It is also 
deeply problematic, as a straightforward thought exercise focused on 
the ADA’s text will disclose.
The ADA’s definition of the class of workers it protects—“qualified 
individual with a disability”—illustrates why this causal link is unlikely 
in a large set of cases. A “qualified individual” is a worker who, with or 
without accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the job 
she holds or desires. However, in its definition of “discrimination,” the 
ADA makes clear that employers are not merely obligated to accom-
modate workers so that they can perform the essential functions of their 
jobs. Employers must also accommodate workers so that they can enjoy 
the privileges and benefits of their workplace. Thus, the ADA protects 
three classes of workers with a disability:
Group 1—workers who can perform the essential functions of their 
jobs without accommodation and do not need accommodation to enjoy 
the privileges and benefits of their workplace;
Group 2—workers who can perform the essential functions of their 
jobs only with accommodation; and
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Group 3—workers who can perform the essential functions of 
their jobs without accommodation but need accommodation to enjoy 
the privileges and benefits of their workplace.
The question is: Which of these workers might have gotten jobs in a 
world without an ADA accommodation mandate but could not get jobs 
in a world with one?
The ADA’s accommodation mandate should not have affected hir-
ing decisions about workers in Group 1. Since neoclassical economics 
assumes that the productivity of workers hired in external labor markets 
is fungible, Group 1’s members should have been able to offer prospec-
tive employers the same net productivity as workers without disabilities. 
Without any need for accommodation, their labor costs would be the 
same. The cost of hiring these workers should not have increased—and, 
therefore, their net productivity would not decrease—as a result of the 
accommodation mandate. Thus, both before and after the ADA’s man-
date took effect, Group 1’s members should have been employed at the 
same rate as workers without disabilities, and the rational-choice view 
cannot explain any change in these workers’ employment rate.
The ADA’s accommodation mandate also likely had no effect on 
the employment rate of Group 2’s members, but for the opposite rea-
son. These workers would not have secured their jobs in the absence 
of the ADA’s accommodation mandate because they could not perform 
their jobs’ essential functions without accommodation. Simply, they 
were unqualified absent accommodations and the law would not have 
required employers to hire them.7 By contrast, the accommodation man-
date made employment possible for this group at the same time it raised 
the costs of hiring them. Thus, at worst, the accommodation mandate 
cannot have had a disemployment effect for these workers, and at best, 
it may have boosted their employment prospects.
Proponents of the rational-choice view might argue that the ADA 
changed these workers’ job-match expectations. Workers with disabili-
ties might have applied for jobs that they would not have otherwise 
sought because the prospect of accommodations made these jobs ei-
ther possible or more desirable. One illustration of this effect might be 
a worker with a chronic back injury who would not have applied for 
a job that entails handling heavy packages absent an accommodation 
mandate. The existence of an accommodation mandate creates a possi-
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bility that the employer would provide a mechanical lift, which, in turn, 
might encourage that worker with a back injury to apply. If so, then 
the argument would be that the accommodation (here, the mechanical 
lift) would make the worker with a back injury more expensive to hire 
than a worker without a back injury. Thus, the worker with the back 
injury would not win the job in a competition with workers without 
disabilities.
Even if evidence of this kind of change in job-search behavior were 
found, it would offer only tepid support for the rational-choice view. 
There is no reason to believe that Group 2’s failure to secure these newly 
available jobs would cause them to abandon the labor market in a world 
with an accommodation mandate. Yet, a decline in their employment 
rate depends upon just that response. More likely, these workers would 
remain in the labor market and seek out jobs they could perform with-
out accommodations, just as they would in the absence of the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate.
If such workers remained in the labor market, then the most that 
can be said is that workers with disabilities who were inspired to seek 
new types of jobs by the ADA’s accommodation mandate might have 
suffered longer spells of unemployment due to a larger number of un-
successful job searches. Thus, the likeliest effect would have been a 
modest decline in the employment rate for some period of time after the 
ADA’s effective date followed by a flattening out or a rebound to the 
pre-ADA employment rate over time. The decline would result from 
the longer unemployment spells, and the rebound would result from 
workers with disabilities learning from their experiences and applying 
for jobs that they could perform without accommodations. Yet, studies 
of the employment rate do not show a shallow dip in the employment 
rate after the ADA followed by a rebound in the following years. They 
show a steady decline after the ADA became law (Acemoglu and An-
grist 2001; Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba forthcoming; DeLeire 
2000).
Group 3 may contain the only individuals whose employment pros-
pects can be explained by the rational-choice view. Similar to Group 1’s 
members, workers in this group would have been able to perform the 
essential functions of their jobs without accommodation in the absence 
of the ADA and, therefore, would have been able to offer prospective 
employers the same net productivity as workers without disabilities 
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both before and after the ADA became law. Yet, we must assume that 
Group 3’s members saw their labor costs increase and their net pro-
ductivity decrease because their employers were required to provide 
non-productivity-related workplace privileges and benefits. Thus, the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate might have caused profit-maximizing 
employers to prefer workers without disabilities to workers in Group 3, 
but not to workers in Group 1 or Group 2. In other words, the rational-
choice view might explain a decline in Group 3’s employment rate but 
not the employment rates of the other two groups.
Disclosing the flaws in these two assumptions shows that the num-
ber of workers with disabilities whose employment prospects might be 
explained by the rational-choice view is quite small. At most, it might 
explain changes in the employment rate of 1) workers who were in the 
external labor market, had impairments at the time of hiring, and those 
impairments and the workers’ needs for accommodation were known to 
their prospective employers, and 2) workers who could perform the es-
sential functions of their jobs without accommodation but who need an 
accommodation to enjoy the privileges and benefits of their workplace. 
In both cases, the prospective employers considering hiring these work-
ers must then also have been able to assess accurately these workers’ 
need for these kinds of accommodations. Simply describing these limi-
tations illustrates the very narrow arena in which the rational-choice 
view might operate. It is too thin a reed to support the hypothesis that 
the ADA’s accommodations mandate caused a decline in the employ-
ment rate of all workers with disabilities.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINING 
EMPLOYMENT RATE OF WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES
If the rational-choice view is not the likeliest explanation for the 
employment-rate decline among workers with disabilities, what might 
have been a better hypothesis with which to begin the debate over work-
place disabilities accommodations? Answering this question requires 
the pursuit of two different paths. The first path starts with the premise 
that the results of the Acemoglu and Angrist and DeLeire studies are ac-
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curate—that is, these studies captured a statistically significant decline 
in the employment rate for working-age people with disabilities associ-
ated with the ADA’s passage or effective date. Recent studies have also 
found a decline in the employment rate that is roughly proximate to 
the ADA’s effective date (such as Donohue et al. forthcoming), so this 
premise should be taken seriously. Pursuing this path requires look-
ing beyond the ADA’s accommodation mandate for causes that might 
explain the association between the ADA’s passage and the employment- 
rate decline that followed.
The second path begins with the premise that any decline in the 
employment rate among workers with disabilities was not associated 
with the ADA. Rather, this path assumes that Acemoglu and Angrist, 
DeLeire, and others examined only one segment of a long-term decline 
in the employment rate that is unrelated to the ADA. Several critiques 
of the Acemoglu and Angrist and DeLeire studies have raised doubts 
about the accuracy of their results, so this premise may also be legiti-
mate (Bound and Waidmann 2000; Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba 
forthcoming; Kruse and Schur 2003). If so, then pursuing this path re-
quires finding explanations for a long-term employment-rate decline 
that is unrelated to the ADA’s accommodation mandate. In the follow-
ing sections, each path will be pursued to its logical conclusion.
Path 1: Assuming the Employment-Rate Decline Was Associated 
with the ADA
In 2004, Christine Jolls and J.J. Prescott produced a landmark study 
of the ADA’s effects on the employment rate of working-age Americans 
with disabilities (Jolls and Prescott 2004). The study disaggregated the 
effects of the ADA’s prohibition of traditional forms of discrimination 
from its accommodation mandate. It compared the post-ADA em-
ployment rate in states that had pre-ADA employment discrimination 
regimes that both prohibited the traditional forms of discrimination and 
mandated accommodations (ADA-like states) with 1) states lacking 
any pre-ADA disability anti-discrimination laws (no protection states) 
and 2) states prohibiting the traditional forms of discrimination without 
mandating accommodations (no accommodation mandate states). Thus, 
in “no protection” states, all of the ADA’s protections for workers with 
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disabilities were an innovation, and in “no accommodation mandate” 
states, only the ADA’s accommodation mandate was an innovation.
Looking at the years immediately following the ADA’s passage, 
Jolls and Prescott found that the employment rate for workers with 
disabilities in the “no accommodation mandate” states was 10 percent 
lower than in the group of “ADA-like” states. They found no compara-
ble gap between the “ADA-like” and “no protection” groupings. These 
results led Jolls and Prescott to conclude that the ADA’s accommoda-
tion mandate, but not the prohibitions on traditional discrimination, had 
caused a short-term decline in the employment rate for workers with 
disabilities (Jolls and Prescott 2004).
The Jolls and Prescott study does not, however, support the 
rational-choice view. The rational-choice view would have suggested a 
steady disemployment effect, not the short-term decline found by these 
scholars. Jolls and Prescott suggest that accommodations costs “may 
well have been exaggerated or particularly salient in employers’ minds 
just after the ADA’s enactment.” Contrary to the rational-choice view’s 
assumption of rationality, employers may have reacted irrationally to 
the perceived costs of accommodations (Jolls and Prescott 2004).
My own analysis of survey responses by participants in the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) mediation pro-
gram (i.e., workers alleging discrimination and their employers) lends 
some support to Jolls and Prescott’s explanation for the employment-
rate decline (Harris 2007b). The responses suggest that mediators faced 
additional barriers when assisting employers and employees who were 
negotiating over disabilities accommodations as compared with negoti-
ations over any other employment discrimination issue, including other 
types of disabilities discrimination charges. One of those added barriers 
was employers’ apparent bias against workers’ disabilities accommoda-
tions charges. When asked to remedy other allegations of employment 
discrimination, including other types of disabilities discrimination, 
employers agreed to solutions proposed in negotiations that were “real-
istic.” In negotiations over accommodations, however, employers were 
less able or willing to consider new information and new proposals 
that would lead to settlement. As a result, employers were less likely 
to agree to an accommodation even if they considered it “realistic.” 
This evidence suggests that employers voluntarily participating in the 
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EEOC’s mediation program systematically doubted the legitimacy of 
workers’ requests for disabilities accommodations, regardless of their 
merits.
In sum, even assuming some relationship between the ADA’s enact-
ment and an employment-rate decline for workers with disabilities, the 
rational-choice view does not necessarily offer the strongest hypoth-
esis explaining this association. Instead, there is evidence supporting 
a hypothesis that employers’ irrational response to accommodating 
workers with disabilities contributed to, or even caused, any post-ADA 
employment-rate decline. Of course, anti-discrimination statutes like 
the ADA are intended to protect against just this kind of irrationality. 
There may be enforcement problems with the ADA, but there does not 
appear to be a conceptual problem.
The irrationality hypothesis has another important advantage over 
the rational-choice view: it is relevant beyond a narrow group of work-
ers. Employers’ negative reaction to workplace accommodations could 
easily have affected workers in any labor market with any kind of 
impairment regardless of whether an accommodation was actually re-
quired. It would not have been bound by the ADA’s scope and the state 
of employers’ knowledge. Thus, an irrationality hypothesis may well 
have been a better starting place than the rational-choice view for the 
debate over the economics of disabilities accommodations.
Path 2: Assuming the Employment-Rate Decline Was Not  
Associated with the ADA
There has been substantial criticism of the research methods em-
ployed in the studies of both DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist. Early 
critics argued that the studies did not look beyond the ADA’s accommo-
dations mandate so as to properly exclude other possible (even likely) 
causes of the employment-rate decline among workers with disabilities 
(Bound and Waidmann 2000; Kruse and Schur 2003). These criticisms 
would not apply to Jolls and Prescott’s cross-state comparison, however 
(Jolls and Prescott 2004). Any factor with national reach that Acemoglu 
and Angrist or DeLeire might not have considered fully would have af-
fected employment rates in all states, not merely in “no accommodation 
mandate” states where Jolls and Prescott found an employment-rate de-
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cline. Any critique of the work of Acemoglu and Angrist or DeLeire 
must also take Jolls and Prescott’s study into account.
A recent study revisited the data set used by Acemoglu and Angrist 
(Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba forthcoming). Burkhauser and his 
colleagues raised questions about the work of Acemoglu and Angrist 
that may also extend to Jolls and Prescott’s results. First, they reconsid-
ered the population of workers studied. Acemoglu and Angrist studied 
working-age people who answered “yes” to the following question on 
the March Current Population Survey in any of the years from 1988 to 
1997: “Does [respondent] have a health problem or a disability which 
prevents him/her from working or which limits the kind or amount 
of work he/she can do?” (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). Burkhauser, 
Houtenville, and Rovba (forthcoming) considered only those workers 
who answered “yes” in at least two consecutive years; that is, the work-
ers that were the likeliest to be protected by the ADA. This change 
eliminated Acemoglu and Angrist’s evidence of a sharp post-ADA 
employment-rate decline. While Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba 
did not also revisit the Jolls and Prescott (2004) study, the pair’s data 
addressed the same group of workers considered by Acemoglu and An-
grist. Thus, like Acemoglu and Angrist, Jolls and Prescott’s results may 
also be too sensitive to the definition of “disability” to capture a genuine 
relationship between the ADA’s accommodation mandate and the em-
ployment-rate decline.
Second, Burkhauser and his coauthors expanded the time horizon 
studied to encompass pre-ADA business cycles. They found equivalent 
employment-rate declines during earlier economic slumps. Economic 
recession, not the ADA’s passage, might have explained Acemoglu and 
Angrist’s post-ADA employment-rate decline. Burkhauser and his co-
authors conclude that the employment rate among working-age people 
with disabilities began its decline long before the ADA became law 
and lasted long after. Thus, other hypotheses about the causes of the 
employment rate’s decline—hypotheses unrelated to the ADA—should 
be considered.
They posit that the declining employment rate among working-
age people with disabilities is associated with increased reliance on 
SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI provides cash 
support to people with substantial work histories who have serious or 
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deadly impairments and cannot engage in “substantial gainful activ-
ity” in the national economy.8 People with disabilities or blindness who 
do not have substantial work histories receive SSI benefits.9 Studying 
the households of men with disabilities, Burkhauser, Houtenville, and 
Rovba found that earnings have represented a declining portion of 
household incomes over the past 24 years, while SSDI and SSI benefits 
have represented a growing portion.
One explanation for this increasing reliance on SSDI and SSI is 
that these programs’ eligibility standards were relaxed in the mid 1980s 
(Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba forthcoming). More readily ac-
cessible SSDI and SSI benefits influence more workers’ reservation 
wages. Workers with disabilities can be expected to choose SSDI or 
SSI benefits over work when the value of those benefits, discounted by 
the transaction costs associated with obtaining the benefits, exceeds the 
workers’ likely wages. Yet, SSDI and SSI benefits are low: $981.40 per 
month on average for SSDI beneficiaries in November 2007 and only 
$519.90 per month on average for working-age SSI beneficiaries in 
January 2009 (U.S. Social Security Administration 2007, 2009). These 
cash benefits alone cannot explain the large number of workers with 
disabilities who have left the labor market.
Three other factors may have also played a contributing role: an 
educational-attainment gap between workers with and without disabili-
ties, the unavailability and inadequacy of employer-provided health 
insurance, and workplace and labor-market discrimination.
Educational attainment 
Workers’ educational attainment affects both their wages and their 
employment levels. In 2005, workers with high-school diplomas had 
an 80 percent higher unemployment rate than workers with bachelor’s 
degrees. The unemployment rate for workers without high-school diplo-
mas was nearly triple that of workers with bachelor’s degrees. Further, 
in 2005, workers with bachelor’s degrees earned 61 percent more than 
workers with high-school diplomas. Workers with bachelor’s degrees 
earned more than double the amount earned by workers without high-
school diplomas (U.S. Department of Labor 2008).
Adults with disabilities have less education than adults without dis-
abilities. In 2005, adults with disabilities were more than twice as likely 
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as adults without disabilities to have less than a high-school degree. 
High-school dropout rates among Americans aged 16–24 and students 
with disabilities have both declined; however, in 2006–2007, 10 percent 
of students without disabilities dropped out of high school compared 
with 15 percent of students with disabilities (Individuals with Disabili-
ties Act 2007; National Center for Education Statistics 2009).10 Further, 
adults with disabilities were only one-third as likely as adults without 
disabilities to have at least a bachelor’s degree (Rehabilitation Research 
and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics 2007).
Students with disabilities are less likely than their counterparts with-
out disabilities to enroll in some form of postsecondary education. They 
are significantly less likely to enroll in a four-year program rather than 
a two-year degree program and less likely to graduate with a bachelor’s 
or associate’s degree (Horn, Bertold, and Bobbitt 1999). Although few 
workers with disabilities have bachelor’s degrees, those with degrees 
have generally comparable employment rates and salaries to those of 
baccalaureates without disabilities, and they enrolled in graduate school 
at similar rates, at least within the first year after earning a bachelor’s 
degree (Horn, Bertold, and Bobbitt 1999). Nonetheless, because of this 
educational attainment gap, workers with disabilities were more likely 
to be unemployed and more likely to compete for jobs with wages at 
or around the level of SSDI benefits. Simply put, less education means 
higher unemployment, lower wages, and a greater incentive to seek 
SSDI benefits.
This educational attainment gap is not new, but its importance may 
have increased as the American economy has demanded ever-higher lev-
els of education from workers.11 Educational attainment among workers 
with disabilities has not kept pace with these demands. As a result, it 
is possible that workers with disabilities have become less employable, 
as a group, over the past two decades. If so, the educational attainment 
gap and the growing importance of education in the American economy 
might help to explain the continuing decline in the employment rate for 
workers with disabilities.
Discrimination
As Jolls and others have observed, workers who are likely to suffer 
discrimination in the labor market face lower returns to their human 
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capital investments and, as a result, are likely to pursue less education 
(Donohue and Heckman 1991; Jolls 2004). Jolls suggested that work-
ers with disabilities might have exited the labor market to increase their 
investments in human capital after the ADA promised an end to dis-
crimination (Jolls 2004). Yet, it is not clear that this is what happened. 
In fact, there is evidence that some workers with disabilities faced ris-
ing discrimination. Instead of choosing labor-market participation over 
education, such workers may have pursued a third option—leaving the 
labor market to join the SSDI rolls.
The Supreme Court drastically narrowed the scope of the ADA’s 
coverage beginning in the late 1990s. As a result, large numbers of 
workers with disabilities were left without protection against workplace 
or labor-market discrimination (Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 1999; 
Murphy v. United Parcel Service 1999; Sutton v. United Airlines 1999; 
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams 2002; Trustees of the University of Ala-
bama v. Garrett 2001). Without the ADA’s protections, workers with 
disabilities might have rationally opted for the certainty of SSDI and 
SSI rather than a discriminatory competition they could not win. Those 
who chose to compete likely did not invest adequately in education 
because it would yield returns more likely to be unnaturally suppressed 
by discrimination. In turn, their low level of education likely resulted in 
worse labor-market outcomes. This rising risk of unremedied discrim-
ination and its effects on both labor-market participation and human 
capital acquisition may also help explain the continuing employment 
rate decline among working-age people with disabilities.
Health care 
For adults with disabilities, the absence of health insurance can mean 
irrevocable physical and mental health deterioration. Many people with 
disabilities need regular care and supervision of their condition by doc-
tors and specialists. Without health insurance, they must pay for these 
services out of pocket and, as a result, might forego or delay the medical 
care they need (Williams et al. 2004). Yet, the crumbling employer- 
provided health insurance system does not provide workers with dis-
abilities adequate relief from this risk. Forty-five million Americans 
had no health insurance in 2007 (Denvas-Walt, Proctor, and Lee 2008). 
The number of employees with employer-provided insurance in 2007 
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has only increased by less than a thousand since 1999 (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2008), and the percentage of employers providing insurance has 
remained at about 60 percent since 2004 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
Health Research and Educational Trust, and Center for Studying Health 
System Change 2008, p. 6). Meanwhile, the cost of health insurance to 
workers has risen substantially: for example, the employee’s share of 
a family premium has doubled since 2000, averaging $3,354 in 2008 
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2008, p. 15).
Workers often lack health insurance because they have lost a job or 
changed jobs (Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance 2004). 
The COBRA system, which allows some laid-off workers to buy into 
their former employers’ health-insurance plans, has proven to be too 
limited and too expensive.12 Furthermore, employees with disabilities 
who find their jobs transformed from full time with benefits to part time 
without benefits get no protection from COBRA. Even those with in-
surance may not have adequate benefits. Workers with disabilities are 
more likely to need specialized health care and to have chronic medical 
conditions requiring more services, such as frequent doctor’s visits or 
hospitalizations, and larger amounts of prescription drugs. Yet private 
health insurance plans are structured around providing insurance to 
relatively healthy people and, as a result, do not take into account the 
needs of people with disabilities (Crowley and Elias 2003).
By contrast, SSDI and SSI beneficiaries are entitled to Medicare or 
Medicaid, respectively.13 These programs also typically provide more 
comprehensive coverage than private insurance. Adults with disabilities 
therefore have a substantial reason to seek and continue receiving SSDI 
or SSI benefits—comprehensive health insurance that cannot be lost or 
taken away as long as the beneficiary’s status is maintained. Thus, the 
spreading entropy in the employer-provided health-insurance system, 
perhaps combined with the increasing importance of the education-
attainment gap and declining protections against discrimination, may 
offer the best explanation for the continuing decline in the employment 
rate (among working-age people with disabilities) and the associated 
rise in SSDI and SSI recipiency rates. 
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REDIRECTING THE DEBATE
In this chapter, I have argued that the debate over the economics of 
workplace disabilities accommodation began with mistaken premises, 
which misdirected the debate away from consideration of the likeliest 
causes of the low and declining employment rate among people with 
disabilities. In an effort to move the debate back onto the right track, I 
attempted to unmask the faulty assumptions skewing the current debate 
and proposed alternative explanations for the problems workers with 
disabilities encounter in the labor market. I offer these arguments in 
tribute to my teacher and friend Vernon Briggs, who challenged me to 
question orthodoxies in pursuit of progressive goals. My sincere hope 
is that this chapter does justice to the example he set.
Notes
1. 42 United States Code §12111(8) (2000) defines a qualified individual with a 
disability as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires.”
2. In the lexicon of employment discrimination lawyers, the traditional forms of 
discrimination divide into two categories, “disparate treatment” and “disparate im-
pact.” Disparate treatment arises when “the employer simply treats some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.” Disparate impact involves “employment practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly on one group 
than another and cannot be justified by business” (International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States 1977).
3. I wish to thank Marisa Baldaccini, Leanne Hamovich, Maria Ingravallo, Damien 
Maree, Marcelo Martinez, and Michelle Tonelli for diligent and helpful research 
assistance with this chapter. In addition, Melissa Stevenson’s assistance was al-
ways essential. Nonetheless, all errors are mine. New York Law School’s generous 
support of my research made this project and many others possible.
4. In 2007, the American Community Survey found employment rates for working- 
age people with and without disabilities of 36.9 percent and 79.7 percent, respec-
tively. The Survey of Income and Program Participation found that 45 percent of 
working-age people with “severe disabilities” were employed in 2002, compared 
with 97.7 percent of working-age people without disabilities. The Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (BLS) published employment and unemployment rates for workers 
with a “disability” from the Current Population Survey for the first time in March 
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2009. In February 2009, the employment-to-population ratio for workers with a 
disability was 19.8 percent while the ratio for workers without a disability was 
64.8 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2009). Although the levels vary, the dif-
ferentials are roughly consistent across statistical measures.
5. 42 United States Code § 12112(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2000) states that, with the excep-
tion of certain circumstances, an employer or hiring “entity” covered by the act 
“shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to 
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or sever-
ity of such disability . . . [However, a] covered entity may make pre-employment 
inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.”
6. This statement applies equally to a flat employment rate or a rising employment 
rate because the population of working-age people with disabilities has grown; 
therefore, maintaining a steady employment rate means that workers with disabili-
ties are acquiring a larger absolute number of jobs. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, in 1995, 10.1 percent of people aged 16–64 had a work disability. In 2006, 
the percentage rose to 10.4 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 1995–2006).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (6) (2000) states that employers may use qualification stan-
dards to “screen out . . . individuals” as long as they are “shown to be job-related 
for the position in question and are consistent with business necessity.”
8. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d) (1) (A) (2000) states that “The term ‘disability’ means—in-
ability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment.”
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a) (3) (B) states that under Title XVI, Supplemental Security 
Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, one who is disabled and eligible for 
SSI benefits is one who is “unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work.”
10. These data describe students who received IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act) services. Virtually all students with disabilities receive IDEA ser-
vices, so these data are a reasonable proxy for all students with disabilities. In 
2006–2007, 675,170 IDEA students exited high school, 100,831 of which were 
dropouts (Individuals with Disabilities Act 2007; National Center for Education 
Statistics 2009).
11. The BLS projected in 1996–1997 that 9 of the 20 fastest growing occupations 
between 1994 and 2005 would require an associate’s degree or more education, 
while BLS projected in 2008–2009 that 12 of the 20 fastest growing occupations 
between 2006 and 2016 would require an associate’s degree or more education 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1996–1997, 2008–2009).
12. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1161-1168, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300BB-1 to 300bb-1 (2000).
13. SSDI beneficiaries are eligible for Medicare beginning 24 months after they begin 
receiving their benefits; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000). SSI beneficiaries are a 
“mandatory eligibility group” for Medicaid—that is, states are “required to pro-
vide them with health insurance under the Medicaid program” 42 CFR 435.120 
(2006).
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Learning Systems for a 
Globalized Economy
Do Americans Face Tough Choices or Tough Times?
Ray Marshall
The University of Texas at Austin
This chapter reflects on two of Vernon Briggs’s long-time interests: 
human resource development and policy-oriented research. Briggs’s 
early research with me on minority participation in apprenticeship pro-
grams was designed to increase our understanding of discrimination 
in these programs and to develop policies and programs to improve 
minority participation in the skilled trades. Our research helped model, 
develop, and expand the successful outreach concept that played an 
important role in overcoming the barriers to minority and female par-
ticipation in the skilled and professional occupations. Similarly, in this 
chapter I examine a proposal, being implemented in at least five states 
(Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, Arizona, and New Mex-
ico), to radically reform school and workforce-development systems. 
The design for these proposals is based on extensive international com-
parative research by the New Commission on the Skills of the American 
Workforce (NCSAW), sponsored by the National Center on Education 
and the Economy (NCEE). If these demonstrations are successful, we 
expect this reform model to spread to many other states now consider-
ing our proposal. The NCSAW research also examined the influence of 
immigrants on workforce quality in the United States and other coun-
tries, which is another of Vernon Briggs’s research interests.
In its December 2006 report, Tough Choices or Tough Times, the 
NCSAW analyzed some of the daunting economic, labor-market, edu-
cation, and workforce-development challenges the United States faces 
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after decades of changes in technology, the globalization of product and 
labor markets, and dramatic demographic twists. These interrelated de-
velopments have caused rising skill requirements for family-supporting 
jobs, declining real wages for most American workers, and growing in-
equality of income, wealth, and opportunity. A restoration of the broadly 
shared prosperity Americans experienced before the 1980s is thwarted 
by obsolete policies and institutions rooted in the less knowledge- 
intensive and less globally oriented mass-production system that domi-
nated America’s twentieth century economy and shaped our education 
and training institutions.
In this chapter, I focus on the need to modernize our education 
and workforce-development policies and institutions. However, these 
reforms, while necessary, are not adequate to restore broadly shared 
prosperity, which also requires economic policies that increase the de-
mand for skilled workers, social safety nets to promote human resource 
development and limit labor-market competition, and labor policies to 
further limit wage competition and give workers a greater voice at work 
and in the larger society (Marshall 2000). It will be difficult, for exam-
ple, to achieve equity—our most serious education problem—unless we 
address the problems associated with poverty. However, it would have 
been difficult for a diverse, bipartisan group like the NCSAW to reach 
sufficient agreement on the components of economic, social, and labor-
market policies to make meaningful recommendations in the six-month 
period during which the commission met before issuing its report (even 
with the 18 months of staff work conducted before the commission was 
convened). I nevertheless will address these issues in this chapter.
I will also discuss the background of the NCSAW; outline its con-
clusions, guiding principles, and recommendations; address some of 
the criticisms of the commission report; and present my conclusions on 
these matters.1 
BACKGROUND
In the late 1980s, the NCEE was concerned about the implica-
tions of the globalization of product markets for American workers and 
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school systems (Marshall and Tucker 1992). We were particularly wor-
ried about growing inequality, American companies’ ability to compete 
in global markets, and declining real wages for workers with a high-
school education or less—trends that started in the 1970s. Declining real 
wages put serious strains on middle- and low-income families, whose 
earnings could only be maintained by having family members—mainly 
women—work more hours, a process that not only strained family life, 
but clearly is self-limiting. The growing college/high-school lifetime 
income differential, which increased for individuals with a bachelor’s 
degree from 50 percent in the late 1970s to 61 percent by 2006 (Baum 
and Ma 2007), suggested that improving education and training was at 
least a partial solution to declining real wages for non-college-educated 
workers. Individuals with professional degrees have lifetime earnings 
up to 2.5 times those of high school graduates. NCEE’s leaders generally 
accepted the broad expert opinion that at least two years of college was 
necessary to enable workers to support themselves and their families.
These considerations prompted the NCEE to create the Commission 
on the Skills of the American Workforce (CSAW), which I co-chaired. 
CSAW was a bipartisan group including members from business, labor, 
government, and education. Its 1990 report, America’s Choice: High 
Skills or Low Wages, boosted the movement to improve the standards 
for schools and workforce-development institutions (CSAW 1990).
The Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce
The CSAW concluded, on the basis of extensive national and inter-
national research, that traditional American school systems were not up 
to the challenge of educating all children to high standards. The prob-
lem was not, as many critics alleged—including A Nation at Risk, the 
1983 report of the Reagan administration’s National Commission on 
Educational Equity—that the system had deteriorated relative to some 
past golden era (National Commission on Educational Equity 1983). 
Rather, the problem was that a system that reflected the needs of the 
mass-production economy was grossly inadequate for a more com-
petitive, knowledge-intensive world. The challenge therefore was to 
determine the kind of schools and systems needed to enable Americans 
to compete on terms that would restore broadly shared prosperity under 
modern conditions.
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To explore this question, the CSAW examined available research 
and conducted extensive interviews with educators, elected officials, 
scholars, and business and labor leaders in the United States, Singapore, 
Japan, Ireland, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. These comparative 
analyses led the CSAW to conclude that traditional American school 
systems were too bureaucratic, gave too little autonomy to local schools, 
lacked coherent instruction systems linked to high standards and diag-
nostic assessments of student performance, and did not have incentive 
systems that rewarded schools and teachers for performance.
Traditional school systems were also based on the debilitating the-
ory that learning is mainly due to innate ability, which absolves schools 
of responsibility for educating all students to high standards and led to 
school cultures, procedures, and policies that denied high quality in-
struction to most—especially low-income and minority—students, thus 
seeming to confirm their learning theory.
Traditional schools were, in addition, based on authoritarian man-
agement and governance systems that assumed teachers did not need 
highly professional training and working conditions to provide basic 
academic knowledge and skills to most students. Cost became a major 
success criterion, placing downward pressure on teachers’ salaries and 
subjecting teachers to arbitrary and discriminatory practices.
To protect teachers from these abuses, many states and school 
districts adopted uniform salary schedules, tenure, and administrative 
due-process procedures. It was not surprising, therefore, that when 
teachers acquired the legal right to organize and bargain collectively in 
the 1960s and 1970s, they became the most unionized college-educated 
workers in the country. It also was no surprise that the resistance to 
unionization by school boards and administrators caused teachers to 
adopt a fairly adversarial industrial union response that limited school 
managers’ discretionary powers and codified many employment prac-
tices—for example, seniority and uniform salary schedules—that 
became institutionalized and therefore difficult to change.
The CSAW’s recommendations for reforming American schools 
included the following (CSAW 1990): internationally benchmarked 
standards for students; a coherent instruction system linked to these 
standards that included diagnostic assessments of students’ work and 
more effective curricular materials to help students meet the standards; 
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professional standards for teachers that included career ladders to en-
able teachers to improve their incomes while remaining in teaching; 
and greater autonomy for schools to adopt methods and materials to 
help students meet the standards.
The recommendations were supported by teachers’ unions, many 
school systems, and by state, local, and federal policymakers. Unfortu-
nately, most states adopted low standards that were less expensive and 
easier to meet, but they did not adequately prepare students for college 
or demanding postsecondary learning opportunities.
America’s Choice School Design
The CSAW’s most enduring legacy is the America’s Choice School 
Design (ACSD), based on the commission’s high-performance school 
concept. The specific features of the ACSD, which has significantly im-
proved the achievement of disadvantaged students in more than 6,000 
schools, include:
• High internationally benchmarked student performance 
standards.
• Continuous, data-driven, and diagnostic assessments that reveal 
student progress toward these standards, which are conspicu-
ously displayed in America’s Choice Schools.
• Curriculum materials that stress mastery of the fundamentals 
of core subjects, instead of the superficial approach used in 
most U.S. schools, which relies on drills, memorization, and 
duplication.
• “Ramp-up” programs that focus materials, time, and resources 
on preventing dropouts and helping struggling students meet 
the standards.
• A theory of learning and teaching based on modern cognitive 
science, which demonstrates that learning is due mainly to hard 
work and supportive learning systems, not innate ability.
• Professional development for teachers and principals that helps 
them to create high-performance learning systems in their 
schools and classrooms. Subject matter coaches, as well as 
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model classrooms and schools, are employed to demonstrate 
best practices for teachers and administrators.
• School management and governance systems that foster a 
collaborative learning environment, efficient (data-driven, 
research-based) learning and diagnostic processes, and parental 
and community involvement in school governance and student 
learning.
• A support system for participating schools provided by the 
NCEE’s America’s Choice division (now America’s Choice, 
Inc. [ACI], a for-profit NCEE subsidiary) that includes cluster 
leaders for several schools; continuous training for princi-
pals, teachers, and coaches; curriculum materials; technical 
assistance; and research publications on teaching, learning, 
and school performance in general, as well as in particular 
subjects.
America’s Choice provides technical assistance and other help to 
schools for five years, after which the schools’ professionals take over 
with help from ACI as needed.
The ACSD has been thoroughly evaluated by the Consortium for 
Policy Research in Education (CPRE), whose first America’s Choice 
evaluation was titled Moving Mountains (Supovitz, Poglinco, and Snyder 
2001). CPRE concluded that, compared with traditional schools, the 
ACSD significantly improved student achievement. NCEE and ACI 
have continued to improve the model on the basis of internal and exter-
nal research and evaluation. They have, for example, developed a very 
effective mathematics curriculum using international benchmarking 
and relying on pretesting in American schools.
Developments Since 1990
Several developments in the 15 years following the CSAW’s 1990 
report prompted the NCEE to create the new commission. 
Labor markets were globalized by the entry of China, India, and 
former Soviet-bloc nations into the international trading system, dou-
bling the size of the global labor market. Labor-market competition 
intensified because of dramatically declining communications costs ac-
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celerated by the collapse of high-tech prices and China’s emergence 
as the world’s leading exporter of information technology. This caused 
American college-educated workers to compete directly with similarly 
educated workers in India, China, and other countries, whose wages 
were much lower than those in the United States. The NCSAW found, 
for example, that similarly qualified engineers’ salaries in 2005 were 
$7,500 a year in India and $45,000 in the United States. The impli-
cation, of course, was that, with prevailing institutions and policies, 
international convergence was likely to cause U.S. workers’ wages to 
fall and Indian wages to rise. These developments likewise meant that 
the CSAW’s assumption of high skills or low wages was no longer 
valid: American workers were competing with workers who had high 
skills and low wages.
A second significant development causing us to reconsider our 1990 
America’s Choice recommendations was the decline of real incomes for 
college graduates. As Table 10.1 shows, between 2000 and 2007 me-
dian incomes for males declined at every educational level except for a 
slight increase for PhDs ($358 or 0.42 percent), who, in 2007, accounted 
for only 1.8 percent of male income recipients. Women experienced 
slight income gains in the bachelor’s-degree-or-more category (con-
taining 30 percent of women income recipients) with median income 
gains of $801 (2.0 percent). Thus, the only significant income gains for 
college graduates between 2000 and 2007 were for the 1.5 percent (in 
2007) of women with professional degrees, who gained $6,328 (11.5 
percent). Despite these gains among female professional degree hold-
ers, in 2007 such women earned substantially less than men—$61,875 
versus $100,000.
These data confirm that in a globalized labor market, even highly 
educated workers are at risk, causing us to question our 1990 conclusion 
that education beyond high school would enable American workers to 
maintain and improve their incomes. Of course, people with more edu-
cation tend to have higher earnings, but higher education alone will not 
prevent declining real income.
A third important development was the “demographic twist” caused 
by escalating immigration and the pending retirement of the baby-boom 
generation. The American economy benefited greatly from the employ-
ment of the 78 million well-educated baby boomers, who are expected 
194Table 10.1  Median Income, People 25 and Older, by Educational Attainment, 2000–2007 (in 2007 dollars)
Male Female
Educational attainment
Median 
income 
2000
Median 
income 
2007
Change    
2000–07
% Change 
2000–07
Median 
income 
2000
Median 
income 
2007
Change   
2000–07
% Change 
2000–07
Less than high school
Less than 9th grade
9th to 12th (no diploma)
17,014
22,774
16,625
20,643
−389
−2,131
−2.29
−9.36
10,290
12,116
10,539
11,982
242
−134
2.42
−1.11
High school graduate 33,087 31,337 −1,750 −5.29 18,245 18,162 −83 −0.45
Some college, no degree 40,117 37,447 −2,670 −6.66 24,281 23,532 −749 −3.08
Associate degree 45,785 43,006 −2,779 −6.07 27,842 27,668 −174 −0.62
Bachelor’s degree or more 64,401 62,421 −1,980 −3.07 39,911 40,712 801 2.00
Bachelor’s degree 59,094 56,826 −2,268 −3.84 36,624 36,167 −457 −1.25
Master’s degree 71,919 71,097 −822 −1.14 48,907 48,077 −830 −1.69
PhD 85,813 86,171 358 0.42 61,960 61,554 −406 −0.66
Professional degreea 100,779 100,000 −779 −0.77 55,487 61,875 6,388 11.50
a Professional degrees include MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD. Current Population Survey, 2008 Annual Social and Economic [ASEC] Supple-
ment, pp. 8–17. http://www.census.gov/apsd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar08.pdf
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008a). 
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to retire in droves between 2000 and 2020. The baby boomers are being 
replaced largely by immigrants, most of whom have much lower levels 
of education (Ottaviano and Peri 2006). In fact, immigrant education 
profiles are bimodal: legal immigrants, mainly from Asia and Europe, 
have more education than natives, wheareas illegal immigrants, mainly 
from the western hemisphere, have less. The net immediate effect of 
immigration has been to lower the average educational attainment of 
our workforce (Ottaviano and Peri 2006).
The net impact of immigration on American wages is hotly debated, 
but there is little doubt that the large-scale influx of competing foreign 
workers has lowered real wages for high-school dropouts (Marshall 
2007). Because of their bimodal education distribution, immigrants 
compete at the high and low ends of the educational distribution. Ac-
cording to economic theory, immigrants improve the incomes of natives 
who are complementary to them but reduce the wages of competitors. 
In terms of their educational impact, large numbers of immigrants with 
limited English proficiency create a pressing need for more effective 
adult education.
Since 1990 international data on education and workforce devel-
opment has also expanded, including research on the workforce, adult 
literacy, school performance, and workforce development. 
Workforce
Some of the most useful comparative workforce data comes from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Program in International Student Assessment (PISA) (OECD 2006).
By the end of the 1990s, the United States no longer had the best-
educated workforce in the industrialized world, as it had in the 1970s. 
By 2000, it ranked eleventh out of 20 industrial countries in the percent-
age of adults who had completed high school, and several lower ranked 
countries were gaining ground.
The United States was the only OECD country where younger 
adults (aged 25–34) were not as well educated as the older cohort (aged 
45–54). Young Americans not only had lower proportions of high-
school graduates but also the lowest proportion of people with associate 
or baccalaureate degrees (39 percent; Canadians, 54 percent; Japanese, 
51 percent; and Koreans, 49 percent).
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The United States also had greater inequalities than other OECD 
countries. Although the United States had the lowest proportion of 
young adults (aged 25–34) who completed high school or college, it 
had the highest proportion of older adults (aged 55–64) with this educa-
tional attainment (36.2 percent, compared with 34.5 percent for Canada 
and 19.2 percent for Japan). These statistics reflect the continuing im-
pact of the post–World War II GI Bill, the baby boomers, and rapid 
improvements in education levels in other countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Ironically, many other countries have lowered the financial 
barriers to higher education while we, despite the positive effects of 
the GI Bill, have made higher education less affordable for low- and 
middle-income students.
Adult literacy
Statistics on years of schooling are less accurate measures of knowl-
edge and skills than those provided by the National Adult Literacy 
Survey (NALS) and the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). 
The 2003 NALS revealed that 93 million American adults scored at 
the lowest two of five reading levels. Another 4 million could not take 
the reading test because of language deficiencies. On assessments of 
quantitative skills, 123 million adults scored in the lowest two levels. 
Adults with these literacy levels are unable to read complex material 
or function very well in society or at work; they therefore have limited 
earning prospects. Indeed, 70 percent of inmates in U.S. correctional 
institutions scored at the lowest two literacy levels.
According to a 2004 Educational Testing Service (ETS) study of 
national and international literacy surveys, “Our overall performance is 
mediocre at best and . . . as a nation we are among the world’s leaders 
in the degree of inequality between our best and poorest performers” 
(Sum, Kirsch, and Yamamoto 2004, p. 1). With respect to immigrants, 
the ETS study had four notable findings:
1) “A majority of our nation’s 16–65 year old foreign born dem-
onstrates proficiencies in the lowest literacy level (Level 1) on 
each of the NALS and IALS literacy scales, while fewer than 
10 percent performed at levels 4 or 5, the highest literacy lev-
els” (Sum, Kirsch, and Yamamoto 2004, p. 1).
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2) “The average literacy proficiency of the nation’s immigrant 
population is considerably below that of their native born peers 
in the United States and their foreign born counterparts in most 
other high-income countries that participated in the IALS as-
sessment” (Sum, Kirsch, and Yamamoto 2004, p. 1). Indeed, 
on their mean composite proficiency scores, U.S. immigrants 
ranked eighteenth among the 20 high-income countries (Sum, 
Kirsch, and Yamamoto 2004, p. 21). The percentile ranking 
along the world skills’ distribution for immigrants with less 
than a high-school degree—probably the vast majority of un-
documented workers—was at the fifth percentile (Sum, Kirsch, 
and Yamamoto 2004, p. 24).
3) Immigrants’ involvement in labor markets, as well as their par-
ticipation in lifelong learning and civic and political affairs, is 
strongly associated with their literacy scores (Sum, Kirsch, and 
Yamamoto 2004, pp. 2–3).
4) The literacy proficiencies of U.S. foreign-born residents have 
a much higher degree of dispersion than either natives or their 
peers in other high-income countries, reflecting immigrants’ bi-
modal education distribution.
Although the ETS picture of relative levels of immigrant literacy 
is pretty grim, it probably understates the severity of the problem be-
cause these analyses are partly based on the 1994 IALS, which does 
not include the subsequent surge in illegal immigration. Immigrants 
accounted for over half of U.S. civilian workforce growth during the 
1990s and 86 percent of the employment growth between 2000 and 
2005.
School performance
National and international assessments confirm America’s growing 
disadvantages in school performance, literacy, and school comple-
tion levels. The main lesson from the Trends in International Math 
and Science Survey (TIMSS) is that American students’ performance 
is relatively high at the lower grades, but it is mediocre or worse in 
the higher grades (National Center for Education Statistics 2003). This 
is confirmed by the OECD’s PISA studies of the performance of 15-
198   Marshall
year-olds. The PISA assessments are significant because they come 
near the end of students’ secondary school careers and are performance 
exams; that is, they test ability to use knowledge and skills, not just 
the students’ ability to memorize. The latest PISA assessments placed 
U.S. students’ mean reading scores at fourteenth of the 22 countries as-
sessed; their mean math scores placed them twentieth of 23 countries 
(OECD 2006).
The 1999 TIMSS study placed only 5 percent of U.S. students in 
the top 10 percent of the world’s best performing eighth graders; 45 
percent of Singaporean students and 32 percent of Japanese students 
were in this category.
The United States also had relatively low high-school graduation 
rates. Of 100 students entering the ninth grade, 32 do not graduate and 
only 18 receive associate or baccalaureate degrees in three to six years. 
It is estimated that roughly half of the nation’s Hispanic and black stu-
dents do not graduate (NCSAW 2007, p. 34).2
The evidence also suggests that American schools are not very 
efficient. As noted earlier, the performance of our students does not 
compare very favorably with that of other high-income countries, even 
though we have the second-highest per-student elementary and sec-
ondary school expenditures of any country. Similarly, in 2002, U.S. 
per-student spending (adjusted for inflation) was 2.64 times as high as 
in 1971 (from $3,400 to $8,971) (Greene and Forster 2004; NCSAW 
2007, p. 4). But, for the same period, fourth-grade National Assessment 
of Educational Progress reading scores were only slightly higher (from 
208 to 219; U.S. Department of Education 2008, Indictors 12 and 17).
Workforce development
It was equally clear that America’s workforce-development system 
was not very effective, especially for low-income workers with limited 
schooling. And, employer training perpetuates already large inequalities 
by providing the most training to higher income managerial, profes-
sional, and technical workers and relatively little training to frontline 
workers. One reason employers underinvest in training is that worker 
mobility makes it uncertain that companies can recoup their training 
investments (the “free rider” problem).
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The federal workforce-development system also does very little to 
develop human capital. The system, considered to be an extension of 
the welfare system, is not very clearly connected to either private-sector 
employers or secondary schools and has grossly inadequate resources 
to address our mounting workforce needs. In fact, in constant dollars, 
federal workforce-development resources were cut from $30 billion in 
1978 to about $3.1 billion in 2006 (Fischer and Twomey 2007).
Similarly, federal–state adult education programs reach less than 
5 percent of those who need these services: as noted previously, about 
93 million adults score at the two lowest reading levels (National Com-
mission on Adult Literacy 2008, p. 3) and 123 million in the two lowest 
math levels, yet only about 3 million participated in federal–state adult 
education programs. And a large number of these participants are 
immigrants taking English classes (National Commission on Adult 
Literacy 2008, p. 10). Given the obvious need for lifelong learning, a 
system based on educating mainly children and adolescents clearly is 
inadequate.
Higher education is a bright spot among American learning institu-
tions, especially some of our community colleges, technical institutes, 
and research universities. But these and other postsecondary institutions 
could be much more efficient if they were linked to secondary schools 
and employer training by standards that improved horizontal and verti-
cal mobility and enhanced the measurement, data, and accountability 
systems needed for continuous improvement.
THE NEW COMMISSION ON THE SKILLS OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKFORCE
The developments described in the last section caused the NCEE to 
reconsider the CSAW’s underlying assumptions, and the NCSAW was 
created to address these issues. As with the CSAW, the NCSAW was 
bipartisan and represented a broad spectrum of former public officials, 
educators, and business, community, foundation, and union leaders. 
The commission’s deliberations were supported by extensive research 
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for over two years in the United States and 14 other countries, including 
India and China.
The commission’s review of global economic conditions supports 
two basic conclusions. The first is that earnings in competitive global 
markets will tend to converge because of rising wages in low-income 
countries, falling wages in high-income countries, or rising wages in 
all countries but faster increases in low-income countries. Obviously, 
the third option would be the best choice for all countries, but since the 
1970s, falling wages in high-income countries appears to be the option 
produced by market forces and prevailing economic and social policies. 
These trends imply continuing inequality in wealth, income, and op-
portunity; declining real wages for most American workers; and serious 
economic, political, and social problems.
The second major conclusion from the NCSAW’s deliberations 
is that to reverse these trends and maintain or improve their incomes, 
American workers need a creative edge because routine work will either 
be automated or outsourced to lower wage countries. The commission’s 
main objective was therefore to determine how the United States could 
foster creativity and innovation. The sources of creativity and innovation 
are not well understood, but there is general agreement that sound basic 
education is essential. The necessary skills include complex communi-
cations, interpersonal relations, judgment, and problem solving (i.e., the 
ability to think systematically and strategically, learn, adapt to change, 
use information and communication technology, and impose order on 
chaotic information). These kinds of skills and knowledge clearly are 
not likely to be produced by most traditional American schools, which 
neither teach nor model higher order thinking skills.
The commission’s recommendations were based on several as-
sumptions. The first was that, for reasons discussed earlier, our learning 
systems must be radically reformed because the nation’s education 
challenges cannot be met effectively by existing schools and workforce- 
development institutions.
The second assumption was that education and workforce- 
development policies alone cannot restore broadly shared prosperity. 
The commission did not elaborate on these other policies, but in my 
view, they include social safety nets (including universal health care), 
minimum and prevailing wage regulations to prevent low-wage com-
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petition, basic labor standards as part of the rules for international 
economic transactions, and economic policies to promote value-added 
competition instead of wage competition, including heavy support for 
research and development.
Much larger and more effective worker adjustment programs for 
those displaced from noncompetitive industries would be a good hu-
man capital investment and could help overcome resistance to an open 
and expanding international trading system, as they do in other coun-
tries. Because of the pervasiveness of globalization’s impact, it makes 
no sense to restrict adjustment services to those who can demonstrate 
damage from international trade. We could pay for these programs by 
replacing regressive federal payroll taxes with graduated rates; remov-
ing the income cap, currently set at $94,200, and repealing recent tax 
cuts on incomes above $250,000.
It should be noted that improving productivity in a highly com-
petitive global economy will not necessarily improve workers’ incomes 
because employers now have much more bargaining power with work-
ers and governments than they had in less-global mass-production 
economies. The ability to outsource and automate means that compa-
nies can whipsaw workers and maintain or reduce wages and increase 
profits even when productivity is rising, as was the case between 1995 
and 2005, when productivity rose by 33.4 percent, while average wages 
and benefits (insurance and pensions) rose by only about half that 
amount (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007, p. 111). And, as noted 
earlier, between 2000 and 2007, among income recipients 25 and older, 
over 98 percent of men and over two-thirds of women were in educa-
tion categories with declining real income (Table 10.1).
Labor policies are required to balance worker and employer power, 
including strengthening workers’ ability to organize and participate in 
workplace decisions. In a global economy, labor standards must be part 
of the international economic rules in order to prevent companies from 
whipsawing workers and countries. In addition, fiscal policy should 
be used to moderate growing income inequalities in more competitive 
markets.
Even if it is not politically feasible to promote broadly shared pros-
perity, improving education and workforce-development systems is 
good public policy because of the high returns on education. Under 
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these conditions, better educated people and nations will improve pro-
ductivity and incomes.
Principles and Recommendations
The commission’s recommendations were based on the following 
principles.
• Improve teacher quality through better pay and working condi-
tions, teacher training, and professional development.
• Reprogram funds for higher performance.
• Let students advance when they are ready.
• Create positive performance-based incentives for teachers, 
schools, and students.
• Give schools the flexibility to innovate and educate all students 
to high standards.
• Create a fair school finance system based on student needs.
• Reform the nineteenth century school governance system to 
enable schools to more efficiently educate all students to high 
standards through a lean, performance-oriented managerial 
system and standards-driven instruction processes with recip-
rocal accountability (i.e., hold schools accountable for results 
and elected officials accountable for providing the resources 
needed to achieve those results).
• Provide fewer, much higher quality tests that are diagnostic 
and linked to internationally benchmarked standards and high- 
quality curricula material.
• Create the same opportunities for working adults as for full-
time students.
• Create seamless, lifetime learning systems connected by stan-
dards, with easy access and supports.
The NCSAW’s recommendations were designed to accelerate the 
establishment of high-performance schools and school systems, as well 
as to create much stronger and more highly coordinated workforce-
development systems to provide training, education, and labor-market 
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services for adults. The commission recommendations were intended to 
be suggestions, not a blueprint for all states and school districts.
Schools and School Systems
Create a coherent system of standards, assessments, 
and curricula 
Curricula should be based on the mastery of key ideas, concepts, 
core facts, and the capacity for creativity and innovation. The K–12 
standards should be designed to get all students ready for college or 
demanding postsecondary training. The commission envisioned the 
creation of a set of Board Examinations similar to those used in other 
high-performing countries. These examinations could be created by 
states or national and international organizations, and they would be in 
a set of core subjects based on syllabi provided by the Board.
The commission assumed that, for most students, the first Board 
Exam (BE1) would come at the end of the tenth grade, but since stu-
dents would be allowed to advance at their own pace, they might take 
BE1 earlier or later. Students would be allowed to take BE1 as many 
times as needed to pass. The standards for BE1 would be benchmarked 
to the exams given by the countries that do the best job of educat-
ing their students. In any case, the standard should be no lower than 
the requirements for entering the state’s community colleges without 
remediation.
Students who pass BE1 would be guaranteed the right to enter a 
community college to work toward a two-year technical degree or the 
requirements needed to transfer to a four-year state college. Students 
who have good enough scores on BE1 could stay in high school to pre-
pare for BE2, which could be like the exams given by the International 
Baccalaureate, Advanced Placement, or other state or private equiva-
lents. Students who do well enough on BE2 could enroll in colleges or 
universities of their choice (subject to admission) and receive college 
credit for the courses leading to BE2. Some of these students might start 
college as juniors.
These Board Exams should be designed to motivate students to meet 
high standards. Continuing student assessments at the elementary and 
secondary levels would be linked coherently to the standards required 
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for BE1, as would syllabi and instruction materials. School profession-
als and instruction systems would provide students enough assistance to 
allow them to proceed at their own pace but never to fall too far behind. 
Experience with ACSD, and other high-performance school designs, 
suggests that these procedures could greatly improve graduation rates.
Create high-performance schools and districts 
Several actions must be taken to create high-performance schools 
and districts. One of the most important is to break schools’ dependence 
on local property taxes by having education funded mainly by states, 
supplemented by the federal government.
Funding equity should be improved by allocating funds to schools 
on the basis of student-weighted budgeting, based on the educational 
needs of different categories of students. Schools with the most disadvan-
taged students would receive larger allocations of resources. Combining 
student-weighted budgeting with district-wide public-school choice, as 
is done in Seattle, for example, would give schools incentives to recruit 
disadvantaged students.
Teacher quality is very important for high-performance schools. 
States and school districts therefore should work with teachers’ orga-
nizations to design systems that would compensate teachers more for 
performance (as is done in Denver, Toledo, and some other districts) 
and less for seniority. The main objective should be to recruit teachers 
from the top third of college students. Traditionally, schools have had 
many very good teachers because discrimination limited the nonteach-
ing opportunities for women and minorities. As discrimination declines 
and the pay and working conditions for teachers fail to improve, fewer 
academically talented students are attracted to teaching. The National 
Council on Teacher Quality, for example, concluded that a dispropor-
tionately high number of teacher candidates came from the lower end 
of the academic ability distribution measured by SAT and ACT scores 
(U.S. Department of Education 2002). And a 2002 National Bureau of 
Economic Research study concluded that the likelihood of a highly tal-
ented (ranked in the top 10 percent of high school students) female 
entering teaching fell from 20 percent in 1964 to 11 percent in 2000 
(Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab 2002).
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Fortunately, recent evidence suggests that more teachers are now 
being recruited from the top half of college classes (Gitomer 2007). 
This is being done in part through initiatives like the University of 
Texas’s UTeach initiative, an innovative teacher preparation program 
for math and science majors.
Beginning teachers’ salaries should be raised to the current 
median—about $45,000 a year; there should be high standards for be-
ginning, intermediate, and master teachers; and career ladders should 
enable educators to improve their earnings and remain in teaching. All 
teachers should be hired by local schools but paid by the states.
School boards should no longer operate schools. Instead, they should 
contract with autonomous local schools that agree to meet performance 
standards for students and school professionals. These contracts should 
encourage performance incentives for teachers and schools to improve 
student performance and provide incentives to attract teachers to hard-
to-fill positions in math, science, special education, or low-performing 
schools.
In addition to negotiating and monitoring performance contracts, 
school districts would support schools in various ways, including certi-
fying helping organizations to provide technical assistance, professional 
development, or other services and providing data and research to pro-
mote continuous improvement.
These recommendations could end the conflict over charter schools 
and private-school vouchers. Any school that met the prescribed stan-
dards could become a contract school, but no school that refused (or 
failed) to meet these standards could receive state funds.
The commission’s recommendations could change the role of 
teachers’ unions in several ways. Teachers’ unions would negotiate com-
pensation contracts with states and working conditions with districts and 
schools. Those unions could also be certified as helping organizations 
to assist schools with school performance, as is currently being done in 
New York City, Boston, Newark, Minneapolis, Toledo, and other urban 
school districts. Indeed, teachers’ unions have comparative advantages 
in helping urban school districts design instructional systems tailored 
to urban conditions, as is currently the case with the American Federa-
tion of Teachers (AFT), the National Education Association (NEA), and 
some local unions affiliated with the Teachers Union Reform Network 
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(TURN), especially the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) in New 
York City. The teachers’ unions would continue to represent teachers in 
negotiating rules for economic and working conditions, but they could 
assume larger roles in promoting teachers’ professional interests in ad-
vancing their knowledge and skills and improving their schools. For 
example, several TURN unions have followed the Toledo Federation 
of Teachers’ lead in taking greater responsibility for teacher quality 
through peer assistance and review programs (Marshall 2008).
Promote more efficient resource utilization 
The commission assumes its recommendations could yield a net 
national savings of $58 billion per year as a result of students spending 
fewer years in high school, requiring less remediation, and avoiding 
course duplication (since different class levels and schools would be 
linked with performance standards). These savings would be divided 
equally between increased investments in universal preschool for three- 
and four-year-olds, higher teachers’ salaries, and stronger support for 
disadvantaged students.
Provide universal high-quality preschool for three- and four-
year-olds 
There is abundant evidence that good preschool programs that al-
low children to start school ready to learn are a very efficient use of 
education resources. Research suggests that a dollar spent in early edu-
cation can save $7 to $17 in social and education costs over children’s 
lives. Unfortunately, only about a fourth of the nation’s eligible children 
are enrolled in publicly funded preschool programs. Since the quality of 
these schools is very important, major efforts should be made to improve 
the standards, training, and compensation for preschool caregivers.
Provide greater support for disadvantaged students 
The most important challenge for American school systems is to 
narrow the large performance gaps between advantaged and disadvan-
taged students. This problem becomes more important as immigrants 
with limited English proficiency and levels of schooling become a larger 
proportion of school populations. This is a particularly serious problem 
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for many poor rural and urban school districts. Federal and state gov-
ernments therefore should give high priority to educational equity and 
allocate funds to schools on the basis of student-weighted budgeting.
In addition, equity requires school professionals to do the follow-
ing: abandon the theory that learning is mainly due to innate ability; 
change teacher compensation and assignment policies to attract the best 
teachers to schools with the greatest need; give more time and support 
to disadvantaged students; and provide diagnostic assessment, data, and 
school-specific research to strengthen educators’ ability to diagnose 
and prescribe interventions to help disadvantaged students. Schools and 
districts also need to provide creative ways to involve minority and dis-
advantaged parents in their children’s education.
Workforce Development and Adult Education
Rising and rapidly changing skill requirements and the displacement 
of workers by technology and global competition, combined with the 
declining education attainment of many new workers, make it critical 
that we create much more coherent and effective systems to meet work-
ers’ training, information counseling, family support, and labor-market 
adjustment needs. The absence of an effective workforce-development 
system will cause workers to incur most of the costs and realize few 
of the benefits of change, as well as prevent the whole economy from 
adjusting smoothly to economic and technological changes and pro-
moting high-value-added economic development policies. The absence 
of an effective workforce-development system also will intensify re-
sistance to an open and expanding global economy. To function more 
effectively, workforce investment boards must have more resources, 
status, authority, and ability to coordinate easily with schools and com-
munity colleges, as well as with adult education, social service, and 
preschool providers.
To strengthen workforce development, the commission made sever-
al proposals. First, provide education paid for by the federal government 
to enable all adults to meet the same academic standards required for 
high-school graduates. A possible division of responsibility would be 
for the states to provide free adult education up to the ninth grade level 
and for the federal government to provide additional education to en-
able adults to meet the BE1 standard.
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Adults should also be given more resources to invest in their own 
education through tax-advantaged individual development accounts 
(IDAs). The NCSAW recommended that the federal government create 
IDAs for every child by depositing $500 in such accounts at birth and 
$100 every year thereafter until age 16. Employers, individual family 
members, and others could make pretax contributions to IDAs, which 
would accumulate tax-free and be used only for career-related educa-
tion purposes.
In addition, regional competitiveness authorities (RCAs) that com-
bine regional workforce- and economic-development activities should 
be created. The RCAs would align workforce investment, economic 
development, and adult education and community college districts into 
common regions based on logical economic and labor markets to form 
new regional and state jobs, skills, and growth authorities. These au-
thorities would coordinate with community colleges and other education 
and training institutions to provide learning systems for adults without 
diplomas, immigrants, and others who need basic literacy skills. The 
RCAs should be empowered to issue tax-exempt bonds, raise money 
from private sources, and have considerable flexibility in the use of 
state and federal funds for developmental purposes.
The RCAs would have much more power than existing workforce, 
adult education, and economic development boards to formulate and 
execute regional development plans. They also would be responsible 
for a reformed adult education system, including establishment of stan-
dards for program providers and instructors and creation of a process 
for identifying and accrediting providers who met the standards, and for 
monitoring compliance and quality. To link adult, career, and continued 
learning functions, community colleges could be designated as the pri-
mary adult education provider, assisted by other institutions, including 
career centers, libraries, and other adult education providers.
Like high-performance school systems, the RCAs should be per-
formance based. They should also generate data and analyses to assess 
the impact of various training providers and programs on different cat-
egories of learners.
The RCAs could become important institutions for addressing 
America’s serious adult education and training problems. These entities 
are called “authorities” to distinguish them from the fragmented boards 
Learning Systems for a Globalized Economy   209
that ostensibly have had oversight of federal workforce, economic 
development, and adult education programs, but actually have little au-
tonomy and inadequate financial and legal independence to work with 
elected officials to develop effective regional development plans.
CONCLUSIONS: DO WE FACE TOUGH CHOICES 
OR TOUGH TIMES?
An examination of the principal criticisms of Tough Choices clari-
fies the relationships between education and the economy, as well as the 
challenge involved in improving our learning systems. At the outset, it 
is worth noting that the media and political responses to the NCSAW’s 
report generally have been positive.3 There seems to be widespread 
agreement that America’s schools have not improved enough since the 
1980s to overcome their most serious problems, especially the wide 
achievement gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged students. Al-
though these gaps have narrowed in some districts, as measured by the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress, there has not been much 
change overall. Progress in some districts, and with the ACSD and other 
comprehensive models, nevertheless provides insights into the kinds of 
interventions that can narrow the achievement gaps and improve over-
all school performance. In particular, these experiences demonstrate the 
importance of developing efficient, high-performance learning process-
es based on coherent instruction systems driven by high standards and 
closely linked diagnostic assessments, high-quality curricula materials, 
and data systems administered by highly motivated professional educa-
tors supported by effective helping organizations such as ACI.
There also seems to be broad support for some of our specific rec-
ommendations, especially universal preschool, higher teachers’ pay, 
student-weighted budgeting, and strengthening workforce-development 
and adult education systems.
Some defenders of existing school systems doubt that their perfor-
mance justifies the radical systemic changes the commission proposes. 
They point out that the schools’ main shortcomings are due to poverty, 
racism, or other societal problems unrelated to the schools themselves. 
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Since the schools cannot solve these problems, critics argue, it is unfair 
to blame them for the achievement gaps.
As noted earlier, the commission did not argue that education poli-
cy alone would return us to broadly shared prosperity—or perhaps even 
reverse the broad declines in real wages. It would be a serious mistake, 
however, to argue that our school systems have no responsibility for in-
equality or that improving education for disadvantaged students would 
not enhance their life chances.
Part of the equity problem is due to the schools’ dependence on 
local property taxes. There is reason to believe that student-weighted 
budgeting and state and federal financing could help narrow the grossly 
unacceptable financial gaps. Moreover, the gaps are due in part to the 
still widespread assumption that learning is due to innate ability, thus 
absolving schools from the responsibility to educate poor and minor-
ity students to high standards. Again, experiences with the ACSD, the 
Comer school model (Comer 1980), and others using similar designs 
based on sound theories of learning and teaching, demonstrate that all 
students can be educated to high standards.
Inequality also is perpetuated by the widely used single-salary 
schedule and the common practice of assigning teachers to schools based 
on seniority, which usually means that the best teachers are assigned 
where they are needed least. There is abundant evidence, however, that 
a systemic approach to transforming low-performing schools, includ-
ing providing financial and other incentives to attract teams of master 
teachers and principals to troubled schools, can significantly improve 
their performance.
In short, while school systems are not entirely responsible for the 
achievement gaps, they bear some of the responsibility; additionally, sys-
temic changes can narrow the gaps, despite the continuation of poverty 
and other serious social problems. Indeed, the most effective interven-
tions coordinate education, social services, and other support activities. 
It would be inexcusably fatalistic to argue that we have to solve our 
poverty problems before making the necessary systemic changes to sig-
nificantly improve the education of disadvantaged students.
Other traditional school defenders contend that the American econ-
omy’s superior performance with workers educated in these institutions 
proves there is nothing seriously wrong with our schools. However, 
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the NCSAW did not argue that all of our schools performed poorly. On 
the contrary, many of our suburban high schools and higher education 
institutions, especially community and technical colleges and research 
universities, perform well despite the waste of resources caused by the 
absence of high standards for high-school graduation, which necessitates 
considerable remedial work. Moreover, the American economy contin-
ues to benefit from immigrants and the baby boomers who will retire in 
greater numbers after 2010, a benefit that will continue long after these 
workers retire because of the technology they have developed. It is, 
however, prudent to note the negative effects on our future workforce 
from the demographic twist in the 20 years before and after 2000. Fi-
nally, although it has had undesirable effects on our workers, American 
productivity has benefited from outsourcing lower value-added work to 
foreigners. Given these realities, it would be a real stretch to argue that 
our economic performance has been due mainly to the soundness of 
our traditional K–12 schools or that systemic reforms in those schools 
would not significantly improve the life chances for their students.
Some criticisms are based on misinterpretations of the commis-
sion’s recommendations. Some, for example, reject the contract school 
idea by equating it to charter schools, which have an uneven record, but 
on average have not so far performed as well as public schools serving 
similar students (Schemo 2004). There are, however, considerable dif-
ferences between contract schools, which have to meet high standards 
for students, teachers, and schools, and charter schools, which do not. 
Moreover, contract schools would be required to affiliate with a state-
approved helping organization and would be closely monitored by the 
contracting district (although they would have considerable autonomy 
to hire teachers and principals and establish a coherent instruction 
system required to meet state-imposed standards, which, hopefully, 
would be more demanding than the low standards currently used by 
most states). The funding system proposed by the commission could 
obviate the high-income school districts’ fiscal reasons for opposing 
high standards—especially if states adopted the concept of reciprocal 
accountability.
A final criticism of Tough Choices is that we are naïve to assume 
that federal and state authorities will adopt such radical recommenda-
tions. Of course, these critics could be right. Whether or not we can 
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gain political support depends on the credibility of our evidence that 
the problems we face are very serious, that our existing institutions are 
not up to the challenges they face, that marginal changes are not likely 
to do much good, and that a failure to act would have serious negative 
consequences for our nation’s future.
The media, political, and scholarly responses to Tough Choices have 
been encouraging, and there are grounds for optimism about support 
from the federal government and enough states to initiate the process 
of institutional change. By 2009, at least 20 states had shown strong 
interest in Tough Choices’ recommendations and five have become part 
of the first cohort to implement the recommendations (Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Delaware, Arizona, and New Mexico). If the first co-
hort of states produces dramatic improvements in student performance, 
then it is likely that others will join; we expect support to spread, as it 
did with the ACSD. Transforming our obsolete education and training 
institutions will not be easy, but real change in deeply entrenched insti-
tutions never is.
Notes
1. I chair the NCEE’s board of trustees, served on the NCSAW, and agree with the 
main thrust of the commission’s analyses and recommendations. But, as is com-
monly true of commission reports, I do not necessarily agree with either all of the 
details of that report or some of the wording of the recommendations. Similarly, 
my colleagues at NCEE and on the commission would not necessarily endorse all 
of the ideas presented in this chapter.
2. Heckman and LaFontaine (2008, p. 3) estimate that “the U.S. high school gradu-
ation rate peaked in the late 1960s and then dropped 4–5 percentage points” and 
“about 65 percent of blacks and Hispanics leave school without a high school 
diploma.” These analysts find “no evidence of convergence in minority-majority 
graduation rates over the past 35 years.”
3. The link to media reports can be found at http://www.skillscommission.org/news.htm.
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Sectoral Approaches to  
Workforce Development
Toward an Effective U.S. Labor-Market Policy
Robert W. Glover
Christopher T. King
The University of Texas at Austin
Labor-market policies refer to government interventions to sup-
port and improve labor-market operations for workers and employers. 
All major industrialized nations have some form of labor-market 
policy, but such policies differ widely in design, size and scope, and 
implementation.
Economists generally distinguish between active and passive labor-
market policies (Kletzer and Koch 2004), and nations typically offer a 
mix of active and passive policy elements. Active labor-market policies 
include five types of activity: job matching and job search assistance 
(such as public employment services), enhancing the supply of labor 
(e.g., training), reducing labor supply (by means such as encouraging 
early retirement or prorating unemployment benefits to accommodate 
reduced work weeks), creating stronger labor demand (e.g., through 
public works or public service employment), and changing the structure 
of demand (e.g., by the use of employment subsidies) (Auer, Efendioglu, 
and Leschke 2008). An example of a passive policy is a program that 
extends or expands unemployment insurance. Active labor-market 
policies have also been called “selective labor-market policies” to dis-
tinguish them from macroeconomic policies and to emphasize their 
targeted nature (Marshall 1984). Sweden and other European nations, 
as well as a few Asian countries, provide examples of countries that 
have long pursued labor-market policies emphasizing active elements, 
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whereas the United Kingdom and the United States are often seen as 
examples of countries that have adopted more passive forms (Kletzer 
and Koch 2004).
Active labor-market policies can aim at a variety of goals, includ-
ing promoting the expansion of employment, facilitating adjustments to 
changes in technology or the economy, and reducing inequality and the 
incidence of poverty. In his career, Vernon Briggs conducted research 
on all of these topics, with a particular concern for the effective imple-
mentation of programs. Yet, a key theme of his work has been reducing 
poverty and improving the well-being of poor people, especially African 
Americans and Latinos (e.g., Briggs 1973; Briggs and Marshall 1967). 
Among the lessons learned from that work about effective workforce- 
development programs since the 1960s is that the best programs operate 
on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market.
In this chapter, we examine major changes in the context within 
which modern labor-market policies operate, the nature of the current 
U.S. workforce- and economic-development “systems,” and the major 
challenges and opportunities these systems face. We then look at an 
important strategy that appears to be effective in bringing together key 
elements of workforce- and economic-development policies: sectoral 
workforce development. A belief motivating many sectoral programs is 
that people who work full time should not be poor. We present emerging 
evidence on the effectiveness of such sectoral approaches and outline 
guiding principles for policymakers and program administrators to fol-
low in pursuing them. Sectoral workforce-development approaches offer 
a much needed, major step toward implementing more active labor- 
market policies in the United States.
THE ECONOMIC, LABOR-MARKET,  
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT
In the early 1960s, the United States began moving toward devel-
opment and implementation of comprehensive workforce-development 
policies.1 Since that time, the economic, labor market, and demographic 
context within which these policies and their accompanying programs 
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operate has changed dramatically. Many of these contextual changes 
have important implications for workforce policies and programs.
The mid to late 1950s were a time of unprecedented economic 
growth and broadly shared prosperity. Employment was expanding in 
most sectors of the economy (including manufacturing), real wages 
were rising, and many more workers found that they were part of a 
“social contract” that offered them health benefits, opportunities for 
training and career advancement, as well as economic security in return 
for their commitment to working hard and long for their employer (see 
King, McPherson, and Long 2000; Marshall and Tucker 1992; Oster-
man 2007). Moreover, immigration was at relatively low levels as the 
domestic workforce expanded to meet the growing demands of a boom-
ing post–World War II economy (Borjas 2007). The United States had 
emerged from World War II with an intact economy and faced limited 
economic competition from other nations.
This is not to say that serious labor-market problems were com-
pletely absent. Some groups of workers—especially minorities and 
low-skilled workers—were largely bypassed or did not participate fully 
in the postwar economic successes (Harrington 1963). Moreover, there 
was a trend toward “creeping prosperity unemployment,” attributed to 
the effects of technological change and disproportionate demand for 
highly skilled and educated workers (Killingsworth 1968; Long 1972). 
U.S. policymakers began to enact legislation to address these and re- 
lated problems by means of a “system” of diverse policies and pro-
grams. Current economic, labor-market, and demographic conditions, 
however, bear little resemblance to the context and conditions facing 
policymakers in those earlier periods. Several points serve to illustrate 
the breadth and depth of the changes.
First, the U.S. economy has become overwhelmingly a producer of 
services. The share of employment in the traditional goods-producing 
industries—which includes mining, manufacturing, and construction—
fell from 35.6 percent in 1958 to a low of just over 16 percent in 2007 
(BLS n.d.). Within the goods-producing sector, the share of employ-
ment in manufacturing fell even more precipitously, from a high of 28.5 
percent in 1958 to a postwar low of 10.1 percent in 2007. The service 
sector, including the government, now accounts for nearly 84 percent 
of all nonfarm jobs. Moreover, as this shift to services was continuing 
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its relentless pace, the economy also was becoming far more tied to in- 
formation. A large majority of workers are now employed in knowledge- 
based or information-related jobs. As Marshall and Tucker (1992) 
phrased it, more and more workers are now “thinking for a living.”
Second, as Tom Friedman argued in his 2005 book The World Is 
Flat, a number of major developments have “flattened the world” and 
dramatically opened up global interconnectedness in many respects. 
These include the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of barriers im-
peding trade with the former Communist countries starting in 1989; the 
rise of the Internet and tools for using it more effectively in the 1990s; 
and the rapid growth of off-shoring and both out- and in-sourcing of 
production, among others.2 Friedman found that these world-flattening 
forces led to a “triple convergence” through which a new global play-
ing field was being created at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
New forms of business and organizational practices and employee 
skills emerged to take advantage of the new interconnected world, and 
1.5 billion new “plug and play” workers from China, India, and the for-
mer Soviet Union joined the global workforce. Increased globalization 
and interdependence in world markets means that a far greater share 
of the American economy now is exposed to global markets, and more 
U.S. workers are competing with much cheaper labor elsewhere in the 
world than ever before. A few short decades ago, workers with limited 
skills and education felt most of the pain, but now even those possess-
ing relatively high levels of skill and education are adversely affected 
by globalization (Friedman 2005).
Rob Atkinson (2005) describes the evolution of the American econ-
omy as proceeding from a Mercantilist, craft-based economy during the 
1840s through the 1880s; to a factory-based, industrial economy during 
the 1890s through the 1940s; to a corporate, mass-production economy 
from the 1950s through the late 1970s; and finally, after several decades 
of “turbulent transition,” to the “new economy,” which is decidedly en-
trepreneurial and knowledge-based since 1994. Atkinson’s comparison 
of the two most recent periods, summarized in Table 11.1, captures the 
transition that Friedman’s book describes. 
Third, the nature of work and the workplace has also changed dra-
matically, as many analysts have noted (e.g., Cappelli 1999; Cappelli 
et al. 1997; Marshall and Tucker 1992; Osterman 2007). Where work 
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had long been highly structured, repetitive, and hierarchical, it has now 
become flexible and fluid, and built more around tasks than jobs. The 
types of skills required to succeed in the new economy are quite differ-
ent (Levy and Murnane 2004), as are those needed for long-term job 
retention and career advancement.
Fourth, the United States has experienced increasing disparities of 
income and wealth in the past few decades, as have other nations (see, 
for example, Galbraith 1998; Marshall 2000). Real earnings have flat-
tened or declined for all but the most highly educated males, while they 
have grown only marginally for females, even as female labor-force 
participation has increased markedly (Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz 
2009). The gap between the haves and have-nots has grown. In fact, 
as Tough Choices or Tough Times, the 2006 report of the New Com-
mission on Skills of the American Workforce (2007) has noted, real 
Table 11.1  A Comparison of Mass Production and Entrepreneurial, 
Knowledge Economies
Issue
     Mass production 
           economy
Entrepreneurial, 
knowledge economy
Economy-wide traits
Markets Stable Dynamic
Competition scope National Global
Organization form Hierarchical Networked
Production system Mass Flexible
Key production factor Capital, labor Innovation, knowledge
Key technology driver Mechanization Digitization
Competitive advantage Economies of scale Innovation/quality
Importance of research Moderate High
Relations between firms Go it alone Collaborative
Workforce
Policy goal Full employment High incomes
Skills Job-specific Broad, sustained
Nature of employment Stable Dynamic
Government
Business-government relations Impose requirements Assist firm growth
Regulation Command & control Market tools/flexibility
SOURCE: Atkinson (2005, p. 96).
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earnings appear to be flattening even for workers with four-year college 
degrees.
Fifth, as a recent Aspen Institute report pointed out, in sharp contrast 
to recent periods in its history, the United States faces three critical gaps 
over the next few decades: workers, skills, and wages (Aspen Institute 
2003). The native-born workforce will be flat or declining for the near 
future, meaning that we will have to rely more on foreign-born workers, 
shift even more work off shore, or introduce more labor-saving tech-
nology into the workplace. In addition, new workers are expected to 
enter the workforce with lower education and skill levels than they did 
in the preceding period. At the same time, real wages are expected to 
decline in the future for many groups in the labor market. The latter two 
issues were addressed in several works by Briggs, who argued that the 
influx of large numbers of low-skilled, undocumented Mexican work-
ers adversely affected job opportunities and substantially depressed real 
wages for African-American males in Los Angeles and other urban ar-
eas for many years (Briggs 1984, 2003).
Finally, workers are experiencing a breakdown of the “social con-
tract” that prevailed in many workplaces during the early postwar era 
(Cappelli 1999; King, McPherson, and Long 2000; Osterman 2007). A 
growing majority of workers can no longer count on being rewarded to 
the same extent as in earlier decades when they devote their working 
lives to their employer, especially with respect to job security, oppor-
tunities for training and career advancement, and secure retirement 
income.
Labor economists once could clearly articulate the “career ladders” 
that workers could use to advance within a given employer or industry if 
they obtained the requisite education, skills, and experience. In today’s 
labor markets, this is no longer the case. Several as yet imperfect met-
aphors are emerging to describe and understand the way labor-market 
advancement works. Two such metaphors—the “career lattice” and the 
“climbing wall”—suggest that progression may sometimes require side-
ways or even downward movement for workers as they navigate today’s 
labor markets.3 As the metaphors suggest, workers will require different 
types of safety nets in this new environment. There may also be related, 
nonlinear work-arounds for potential skill shortages, such as community-
college skill training and certification for graduates of four-year colleges 
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who have general knowledge but need practical skills or experience ap-
plying that knowledge before they can secure better paying positions 
(Glover et al. 2005).
Research made possible by the recently available (longitudinal, 
linked) employer-employee data files from the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics Program (LEHD), a joint initiative of the U.S. 
Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, has led to new insights on career development in today’s la-
bor markets. Brown, Haltiwanger, and Lane (2006) studied job ladders 
and actual career paths of workers over a decade in five industries: semi-
conductors, software, financial services, trucking, and retail food. Their 
research documented that the quality of career paths varies by industry 
as well as by firm. In general, workers improved their career paths by 
moving into semiconductors, software, trucking, or financial services 
and by moving out of retail food. The researchers also found a gen-
eral pattern with regard to inter-firm differences and their effects. While 
acknowledging significant variations across firms, they write: “The ba-
sic message here is that businesses with higher-quality workforces and 
lower churning are more likely to survive” (Brown, Haltiwanger, and 
Lane 2006, p. 54). For the individual worker, it made a big difference 
whether the person got a job with a high-wage, career-oriented firm.
Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005) also used LEHD data to fol-
low and analyze the experiences of low-income workers in California, 
Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and North Carolina during the late 1990s.4 
They found considerable mobility into and out of low-earnings catego-
ries during the six years tracked by the study. But earnings increased 
only from $12,000 to $15,000 per year for these workers. Success dif-
fered by racial group. White males and Asians had the highest transition 
rates. In cases involving a transition into construction and manufactur-
ing, African-American males were underrepresented relative to whites 
and Latinos. Of particular interest were the findings about successful 
transitions out of low earnings. Transitions out of low earnings were 
“associated with subsequent employment in high-wage industrial sec-
tors, larger firms, firms with lower turnover, and, especially, high-wage 
firms” (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005, p. 143). They were also 
more common among workers who changed jobs rather than stayed 
in them. Increased earnings for job-changers tended to accrue to those 
222   Glover and King
who changed jobs from a low-paying to a higher paying position early 
on and subsequently remained with that firm.
Taken together, this new, transformed context suggests that the old 
approaches to workforce development, based on outmoded conceptions 
of the economy and labor markets, are unlikely to perform well, now or 
in the foreseeable future. New workforce organizational forms appear 
to be needed to respond to the changing nature of labor markets. Before 
we can say that with confidence, however, we need to examine Ameri-
can workforce- and economic-development systems more closely. In 
many respects, these aren’t really “systems” at all, but fragmented sets 
of strategies and programs addressing ad hoc problems for varying tar-
get groups with widely differing needs and expectations.
THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE-DEVELOPMENT “SYSTEM”
Frederick Harbison, in his classic 1973 volume, Human Re-
sources as the Wealth of Nations, explained that human resource 
development—what we now more commonly refer to as workforce de-
velopment—encompasses three broad functions:
• Maintenance, including cash welfare benefits (such as Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families), in-kind support (e.g., 
food stamps, assistance with transportation, and child-care 
subsidies), Unemployment Insurance payments, and income 
supplements for the working poor available through the Earned 
Income Tax Credit;
• Utilization, including basic labor exchange services through 
the Employment Service or one-stop core services supported 
by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, as well as 
similar private efforts matching workers and jobs (such as Ca-
reerBuilder.com and Monster.com); and
• Development, including a broad array of efforts intended to 
build workers’ skills at all levels, by means of adult basic edu-
cation (ABE), occupational skills training, customized training, 
on-the-job training, and apprenticeship.
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Yet, on the surface, it would appear that very little about our current 
approach to workforce development in this country can accurately be 
characterized as a “system.” In fact, as noted above, what has evolved 
over the decades is really a hodgepodge of programs and initiatives 
funded by various federal, state, local, and private entities and oper-
ated by a similarly varied mix of public and private organizations with 
widely divergent goals and expected outcomes.5
Osterman (2007) outlined a framework for publicly funded work-
force development. He spelled out several key functions of this system, 
starting with improving skill levels—its “core” function—and job 
matching to better connect workers and employers in the labor mar-
ket. He also envisioned a series of demand-side functions, including 
working directly with employers and their associations to help them 
become more economically competitive and provide training and ca-
reer opportunities to less-educated and low-skilled workers. According 
to Osterman (2007, p. 125), the publicly funded system for less-skilled 
adults and dislocated workers comprises six main “buckets” (with Fis-
cal Year [FY] 2005 federal budget amounts shown in parentheses):6
• WIA programs geared primarily toward poor adults ($1.5 
billion);
• WIA and Trade Adjustment Assistance programs for dislocated 
workers ($1.6 billion);
• ABE programs funded by federal and state governments ($570 
million in federal grants to states; totaling around $2.1 billion, 
including state-reported matching funds);
• State-funded programs providing training to incumbent work-
ers ($270 million);7
• The Employment Service or one-stop system supported largely 
by WIA for job matching ($0.9 billion); and
• Community and technical college programs (totaling $12 bil-
lion to $20 billion, including state and local contributions along 
with $1.2 billion in federal Perkins funding).8
To this list, apprenticeship programs need to be added. Although 
apprenticeship programs received only $21 million from the U.S. 
Department of Labor in FY 2005, this covered only the expense of 
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administering the apprenticeship registration system and a few demon-
stration grants. Apprenticeship is primarily financed by employers and, 
in the union sector, through collective bargaining. In some areas, ap-
prenticeship training is provided in collaboration with community and 
technical colleges.
To fully characterize the broader system, we must add employer- 
provided training, education, and career development to these pub-
lic “buckets.”9 U.S. employers are responsible for the lion’s share of 
workforce-development activity. The American Society for Training 
and Development (ASTD) estimates that employer spending on formal 
workplace learning—on such activities as on-the-job training, custom-
ized training, work-based learning, and tuition assistance—exceeded 
$139 billion in 2007, about two-thirds of which was spent on internal 
workplace learning (Paradise 2008). Employers in the ASTD survey 
spent $1,103 per worker/year, about 2.15 percent of payroll.
Employer spending disproportionately favors better educated and 
higher skilled workers (Lerman, McKernan, and Riegg 2004). Em-
ployers across industries tend to provide far better training access and 
financing to their most skilled workers. The low level of training of-
fered to the least skilled employees makes it more difficult for them to 
advance. Advancement out of low-wage work has become a critical is-
sue, posing a serious obstacle for workers who want to move up to jobs 
with family-supporting incomes.
America’s workforce development efforts fall far short of being a 
coherent “system” and have many serious shortcomings, among them 
the following:
• Public workforce-development programs have too often failed 
to effectively engage employers. With few exceptions, the 
publicly funded workforce system does not connect well with 
employers. Despite the fact that workforce investment boards 
must be composed of a majority of business representatives, 
a study of the implementation of the WIA in eight states con-
cluded that employer involvement in workforce development 
is weak in many areas (Barnow and King 2005; Rockefeller 
Institute of Government 2004a,b).
• Most public workforce training programs have not been well 
connected to educational institutions, especially community 
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colleges (Grubb 1996a,b; Grubb et al. 1999). Although commu-
nity and technical colleges generally enjoy a better reputation 
with employers as a source of trained workers than do work-
force programs (Laufer and Winship 2004), their completion 
rates are very low (McIntosh and Rouse 2009). Few students 
obtain any form of credential. Further, community colleges 
rarely offer effective job placement services.
• The training in American public workforce development is 
generally too short term to have the necessary impact (King 
2008). In a study of persistence and outcomes of community 
college in Washington State, Prince and Jenkins (2005) found 
that at least one year of community college work with a creden-
tial is needed to make significant advancements in employment 
and earnings.
• Even short-term follow-up services are rarely provided in 
workforce-development programs, yet the highest turnover of 
new employees occurs during the early stages of their employ-
ment (Price 1977, p. 84).
• Federal support for workforce development, broadly consid-
ered, has been on the decline for decades, despite a growing 
need for publicly funded efforts in an increasingly global 
marketplace.
Despite these shortcomings, in the past decade new approaches to 
workforce development have emerged that show real promise to help 
improve the employment and earnings of low-income individuals. 
These so-called sectoral strategies, utilizing workforce intermediaries 
as key actors, appear in part to succeed by making explicit connections 
to economic development, among other important steps. A brief review 
of economic development follows in the next section.
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
In the United States, the traditional approaches to economic de-
velopment and workforce development have differed substantially.10 In 
economic development, the key focus is on marketing or “branding” to 
attract firms and jobs to the area. Attention to specific workforce issues, 
if any, is typically limited to recruiting high-level out-of-area talent 
to fill top positions in management, engineering, and marketing. Eco- 
nomic developers tend to leave details to the market after an initial as-
sist through public sector incentives. In contrast, workforce developers 
are concerned about these details, including which occupations might 
be critical for a given industry cluster to flourish, how local residents 
might best be prepared for these jobs, how long the process to prepare 
the workforce might take, and how this process will be financed.
A market approach may take many years to accomplish, during 
which time area residents will not be prepared for jobs, so companies 
will incur added costs to recruit out-of-town employees for the available 
jobs. Also, individual employers typically do not foresee skill shortages 
until they are imminent. Firms in growing clusters frequently do not 
identify or project their workforce needs more than a few months into 
the future and are generally unwilling to commit significant resources 
to planning.
Successful, timely preparation of area residents often requires con-
siderable planning and sustained investment—and coordination—of 
public and private resources. To be effective, a workforce-development 
system must give attention to the need for workers across the spectrum 
of skill levels. Workforce developers are aware that one must plan ahead 
to develop and deploy effective training programs. Traditionally, the 
workforce system has been charged primarily with addressing current 
workforce demands and training for existing jobs. However, workforce 
development systems have begun moving toward innovation and ca-
pacity building for the emerging future.
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The Rise of Cluster-Driven Economic Development
The initial description of industry clusters traces back to economist 
Alfred Marshall, who described the advantages found in externalities 
of specialized industry locations in his Principles of Economics (1890). 
Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School popularized the mod-
ern concept of industry clusters (Porter 1990). Although Porter’s initial 
work on competitive advantages was originally applied to nations, he 
soon recognized that most economic activities take place at the regional 
level. So, he extended his theory and applied it to regional, state, and 
metropolitan economies as well (Porter 2000). According to Porter, 
clusters are a striking feature of the economy of virtually every coun-
try, region, state, and even metropolitan area, especially in advanced 
economies (Porter 1998b). It is now common for states and regions 
to use clusters to help them target economic development activities. 
Porter defines a cluster as “A geographically proximate group of in-
terconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms 
in related industries, and associated institutions (such as universities, 
standard-setting agencies, trade associations) in a particular field, linked 
by commonalities and complementarities” (Porter 2000, p. 16).
Clusters can take varying forms, depending on their depth and 
sophistication, but a majority of them include end-product or service 
companies; suppliers of specialized inputs, components, machinery, and 
business services; financial institutions; and firms in related industries. 
They may also include the producers of complementary products and 
specialized infrastructure providers, including governmental entities 
(Porter 1998b, p. 199). Porter argues that clusters may be considered an 
alternative way of organizing a value chain (Porter 1998a, p. 80).
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter (1990) developed 
the Diamond Model in which the competitive advantage of nations lies 
in four interlinked factors: 1) demand conditions, 2) industry strategy 
or rivalry, 3) related and supporting industries, and 4) factor conditions. 
In the model, government plays a role as catalyst and challenger—en-
couraging and pushing businesses to raise their aspirations and move 
to higher levels of competitive performance, stimulating early demand 
for advanced products, focusing on specialized factor creation, and 
stimulating local rivalry by limiting direct cooperation and enforcing 
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anti-trust regulations. Porter used his “diamond of advantage” notion 
to determine which firms, sectors, or industries had competitive advan-
tages, and his emphasis on the importance of related and supporting 
firms or industries encouraged interest in clusters.
Clusters offer an organizing framework for understanding regional 
economies and for developing economic strategies. Cluster analysis can 
help diagnose a region’s economic opportunities and challenges and 
identify what a region might do to influence its economic future. It can 
help highlight a region’s competitive strengths and weaknesses and 
clarify an area’s economic drivers.
Regional economies are composed of three main types: natural- 
resource clusters, local clusters, and traded clusters, which can be char-
acterized as follows:
• Natural-resource clusters are found in regions where a particu-
lar natural resource is abundant.
• Local clusters are found in every region and produce goods 
and services that are needed by the local population (these in-
clude retail and personal-services firms, and hospitals and other 
medical-services institutions).
• Traded clusters in a region produce goods and services that 
are in competition with other regions and nations. They trade 
across the nation and even the globe (semiconductors and med-
ical devices, for example) and tend to be concentrated in only 
a few regions.
Traded clusters tend to drive regional prosperity. Although local 
clusters account for roughly two-thirds of employment in an average 
region, traded clusters are usually the keys to the prosperity and growth 
of the region. This is because traded clusters can achieve higher pro-
ductivity and attain growth that is unconstrained by the size of the local 
market. The success of traded clusters creates much of the demand for 
the services and products of local clusters. Traded clusters bring new 
value to a region, rather than simply shifting value within a region (Por-
ter 2003).
Stuart Rosenfeld, who has conducted research with regions, states, 
and community colleges, defines an industry cluster as “a geographi-
cally bounded concentration of similar, related or complementary 
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businesses, with active channels for business transactions, communica-
tions and dialogue, that share specialized infrastructure, labor markets 
and services, and that are faced with common opportunities and threats” 
(Rosenfeld 1997, p.10). In a more recent publication, he explains the 
concept in more operational terms: “A cluster consists of groups of 
companies and/or services and all of the public and private entities on 
which they in some way depend, including suppliers, consultants, bank-
ers, lawyers, education and training providers, business and professional 
associations and government agencies” (Rosenfeld 2002, p. 8).
Rosenfeld further explains the minimum requirements of a cluster 
as follows: “A scale of demand sufficient to produce externalities (i.e., 
sufficient number of firms with common or overlapping needs to cre-
ate or attract more services and resources, including labor, than would 
be available to more isolated firms).” He identifies the externalities 
produced by mature and growing clusters. They include mid-skilled 
technical labor-force members who are educated locally and area pro-
fessionals (such as bankers, consultants, and accountants) with a depth 
of understanding regarding the needs of local firms. “There is a depth 
of relationship among members within the region. The dynamics of 
clusters are embodied in the value-added and knowledge-adding chains 
among its members” (Rosenfeld 2002, pp. 9–10).
Rosenfeld’s explanation highlights the importance of the mid-
skilled labor force and the workforce-development system’s role in 
creating it, as does a recent work by Holzer and Lerman (2007). Of 
course, workforce quality is one of several factors that influence eco-
nomic development by means of a regional industry cluster. Others 
include innovation, entrepreneurship, and business incubation, venture 
capital funding, infrastructure development, product characteristics, the 
location of suppliers, availability of professional services, competitors, 
and the customer base.
In the past decade, a number of states have begun pursuing cluster-
based economic-development strategies to bolster the competitiveness 
of their economies and have attempted to link them much more closely 
to their workforce-development strategies. The National Governors 
Association’s (NGA) Center for Best Practices has played a key role 
in fostering the development and use of such strategies over the past 
decade, using multi-state “policy academies” as a key tool (see NGA 
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Center for Best Practices 2002; Simon and Hoffman 2005). For ex-
ample, six states—Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Virginia—participated in NGA’s Next-Generation of Workforce De-
velopment Project, with support from the Ford Foundation and the 
U.S. Department of Labor, and have continued to develop policies and 
activities that better link their economic- and workforce-development 
systems.
SECTORAL APPROACHES TO WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Labor-market intermediaries have been in existence for a long 
time (see Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall 1981, chapter 24; National 
Commission for Manpower Policy 1978). They range from the public 
employment service to union hiring halls and staffing agencies. A new 
form of labor-market intermediary has been developed since the 1990s, 
which has come to be called a “workforce intermediary” (Giloth 2004). 
These intermediaries have several distinguishing features, including 
an explicit “dual-customer” focus on both participants and employers, 
serving as integrators of varied funding streams, fostering new ideas 
and solutions and the pursuit of high-skills, high-wage strategies rather 
than simply promoting labor-force attachment, among others (Giloth 
2004, p. 7). Workforce intermediaries often pursue sectoral approaches 
to workforce development, operating in partnership with industry 
clusters. These sectoral partnerships connect supply and demand for 
a cluster of firms. They generally focus their efforts on improving the 
economic status of low-income residents in American cities (Clark and 
Dawson 1995).
A sectoral strategy to workforce development functions as follows. 
It targets a specific industry or cluster of occupations, developing a 
deep understanding of the interrelationships between business competi-
tiveness and the workforce needs of the targeted industry. It intervenes 
through a credible organization or set of organizations, crafting work-
force solutions tailored to that industry and its region. It supports 
workers in improving their range of employment-related skills, improv-
ing their ability to compete for higher quality work opportunities. It 
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meets the needs of employers, improving their ability to compete in the 
marketplace. And it creates lasting change in the labor-market system 
to the benefit of both workers and employers (Conway et al. 2007).
Sectoral approaches offer promise to help resolve problems that 
have long plagued workforce development in America. In particular, 
such programs:
• Offer a means to effectively engage employers in public work-
force development by focusing on selected industries and firms, 
developing a keen knowledge of their situation, and implement-
ing strategies to meet their needs.
• Help integrate funding streams, putting pieces together to pro-
vide effective services to reach successful outcomes. This is 
achieved through advocacy and expert knowledge of the frag-
mented array of available public workforce, social services, 
tuition assistance, and work-support programs.
• Work with community colleges as partners, improve their per-
formance, and help provide more substantial training tailored 
to employer needs.
• Provide support and follow-up services that help clients keep 
the jobs they obtain.
In short, sectoral programs serve as integrators. They convene the 
parties and establish public/private partnerships. They fill the gaps in 
service needs to help ensure successful completion of training and entry 
into career paths.
Sectoral workforce-development programs target a particular indus-
try—and specific occupations within it—to improve the quality of job 
opportunities available to low-income and disadvantaged individuals. 
They take a dual customer approach, serving both employers and job 
seekers. They establish sustained relationships with firms over extended 
periods of time and develop deep knowledge of the industry. They 
match workers to jobs through careful screening, and address what-
ever skills are needed for the jobs, including “soft” skills, life skills, 
language skills, literacy and basic skills, and occupational skills. At the 
same time, they develop expertise in overcoming barriers of disadvan-
taged workers and implement support and follow-up services to help 
assure training completion, certification, and job retention.
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Sectoral workforce-development programs operate on both the sup-
ply and demand sides of the labor market. They take a systems approach, 
and the lasting changes they seek may involve the modification of in-
dustry practices, educational institutions, training programs, or public 
policy. Sectoral programs seek to promote access to jobs by removing 
barriers to getting good jobs or advancing to better jobs. Alternatively, 
where jobs offer low wages, few benefits, and poor working conditions, 
sector strategists may focus on improving the quality of jobs. Accord-
ing to A Governors Guide to Cluster-Based Economic Development:
The best sectoral organizations are more than brokers or bridges 
between disadvantaged communities and industry; they help ar-
ticulate career paths and advancement opportunities, develop stan-
dardized industry training, establish standards for job quality and 
working conditions, assist with market coordination, broker busi-
ness networks, and help develop strategic plans. Successful inter-
mediaries employ staff with solid cluster experience and expertise, 
people who understand employers’ needs but also have the trust 
of the communities they serve. (NGA Center for Best Practices 
2002, p. 32)
Sectoral workforce development can provide an effective comple-
ment to economic-development activities, especially as cluster-driven 
economic development has become an increasingly popular approach. 
Indeed, combining the two offers the logical and practical means to 
promote a regional economy and help ensure that local residents 
benefit from the job growth that occurs. Sectoral programs have the 
potential to address three goals simultaneously: increase skills, improve 
productivity, and enhance regional competitiveness. Sectoral workforce- 
development programs aim to create value for employers and to 
strengthen their targeted industry sector(s) while creating pathways 
to employment and advancement for low-income individuals (Giloth 
2004).
Sectoral workforce-development programs began during the 1990s 
with funding from philanthropic organizations. Since then, variations of 
the sectoral approach have become more widely adopted. A recent sur-
vey of sectoral workforce programs made by the Workforce Strategies 
Initiative at the Aspen Institute found 227 organizations targeting ap-
proximately 20 industries (Conway et al. 2007, p. 82). In 2001, the U.S. 
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Department of Labor funded 39 Workforce Investment Boards to par-
ticipate in a Sectoral Employment Demonstration project (Pindus et al. 
2004). Subsequent Labor Department initiatives—including the High 
Growth Job Training Initiative and the Community-Based Job Training 
Initiative, which sought to link workforce-development organizations 
with high-growth industries in need of skilled workers—included ele-
ments of sectoral approach. In 2006, the NGA, in collaboration with the 
Corporation for a Skilled America and the National Network of Sector 
Partners, began a project with 11 states to accelerate state adoption of 
sectoral approaches to workforce development.
Sectoral programs are undertaken by collaborations, usually in-
cluding community colleges as training partners. The collaborations 
can be initiated, organized, and led by any of a variety of organizations, 
including community-based organizations, local workforce-investment 
boards, educational institutions, faith-based organizations, or industry 
associations.
The Effectiveness of Sectoral Workforce Development
Evidence is emerging on the effectiveness of sectoral workforce- 
development approaches. The National Economic Development and 
Law Center and the National Network of Sector Partners have docu-
mented sectoral workforce practices.11 Evaluations of sectoral programs 
have been conducted by several organizations, including the Aspen 
Institute, Public/Private Ventures (P/PV), Abt Associates, the Ray Mar-
shall Center, and others. Some of these studies include longitudinal data 
on participant outcomes, and a few have actually estimated program 
impacts on employment, earnings, or other measures.
The Aspen Institute and P/PV have conducted the most extensive 
field research on sectoral workforce programs. As part of its Sectoral 
Employment Development Learning Project, Aspen’s Workforce Strat-
egies Initiative group conducted case studies of six sectoral programs 
and collected data on participants at the start of training, and at 90 days, 
at one year, and at two years after training. The six programs and their 
industry targets are presented in Table 11.2.
The Aspen Institute’s in-depth case studies—which relied on 
pre- and post-training comparisons rather than an experimental or 
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quasi-experimental design—found that 87 percent of participants 
completed their training and, on average, participants increased their 
earnings by 41 percent within one year after training. Across all the 
programs, average earnings rose from $9,036 shortly before or during 
training to $19,809 two years after training. This increase reflected a 
rise in both wages and hours worked. Also, significant proportions of 
those placed in jobs were receiving fringe benefits. In the second year of 
employment, large shares of participants reported receiving health-care 
benefits (65 percent), paid vacation (77 percent), paid sick leave (64 
percent), and pensions other than Social Security (59 percent). Fully 82 
percent of respondents reported that they were satisfied with the qual-
ity of their jobs, and the same percentage believed that their future job 
prospects improved due to their participation in the sectoral program 
(Zandniapour and Conway 2002, pp. 9–11).
P/PV studied a wider array of nine sectoral initiatives, including six 
skills-training organizations, two social enterprises (to place day labor-
ers and home health-care providers), and a membership organization 
Table 11.2  Six Sectoral Workforce Programs Studied by the Aspen  
Institute
Program (location) Target industry
Asian Neighborhood Design  
(San Francisco, CA)
Construction industry
Garment Industry Development 
Corporation (New York, NY)
Garment industry 
Focus: HOPE (Detroit, MI) Metalworking manufacturing
Jane Addams Resource Corporation 
(Chicago, IL)
Metalworking manufacturing
Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute 
(Bronx, NY)
Home care (home health aides)
Project QUEST (San Antonio, TX) Health services; business systems 
and information technology; and 
maintenance, repair, and overhaul 
(including heavy equipment/diesel 
mechanics, aircraft mechanics, auto 
collision repair technicians, and 
electricians)
SOURCE: Conway et al. (2007).
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(for family child-care providers). These programs are listed in Table 
11.3.
The P/PV study included baseline and one- and two-year follow-up 
studies administered by Abt Associates. Although two of the initiatives, 
ARCH and PhAME, tried to establish in-house training and failed, the 
others were able to recruit and place low-income, less-educated, and 
minority individuals into employment previously unavailable to them. 
Participants experienced more stable employment, higher hourly wages, 
and better quality jobs. P/PV concluded that the most successful orga-
nizations sought to combine employment and training services for job 
seekers with efforts to influence the practices of employers and educa-
tors or to change state policies to do so (Roder, Clymer, and Wyckoff 
2008).
Table 11.3  Sectoral Programs Studied by Public/Private Ventures
Program (location) Target industry/occupation
Skills-training organizations
Action to Rehabilitate Community 
Housing (ARCH) (Washington, DC)
Paralegal profession 
Philadelphia Area Accelerated 
Manufacturing Education, Inc 
(PhAME)
Manufacturing
Southern Good Faith Fund (Pine Bluff, 
AR)
Certified nursing assistants
Training, Inc (Newark, NJ) Information technology
Project QUEST (San Antonio, TX) Health services; business systems/ 
information technology; and 
maintenance, repair, and overhaul
WIRE-Net (Cleveland) Metalworking
Social enterprises
Quality Care Partners
New Hampshire Community Loan Fund 
Health care
Primavera Works (Tucson, AZ) Day laborer
Membership organization
Day Care Justice Co-op
Direct Action for Rights and Equality 
(DARE) (Providence, RI)
Child care
SOURCE: Roder, Clymer, and Wyckoff (2008).
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Examples of Successful Sectoral Programs
Project QUEST is a training and support services program in 
San Antonio aimed at working poor people with high-school degrees 
(Rademacher, Bear, and Conway 2001). Project QUEST was founded 
as a nonprofit organization in 1992 by two community organizations, 
Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) and Metro Alli-
ance, both affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation (see chapter 
in this volume by Ernesto Cortés Jr.). The program identifies jobs in 
high demand that pay a living wage and works with firms to identify 
job openings and the skills required. Training is provided through local 
community colleges and usually lasts from one to four semesters. The 
program provides modest financial support, extensive counseling, and 
follow-up services.
Lautsch and Osterman (1998) estimated that post-program earnings 
for Project QUEST participants increased over their pre-program earn-
ings by $7,457 (p. 221). Zandniapour and Conway (2002) compared 
pre- and post-program earnings of participants in San Antonio’s Project 
QUEST and five other sectoral workforce programs over a two-year 
period and found significant improvements in hourly pay and hours of 
work earnings, and proportions of participants covered by fringe ben-
efits, as previously summarized. To be sure, these results are based only 
on simple pre–post comparisons of gross outcomes and do not address 
the value-added issue. The impacts of Project QUEST are currently 
being evaluated by P/PV. In addition, P/PV has evaluated three other 
sectoral programs using a random assignment design and found strong 
positive impacts, as previewed in a brief published in May 2009. The 
evaluated programs are Jewish Vocational Services in Boston, MA, Per 
Scholas in New York, NY, and the Wisconsin Regional Partnership in 
Milwaukee, WI (Maguire et al. 2009).
Project QUEST has been replicated by four sister organizations in 
Texas and Arizona: Capital IDEA (Austin), VIDA (Rio Grande Valley), 
Project ARRIBA (El Paso), and JobPath (Tucson). All of these programs 
were established during the mid to late 1990s by their local interfaith 
organizations, multi-denominational coalitions of congregations from 
churches and synagogues established through the Southwest Chapter 
of the Industrial Areas Foundation. Key benefits of this model are that 
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the local interfaith organizations help in providing political support and 
raising funds for the programs, assist in identifying suitable candidates 
for participation, and provide mentoring and motivational support. 
Capital IDEA offers occupational skills training and extensive 
support services to low-income residents, concentrating on long-term 
engagement to improve education and labor-market outcomes. It takes 
a sectoral approach, focusing on occupations in high demand, typically 
with starting wages of $14 per hour or more in health care, information 
technology, accounting, wireless technologies, utilities, and education. 
Fully three-quarters of Capital IDEA’s training in the 2003–2006 period 
was in nursing and allied health careers, and its training is usually pro-
vided through Austin Community College.
The evaluation results for Capital IDEA’s efforts are noteworthy. 
Whereas the previous studies were only able to make simple com-
parisons of participant earnings before and after training, Smith, King, 
and Schroeder (2007, 2008) documented the gross labor-market out-
comes for participants from Capital IDEA and estimated labor-market 
impacts for participants using a quasi-experimental design. They mea-
sured the value added of intensive occupational skills investments with 
wrap-around support services provided through Capital IDEA relative 
to registration for or receipt of low-intensity labor-force attachment 
services. Comparison group members drawn from the local Employ-
ment Service, and WIA “core services” rolls were closely matched on 
an array of variables, including age, race/ethnicity, gender, and prior 
employment and earnings patterns, through a technique known as 
weighted multivariate matching.12 Incremental training impacts were 
estimated over a five-year period following program entry. The study 
is continuing, so longer term impacts will be documented as additional 
data become available.
Five years (20 quarters) after their initial entry into training, Capital 
IDEA participants, a group that entered in the 2003–2005 period and 
included both graduates and program dropouts, enjoyed a substantial 
earnings advantage over comparison group members (Figure 11.1).13 At 
the end of five years, the statistically significant advantage was about 
$1,500 per quarter (or about $6,000 per year) and still widening. By the 
end of the period, participants were experiencing roughly a 100 percent 
gain in quarterly earnings compared with their two-year pre-program 
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average. In contrast, the earnings of the comparison group members 
who only had the benefit of less intensive labor-force attachment ser-
vices flattened out for much of the post-entry period.
Further analysis suggests that, much like the results reported in a 
“tipping point” study in Washington State (Prince and Jenkins 2005), 
the earnings impacts appear to be strongly associated with program 
completion and attaining the occupational (nursing/allied health) cer-
tificates. As Figure 11.2 shows, program completers actually garnered 
most of the impacts. In addition to enjoying substantial continuing earn-
ings effects from Capital IDEA’s sectoral workforce-training program, 
Capital IDEA participants were also significantly more likely to qualify 
for Unemployment Insurance benefits and much less likely to claim 
them in the follow-up period than were their comparison group coun-
terparts (Smith, King, and Schroeder 2008).
NOTE: “0” represents the participant’s entry into the training program.
SOURCE: Smith, King, and Schroeder (2008).
Figure 11.1  Quarterly Earnings for Capital IDEA Participants and  
Members of a Comparison Group
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These results provide compelling empirical evidence that a sectoral 
training strategy can be successfully implemented through an estab-
lished workforce intermediary with strong employer engagement and 
commitment to a high-skills, high-wage strategy for its participants.
Promising sectoral training programs have been operating and 
are now emerging in other parts of the country as well, including the 
following.
• Workforce Solutions—The Gulf Coast Workforce Board (Hous-
ton, TX). For the past several years, Houston’s workforce board 
has been operating a large-scale sectoral initiative focused 
on the region’s expansive health-care industry sector, which 
includes numerous hospitals and universities, among other em-
ployers (see Love et al. 2006). This effort has been driven by 
perceived shortages of nurses in the region, and the initiative 
Figure 11.2  Quarterly Earnings for Capital IDEA Program Completers 
and Members of a Comparison Group
NOTE: “0” represents the participant’s entry into the training program.
SOURCE: Unpublished results for 2003–2005 Capital IDEA program completers (Ray 
Marshall Center).
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has advocated successfully for improvements in Texas state 
policies and budgets for nursing education.
• The Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP) (Mil-
waukee, WI). WRTP is a nonprofit organization begun during 
the 1990s with the assistance of the Center on Wisconsin 
Strategy at the University of Wisconsin. The initiative is a 
collaboration of employers, unions, and community residents 
developed in response to the devastating decade of the 1980s, 
during which Milwaukee lost a third of its industrial base, and 
poverty and unemployment rose dramatically. WRTP helped 
manufacturing recover in Milwaukee by assisting local com-
panies to modernize plants and adopt innovative workplace 
practices; upgrading the skills of incumbent workers; and re-
cruiting, training, and mentoring new workers to replace large 
numbers of retiring workers. By the year 2003, the WRTP col-
laboration had grown to 125 worksite partners covering about 
125,000 employees. The partners had invested more than $100 
million in education and training. WRTP had placed more 
than 1,400 community residents into jobs at family-supporting 
wages. In short, WRTP has benefited employers, workers, 
unions, and the community (Bernhardt, Dresser, and Rogers 
2004). In recent years, WRTP has expanded to replicate its 
collaboration model in other Milwaukee industries, including 
construction, health care, transportation, and utilities.
• The Investing in Workforce Intermediaries Initiative/National 
Fund for Workforce Solutions (multi-site). This initiative, which 
was initially created and funded by the Annie E. Casey, Ford, 
and Rockefeller Foundations, began in 2004–2005 in five sites 
and one state—Austin, Baltimore, Boston, New York, San Fran-
cisco, and Pennsylvania. Sites with workforce-intermediary 
organizations and supporting partners were provided with seed 
funding and encouraged to focus their efforts on a few growth 
sectors of their local economies while creating career pathways 
for less-skilled workers. Health care was chosen as a target sec-
tor in most of the sites. The initiative has grown into a larger 
effort involving about a dozen sites around the country with 
funding from the National Fund for Workforce Solutions, which 
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includes support from foundations, corporations, and the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administra-
tion (see Griffen 2008; National Fund for Workforce Solutions 
2008). A related initiative, the Jobs-to-Careers Initiative, sup-
ports a number of intermediary-driven, work-based learning 
and career advancement projects in health care with funding 
from the Robert Wood Johnson and Hitachi Foundations and 
others. Boston-based Jobs for the Future is coordinating all of 
these efforts.
• WIRED Initiative (multi-site). The U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Employment and Training Administration began the Workforce 
Innovation in Regional Economic Development (WIRED) dem-
onstrations in 13 regions in late 2006 and has since expanded 
to a total of 39 regions across the country.14 Regional WIRED 
projects, not surprisingly, vary widely in their sectoral empha-
ses, funding mix, and participating actors, but all of the projects 
are explicitly focused on more closely aligning economic- and 
workforce-development strategies in key sectors, often with the 
active involvement of workforce-intermediary organizations.
• Tulsa Initiative (Tulsa, OK). The Ray Marshall Center is cur-
rently working with colleagues in a project led by Harvard’s 
Center for the Developing Child to design and implement a 
sectoral jobs strategy for the parents of children in local Head 
Start and Early Head Start programs in a unique dual-generation 
anti-poverty initiative. The initiative draws on findings of the 
interdisciplinary science of early childhood and early brain 
development, as well as emerging evidence that children in 
families with stable and growing incomes have significantly 
improved academic and behavioral outcomes (Yoshikawa, 
Weisner, and Lowe 2006). Candidate target sectors for the 
Tulsa Initiative include health care, manufacturing (including 
aerospace), early childhood development, and construction.
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GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR COORDINATED  
SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT
Sectoral workforce programs are labor-market intermediaries that 
serve dual customers—both employers and workers (and job applicants) 
in an industrial cluster of firms that they come to know well. Successful 
sectoral strategies can address multiple goals simultaneously, including 
strengthening regional competitiveness and workforce preparedness 
and promoting broadly shared prosperity and family self-sufficiency. 
They can align workforce development with economic development 
to benefit local residents. The National Center on Education and the 
Economy (NCEE) has conducted a series of case studies of local initia-
tives to combine workforce development with economic development 
(NCEE 2007).
Effective industry engagement is critical to success. Success begins 
with careful selection of industries and firms facing shortages of skilled 
workers, collaborating with employers to clearly identify the skills 
needed, and finding ways to fulfill those needs. Sectoral workforce pro-
grams usually focus selectively on good jobs offering high pay along 
with benefits and opportunities for advancement. Alternatively, they 
may target low-wage jobs that are key entry points into the labor mar-
ket for low-skilled individuals but the jobs could be improved through 
restructuring or connecting them with pathways leading to higher wage 
jobs. Sectoral workforce development aims at long-term retention and 
career advancement, whether through ladders or lattices, in the “right” 
firms and industries. As programs build capacity, they can partner with 
multiple sectors, enabling them to offer participants a wider array of 
occupational opportunities.
Sectoral workforce programs operate as intermediaries between the 
supply and demand sides of the labor market, serving as interpreters, 
integrators, and facilitators. There is a critical need for good communica-
tion between economic developers and workforce developers, between 
industry and educators, and between participants and social service 
agencies. Sectoral workforce programs can use a variety of approaches 
that benefit low-income workers by producing “systems changes” in 
industry practices, education and training, and/or public policy.
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Training is geared to employer needs. Appropriate preparation in 
math and reading and in acquisition of English language is usually a 
key beginning, but effective accelerated remediation strategies and 
preparation in these foundation skills should be closely connected to 
occupational skill preparation. Such connections are often missing.
Sectoral programs partner with community colleges and help them 
become more effective at producing the skills that employers need. 
At least one and often two years of education or training beyond high 
school plus certification are needed to produce levels of knowledge 
and skills that are meaningful to industry. This is not a new message. 
Similar recommendations have been made by the New Commission on 
Skills for the American Workforce in their 2006 report, Tough Choices 
or Tough Times, and by the Skills2Compete campaign.15 Long-term, se-
rious training is markedly different from workforce development of the 
past. As LaLonde concluded in his 1995 review of evaluations of public 
training programs: “The best summary of evidence about the impact of 
past programs is that we got what we paid for . . . Not surprisingly, mod-
est investments usually yield modest gains—too small to have much 
effect on poverty rates” (LaLonde 1995, p. 149).
Wherever possible, classroom instruction is joined with work-based 
learning, combining earning with learning through paid internships, 
apprenticeships, or other hands-on practical experience. This not only 
enhances learning but also gives job seekers early exposure to the types 
of work involved, provides an important technique for engaging em-
ployers, and offers a source of income for households during long-term 
training.
Case/care management is provided through the program to encour-
age completion of training. This includes individual counseling, peer 
group meetings, tuition assistance, and work supports (such as child 
care, transportation, social services, and income supplements). Follow-
through services are available afterward to help ensure retention on the 
job after graduation.
To be sustained, a sectoral workforce program needs to maintain 
good records and build a track record of performance through cred-
ible evaluation of results achieved, producing outcomes for workers, 
employers, and the public. Evaluation not only documents program 
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success to justify continued funding, but also feeds a process of con-
tinuous improvement.
Revitalizing Active Labor-Market Policy in America
Evidence is accumulating to demonstrate that many workforce-
development programs yield strong rates of return to participants, 
employers, and the public (King 2008; King et al. 2008; Smith, King, 
and Schroeder 2007). Yet for decades, workforce development has been 
relegated to a minor role in American economic policy for reasons that 
are now well documented. As noted in this chapter, substantial work 
has been under way in recent years to more closely align economic- and 
workforce-development policy through sectoral strategies and to intro-
duce new organizational forms—workforce intermediaries—that could 
and should raise its profile. Sectoral workforce strategies—bolstered 
through the use of workforce intermediaries and pressing for high skills 
and high wages for all workers, including those who have not had ac-
cess to good opportunities—represent the way forward.
Notwithstanding the deep recession that has been under way since 
2007, there are likely to soon be real opportunities for turning the nation’s 
current workforce-development situation around through such active 
labor-market policies. First, while many older workers may choose to 
work longer to restore the value of their severely depleted retirement 
savings, jobs will open up in the future as the baby boom generation 
begins to retire in large numbers. Second, as the Aspen Institute’s 2003 
report suggested, the United States will face three important gaps in 
the near future: workers, skills, and wages. More effective workforce 
strategies are needed to ensure that workers will be there with the right 
skills to address these gaps as they surface. Third, considerable knowl-
edge and experience have been developed—at all levels—about how to 
connect economic and workforce policies for enhanced, lasting impacts 
that can benefit employers and workers; the result is insight that can 
now be put to use more broadly. Finally, there seems to be a grow-
ing, though grudging, recognition that the labor-market policy mix the 
United States has been content with for years, one tilted heavily toward 
passive rather than active elements, has not worked all that well and that 
new, more active approaches are in order.
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The challenge will be to secure the necessary resources and reach a 
sufficient scale in order to truly make such policies work at the level we 
now need. The sectoral workforce-development approaches outlined 
in this chapter hold enormous promise and would move the United 
States much more toward the active labor-market policy that is sorely 
needed.
Notes
1. Mangum (1976) and Clague and Kramer (1976) document the early history and 
evolution of what were then known as “manpower” policies.
2. In-sourcing involves arranging for previously subcontracted work to be done in-
house, often in a stand-alone facility.
3. For example, Stevens (2001) describes the climbing wall metaphor and discusses 
its implications for workforce-development policy, while the Council for Adult 
and Experiential Learning (2005) outlines the way career lattices are being used in 
designing effective interventions for training and employing nurses.
4. This research is reinforced and expanded upon in a follow-up volume using LEHD 
data by Brown, Haltiwanger, and Lane (2006).
5. Barnow and King (2005) describe the “system” in a report prepared for the Rock-
efeller Institute of Government. Two companion volumes (Rockefeller Institute of 
Government 2004a, b) offer details for the eight states and more than a dozen local 
areas that participated in the field network study, which was funded by the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration and led by the 
Rockefeller Institute of Government.
6. These amounts are derived mainly from the President’s FY 2006 budget request 
and related documents. Kletzer and Koch estimate that, including all active and 
passive labor-market activities, U.S. spending in 2000 amounted to only about 
0.38 percent of gross domestic product.
7. State Unemployment Insurance–funded training programs, their key features, and 
the literature on their effectiveness are reviewed in King and Smith (2007).
8. Federal funds have historically accounted for only about 6–10 percent of total 
Perkins spending. Overall community and technical college spending on workforce- 
related programs is likely to be many times greater than the total shown here.
9. This discussion draws on King (2008).
10. This discussion draws on Glover et al. (2005).
11. The National Economic Development and Law Center has recently been re-
named Insight Center for Community Economic Development. See http://www 
.insightcced.org/.
12. Details of the matching procedure, a variation of “nearest-neighbor” matching, are 
provided in Smith, King, and Schroeder (2008).
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13. Krueger (2003) observed a similar pattern of earnings for similar investments in 
training and workforce services.
14. See http://www.doleta.gov/wired/ for more information.
15. See http:// www.skills2compete.org for more information.
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